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Editorial Note:
The following article by Susan Hurley, “The Shared Circuits Model: How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable
Imitation, Deliberation, and Mindreading,” with its commentaries and response was produced under unusual and sad
circumstances. Susan Hurley passed away in August 2007 following a long struggle with cancer after her target article
had been completed, and the list of those invited to comment had been assembled. Because she had foreseen the need for
help in producing her response to the commentaries, she enlisted Andy Clark, Professor at Edinburgh University, for
this purpose, with BBS’s full encouragement. Julian Kiverstein, another colleague at the University of Edinburgh with par-
ticular interest in the shared circuits model, volunteered to help as well in the composition of the response to commentators.
Commentators were specifically enjoined from writing eulogies and asked to produce the lively intellectual dialogue that
Susan Hurley certainly had sought in sending her work to BBS. Kiverstein and Clark undertook not to emulate a response
from Susan Hurley, but rather to clarify misunderstandings, organize the commentaries thematically, and show where the
research might lead. We are grateful to all commentators, and particularly Kiverstein and Clark, for their graceful
execution of what even in the normal case is a challenging task.
The shared circuits model (SCM):
How control, mirroring, and
simulation can enable imitation,
deliberation, and mindreading
Susan Hurley
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TB, and All Souls
College, Oxford University, Oxford OX1 4AL, United Kingdom
Susan.hurley@bristol.ac.uk
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Abstract: Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role
in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines. Imitation is surveyed in this target article under headings of behavior,
subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed
can be located and explained. The shared circuits model (SCM) explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be
enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring, and simulation. It is cast at a middle, functional level of description, that
is, between the level of neural implementation and the level of conscious perceptions and intentional actions. The SCM connects
shared informational dynamics for perception and action with shared informational dynamics for self and other, while also showing
how the action/perception, self/other, and actual/possible distinctions can be overlaid on these shared informational dynamics. It
avoids the common conception of perception and action as separate and peripheral to central cognition. Rather, it contributes to
the situated cognition movement by showing how mechanisms for perceiving action can be built on those for active perception.
The SCM is developed heuristically, in five layers that can be combined in various ways to frame specific ontogenetic or phylogenetic
hypotheses. The starting point is dynamic online motor control, whereby an organism is closely attuned to its embedding environment
through sensorimotor feedback. Onto this are layered functions of prediction and simulation of feedback, mirroring, simulation of
mirroring, monitored inhibition of motor output, and monitored simulation of input. Finally, monitored simulation of input
specifying possible actions plus inhibited mirroring of such possible actions can generate information about the possible as opposed
to actual instrumental actions of others, and the possible causes and effects of such possible actions, thereby enabling strategic
social deliberation. Multiple instances of such shared circuits structures could be linked into a network permitting decomposition
and recombination of elements, enabling flexible control, imitative learning, understanding of other agents, and instrumental and
strategic deliberation. While more advanced forms of social cognition, which require tracking multiple others and their multiple
possible actions, may depend on interpretative theorizing or language, the SCM shows how layered mechanisms of control,
mirroring, and simulation can enable distinctively human cognitive capacities for imitation, deliberation, and mindreading.
Keywords: action; active perception; control; embodied cognition; imitation; instrumental deliberation; isomorphism; mindreading;
mirroring; mirror neurons; shared circuits; simulation; social cognition
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1. Introduction: From active perception to social
cognition and beyond
Like many today, I view perception as inherently active
(Hurley 1998; Hurley & Noe¨ 2003, O’Regan & Noe¨
2001a; 2001b; Noe¨ 2004) and cognition as embodied and
situated. How does cognition relate to active perception?
This article shows how subpersonal resources for social cog-
nition can be built on those for active perception. Its central
issue is the following: How is it possible to perceive events
as instrumentally structured intentional actions, and to
learn new instrumental actions by means of such percep-
tions of actions? The article shows how the structures and
mechanisms for perceiving action and for situated social
cognition can be built on those for active perception. It
extends my previous contributions to a view of perception
as inherently active and of cognition as embodied and situ-
ated (Hurley 1998; Hurley & Noe¨ 2003).
The classical sandwich conception of the mind –
widespread across philosophy and empirical sciences of
the mind – regards perception as input from world to
mind, action as output from mind to world, and cognition
as sandwiched between. I have argued that the mind isn’t
necessarily structured in this vertically modular way
(Brooks 1999; Hurley 1998). Moreover, there is growing
evidence that it is not actually so structured in specific
domains, where perception and action share dynamic
information-processing resources as embodied agents
interact with their environments, rather than functioning
as separate buffers around domain-general central
cognition.
Rather, cognitive resources and structure can emerge,
layer by layer, from informational dynamics, enabling
both perception and action. Such a horizontally modular
structure can do significant parts (I don’t claim all) of
the work the classical sandwich conception assigned to
central cognition. Here I show how this promise can be
fulfilled for the perception of action and associated social
cognition, as embodied agents interact with their social
environments.
I first review recent work on social cognition, focusing
on imitation (Hurley 2005b; Hurley & Chater 2005a;
2005b). Imitation is still popularly regarded as cognitively
undemanding. However, Thorndike (1898) showed that
many animals can learn through individual trial and
error but not imitatively; scientists regard the later as
more cognitively demanding. Imitative ability is rare
across animal species and linked to characteristically
human capacities: for language, culture, and understanding
other minds (Arbib et al. (2000); Arbib 2005; Arbib &
Rizzolatti 1997; Barkley 2001; Frith & Wolpert 2004;
Gallese 2000; 2001; 2005; Gallese & Goldman 1998; Gallese
et al. 2004; Gordon 1995b; Iacoboni 2005; Meltzoff 2005;
Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998; 1999; Stamenov & Gallese 2002;
Tomasello 1999; Whiten et al. 2005b; Williams et al. 2001).
Imitation is important in adult human sociality, as well as
human development, in ways we’re just beginning to
understand.
Part 1 of this article reviews recent research on imita-
tion, under the headings of behavior, subpersonal mech-
anisms, and functions. Part 2 presents a functional
architecture that shows how subpersonal mechanisms of
control, mirroring, and simulation can enable distinctively
human skills of imitation, deliberation, and action under-
standing. The shared circuits model (SCM) draws together
many threads of work from Part 1. It includes elements
suggested by various researchers, contributes further
elements, and unifies these in a distinctive framework.
SCM aims to show how the following are possible:
SUSAN HURLEY, who passed away in August 2007, had
been Professor and Chair in Philosophy at the University
of Bristol since August 2006 and was also a Fellow of All
Souls College in Oxford. She had served as Professor and
Politics and International Studies affiliate at the Univer-
sity of Warwick for the previous twelve years. Her most
recent research had been in philosophy of psychology
and neuroscience, focusing on consciousness, social cog-
nition (imitation and mindreading), and action (ration-
ality, control, responsibility). She had also worked in
political philosophy and related areas, with a particular
interest in bringing the cognitive and social sciences
into constructive contact. Hurley’s books include
Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1989), Consciousness in Action (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1998), Justice, Luck and Knowledge
(Harvard University Press, 2003), and edited volumes
on the foundations of decision theory, on imitation, on
rationality in animals, and on human rights. Hurley did
her undergraduate work in philosophy at Princeton Uni-
versity and her graduate work in philosophy (a B.Phil.
and a doctorate) at Oxford University. She also earned
a law degree at Harvard University. After four years
(1981–1984) as a Junior Research Fellow at All Souls
College, Oxford, Hurley spent ten years as a Tutorial
Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford, before moving to
Warwick. At the time of her passing, Hurley was one of
the Principal Investigators on a large multicentre
project studying the role of the natural and social
environment in shaping consciousness.
ANDY CLARK is Professor of Philosophy in the School
of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences, at
Edinburgh University in Scotland. He was a close
friend to Susan Hurley, whose ideas concerning mind
and dynamics have had a large influence on his own
work which concerns the nature of mind, and the cog-
nitive role of bodily and environmental structures and
processes. He is the author of several books including
Being There: Putting Brain, Body And World Together
Again (MIT Press, 1997), Natural-Born Cyborgs:
Minds, Technologies And The Future Of Human Intel-
ligence (Oxford University Press, 2003) and Supersiz-
ing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive
Extension (forthcoming with Oxford University Press).
JULIAN KIVERSTEIN is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow
in the Department of Philosophy at the University
Edinburgh working as part of the collaborative
research project CONTACT – Consciousness in Inter-
action. CONTACT is a part of the EUROCORES
program, Consciousness in the Natural and Cultural
Context, which will run from 2006 to 2009. Susan
Hurley was a Principle Investigator of the CONTACT
group based at Bristol University. Kiverstein and
Hurley were just beginning to collaborate on a
project investigating the relationship between social
cognition and consciousness using the shared circuits
model, one of the many applications of shared circuits
Hurley had planned to explore. Kiverstein plans to
complete this work as part of postdoctoral research.
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1. Building subpersonal informational resources for
situated social cognition on those for active perception,
while
2. Uniting a large body of evidence and theorizing in a
common framework;
3. Avoiding the “classical sandwich”; and
4. Respecting the personal/subpersonal distinction and
avoiding interlevel isomorphism assumptions.
Philosophers distinguish descriptions of contentful
actions and mental states of persons from subpersonal
(informational or neural) descriptions (Bermudez 2000;
2003; Dennett 1969; 1991; Elton 2000; Hornsby 2000;
McDowell 1994). At the subpersonal level of description,
information is processed and the cycling of causes and
effects knits actively embodied nervous systems into
environments they interact with.1 But these processes
are not correctly attributed to persons. Persons see trees,
make friends, look through microscopes, vote, want to
be millionaires. Subpersonal informational and causal the-
ories explain how personal-level phenomena become pos-
sible – are enabled – but need not share structure with
personal-level descriptions of processes as rational or con-
scious.2 I distinguish three levels of description: the per-
sonal level, the informational/functional subpersonal
level, and the neural subpersonal level.
Two questions arise about personal/subpersonal
relations: (1) How are specific personal-level capacities
actually enabled by subpersonal processes? (2) What
kinds of subpersonal processes could possibly do the
enabling work? For example, must there be isomorphism
between levels? Views about question 2 can influence
answers to question 1.
SCM addresses question 2 for social cognition by using
subpersonal resources from an active perception
approach. SCM is cast at the subpersonal functional
level, not the personal or the neural levels, though it
aims both to show how certain personal-level capacities
can be informationally enabled and to raise empirical
questions about neural implementation. Since SCM
addresses the “how possibly?” rather than the “how actu-
ally?” question, it provides a higher-order theoretical
model. But it also provides generic heuristic resources
for framing specific first-order hypotheses and predictions
about specific ontogenetic or phylogenetic stages. Its five
layers, detailed below, can be re-ordered in formulating
specific first-order hypotheses.
SCM’s central hypothesis is that associations underwrit-
ing predictive simulation of effects of an agent’s own
movement, for instrumental control functions, can also
yield mirroring and “reverse” simulation of similar per-
ceived movements by others. Mirroring allows ends/
means associations with instrumental control functions to
be accessed for simulative functions bilaterally, so causes
of observed movements can be simulated, as well as
effects of intended acts. Such bilaterally accessible simu-
lations of instrumental structure can provide enabling
information for deliberation, imitation, and understanding
the instrumental acts of others. Shared dynamics for action
and perception can provide the foundations of shared
dynamics for self and other, and of the self/other and
actual/possible distinctions characteristic of human
cognition.
Simulation has a generic sense throughout, including,
but broader than, that in simulationist theories of
mindreading (Gallese 2003; see Goldman 1989; 1992 on
process-driven simulation). Simulation uses certain pro-
cesses to generate related information, rather than theoriz-
ing about them in separate meta-processes. Effects or
causes can be simulated, online or offline. Simulation
can be subpersonal or personal; in SCM it is subpersonal.
Subpersonal processes that predict results of movement
online can also generate information about results of poss-
ible movements offline. Subpersonal mirroring that
enables copying can also generate information covertly
about observed movements or their goals, without overt
copying (cf. Barkley [2001] on executive functions as
covert behavior).
2. Part 1. Review
I begin in Part 1 by reviewing recent work, strands of
which are knitted together by SCM in Part 2.
2.1. Behavior
Imitative learning is a sophisticated form of social cogni-
tion. It requires copying in a generic sense: Perception
of behavior causes similar behavior by an observer, and
the similarity plays a role – not necessarily conscious-
ly – in generating the observer’s behavior. True imitation,
restrictively understood, requires novel action learned by
observing another do it, plus instrumental or means/
ends structure: the other’s means of achieving her goal is
copied, not just her goal or just her movements. The
concept of true imitation is contested, given the different
aims and methodologies of imitation researchers (Byrne
2005; Heyes 1996; 2001; Rizzolatti 2005).
Other forms of social learning can seem similar to imita-
tion, but should be distinguished. In stimulus enhance-
ment, another’s action draws your attention to a
stimulus, which triggers an innate or previously learned
response; but a novel action isn’t learned directly from
observation. Bird A’s pecking may draw bird B’s attention
to a food, which evokes pecking in bird B. In goal emula-
tion,3 you observe another achieving a goal by certain
means, find that goal attractive, and try to achieve it your-
self. Monkey A may use a tool in a certain way to obtain an
attractive object, leading monkey B to acquire the goal of
obtaining a similar object. Through his own trials and
errors, monkey B may arrive at the same type of tool use
to obtain the object. Emulation is found in macaques,
who have not shown imitative learning. In movement
priming, bodily movements are copied, but not as
learned means to a goal. Primed movements can be
innate, as in contagious yawning.
Goal emulation and movement priming provide the
ends-and-means components of full-fledged imitation.
Ends and means can be relatively distal or proximal; the
distinction is relative, not absolute. Misunderstandings
can result concerning whether ends, means, or both are
copied and hence whether imitation or emulation is
present (Voelkl & Huber 2000, pp. 196, 201). A movement
can be the proximal means to a bodily posture, which is
regarded as the proximal end of the movement (Graziano
et al. 2002, pp. 354–55), but posture can also be a means
to more distal ends – effects on objects or others in social
groups. Complex imitation can involve structured
Hurley: The shared circuits model
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sequences or hierarchies of ends–means relations: acquir-
ing a goal, learning to achieve it via subgoals, and so on.
How are these forms of copying distributed across
animals, children, and adults? Stimulus enhancement,
goal emulation, and movement priming are certainly
found in nonhuman animals. But careful experiments are
needed to distinguish these from imitation proper and
obtain evidence of the latter. The two-action paradigm
has been the tool of choice. Suppose two demonstrators
obtain an attractive result by two different means:
One group of animals observes one demonstrator, and
the other observes the other demonstrator. Will the
observer animals tend differentially to copy the specific
method they have seen demonstrated? If not – if the
animals’ choices of method do not reflect the specific
method they have observed, say, because both groups con-
verge on one method – they may be displaying stimulus
enhancement or goal emulation plus trial-and-error learn-
ing, but not imitative learning. Even if they do
differentially display the behavior demonstrated, this
may be merely movement priming if the behavior is
already in their repertoire. But if the behavior is differen-
tially used in a new way to achieve a result, it expresses imi-
tative learning (Call & Tomasello 1994; Nagell et al. 1993;
Voelkl & Huber 2000).
The difference between copying ends and copying
means is important for theorizing the phylogeny of imita-
tion and action understanding. (Action understanding is
short for understanding observed behavior as goal-
directed action.) Is action understanding phylogenetically
prior to imitation? This view seems to face an objection:
Some animals copy movements (schooling fish), though
we don’t think they understand the others’ actions.
A response to this objection distinguishes movement
copying from mirroring of goals (Rizzolatti 2005) and
both from imitation. Movement copying may precede
action understanding, whereas action understanding may
require goal mirroring, but precede imitation. True imita-
tion involves something phylogenetically rare: the flexible
interplay of copying ends and copying means; a given
movement can be used for different ends and a given
end pursued by various means (Barkley 2001, p. 8;
Tomasello 1999). This is something humans are distinc-
tively good at.
It is difficult to find evidence of true imitation in nonhu-
man animals (Byrne 1995; Galef 1988; 1998; 2005; Heyes &
Galef 1996; Tomasello 1996; Tomasello & Call 1997;
Voelkl & Huber 2000; Zentall 2001). Early work with
chimps seems to reveal imitation, but critics have chal-
lenged this interpretation effectively; the results of sub-
sequent experiments were negative for chimp imitation.
Skeptics about nonhuman imitation long had the upper
hand; for example, Tomasello et al. (1993) found no con-
vincing evidence of nonhuman imitative learning. They
proposed that understanding behavior as intentional dis-
tinguishes human from nonhuman social learning. On
this view, humans can imitate observed means or choose
other means to emulate observed goals. Other animals
don’t distinguish means and goals this way; rather, they
copy movements without understanding their relevance
to goals, or learn about the affordances of objects by
observing action on them. In neither case, it was
claimed, do other animals learn about the intentional,
means/end structure of observed action.
Many skeptics have now been won over by work on imi-
tation in great apes and monkeys (Voelkl & Huber 2000;
Whiten et al. 2005b), dolphins (Herman 2002), and birds
(Akins & Zentall 1996; 1998; Akins et al. 2002; Hunt &
Gray 2003; Pepperberg 1999; 2002; 2005; Weir et al.
2002). Continuities are described along a spectrum from
the capacities of other social animals to human socio-
cognitive capacities (Arbib 2005; Tomasello 1999). For
example, innovative experiments extend the two-action
method by using “artificial fruits” that can be opened in
different ways to obtain a treat: Chimps tend to imitate
for one aspect of a demonstrated task and emulate for
another aspect, whereas children tend to imitate both
aspects, even when the method imitated is inefficient.
These and other experiments suggest that chimps imitate
more selectively than children (Whiten 2002; Whiten
et al. 1996; 2005b; see also Call & Tomasello 1994; Galef
2005; Harris & Want 2005; Heyes 1998; Nagell et al.
1993; Tomasello & Carpenter 2005).
Children have been called “imitation machines”
(Tomasello 1999, p. 159). They don’t always imitate unse-
lectively and sometimes emulate goals instead (Gergely
et al. 2002), but they have a greater tendency than
chimps to imitate rather than emulate when the method
demonstrated is transparently inefficient or futile
(Tomasello 1999, pp. 29–30). After seeing a demonstrator
use a rake inefficiently, prongs down, to pull in a treat,
2-year-old children do the same; they almost never turn
the rake over to use more efficiently, edge down. By con-
trast, chimps given a parallel demonstration, tend to try
turning the rake over (Nagell et al. 1993).4 The differential
tendency of children and chimps to imitate suggests an
interplay of biological and cultural influences, with a role
for innate endowment enabling human imitation
(perhaps a matter of articulated relations among multiple
mirror subsystems, enabling recombinant structure in
social learning, rather than the presence versus absence
of a mirror system at all; see discussion of mechanisms
in sect. 2.2).
Imitative and related behaviors appear throughout
human development (Meltzoff 1988a; 1990; 1995; 1996;
2002a; 2002b; 2005; Meltzoff & Moore 1977; 1983a;
1983b; 1989; 1997; 1999; 2000). Infants younger than
1 month of age appear to copy facial gestures. By 14
months, infants imitate a novel act a week later: They
turn on a light by touching a touch-sensitive panel with
their forehead instead of their hand, differentially
copying the novel means demonstrated, as well as the
result (Meltzoff 1988a; 2005; cf. Gergely et al. 2002).
They don’t turn the light on in this odd way unless they
have seen it demonstrated. By 15 to 18 months, infants
recognize the underlying goal of an unsuccessful act they
observe, and produce it: After seeing an adult try but fail
to pull a dumbbell apart in her hands, they succeed in
pulling it apart using knees and hands. But they don’t
pick up goals from failed “attempts” involving similar
movements by inanimate devices, thus apparently discri-
minating agents from non-agents (Meltzoff 1988a; 1995;
1996; 2005; Meltzoff & Moore 1977; 1999; Tomasello &
Carpenter 2005). Children’s perception of behavior
tends to be enacted automatically in similar behavior,
unless actively inhibited; but frontal inhibitory functions
are not well developed in young children (Barkley 2001,
pp. 5, 22; Kinsbourne 2005; Preston & deWaal 2002, p. 5).
Hurley: The shared circuits model
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Adult “imitation syndrome” patients with frontal brain
lesions also imitate uninhibitedly (Barkley 2001, p. 15;
Frith 1992, pp. 85–86; Lhermitte 1983; 1986; Lhermitte
et al. 1986, p. 330). They persistently copy the exper-
imenter’s gestures, though not asked to, even when
these are socially unacceptable or odd, such as putting
on eyeglasses when already wearing glasses.
But the human copying tendency isn’t confined to the
young or brain damaged! Normal adults can usually
inhibit overt imitation selectively, which is evidently adap-
tive, but their underlying tendency to copy is readily
revealed or released. Overt imitation is the disinhibited
tip of the iceberg of continual covert imitation (Barkley
2001; Dijksterhuis 2005). Experiments show how action
is modulated or induced by perception of similar action
(Brass et al. 2001; Prinz 2002). Imitative tasks have
shorter reaction times than nonimitative tasks; gestures
are faster when participants are primed by perceiving
similar gestures or their results or goals – even when
primes are logically irrelevant to the task (W. Prinz
2005). Similarity between stimulus and response also
affects which response is made. Normal adults, instructed
to point to their nose when they hear “Nose!” and to a
lamp when they hear “Lamp,” performed perfectly while
watching the experimenter demonstrate the required per-
formance, but made mistakes when watching the exper-
imenter doing something else: they tended to copy what
they saw done rather than to follow instructions
(Eidelberg 1929; Prinz 1990). Movements can be induced
by actions you actually perceive or by actions you would
like to perceive – as when moviegoers or sports fans in
their seats make movements they would like to see
(W. Prinz 2005). Visually or verbally represented, as well
as observed, actions can induce similar actions.
It is helpful to distinguish copying of specific behaviors
from chameleon effects, where complex patterns of beha-
vior are induced – a relevant kind of copying, if not
strict imitation. In an experiment involving specific beha-
viors, when normal adults interact in an unrelated task
with someone rubbing her foot, they rub their own feet
significantly more. Transferred to another partner who
touches his face, they touch their own faces instead. Dem-
onstrations of chameleon effects show that exposure to
traits and stereotypes automatically elicits general patterns
of behavior and attitude and influences how behavior is
performed (Bargh 1999; 2005; Bargh & Chartrand 1999;
Bargh et al. 1996; 2001; Chartrand & Bargh 1999;
Chartrand et al. 2005; Dijksterhuis & Bargh 2001).
Normal adults primed with stimuli associated with traits
(e.g., hostility, rudeness, politeness) or stereotypes (e.g.,
elderly persons, college professors, soccer hooligans)
tend to behave in accordance with the primed traits or
stereotypes. For example, hostility-primed participants
deliver more intense “shocks” than control participants
in subsequent, ostensibly unrelated experiments based
on Milgram’s (1963) classic shock experiments. Priming
can also affect intellectual performance: College pro-
fessor–primed participants perform better and soccer
hooligan–primed participants perform worse than con-
trols on a subsequent, ostensibly unrelated general
knowledge test (Dijksterhuis 2005; Dijksterhuis & van
Knippenberg 1998).
Such priming results are robust across a wide range of
verbal and visual primes and induced behavior, using
dozens of stereotypes and general traits, and various
priming methods, including primes perceived consciously
and subliminally. Whether subjects perceive primes
consciously or not, they are unaware of any influence or
correlation between primes and their behavior. These
influences are rapid, automatic, and unconscious, apply
both to goals and means, and don’t depend on subjects’
volition or having independent goals that would rationalize
their primed behavior.
Copying, at various levels of generality, is thus a default
social behavior for normal human adults; it requires
specific overriding or inhibition (Barkley 2001, p. 22;
Dijksterhuis 2005; Preston & de Waal 2002). Just thinking
about or perceiving action automatically increases, in ways
participants are unaware of, the likelihood that they will
perform similar actions themselves. Nevertheless, these
influences are often inhibited, as when goals make con-
flicting demands: elderly–primed participants tend to
walk more slowly, but not if they have independent
reasons to hurry.
2.2. Mechanisms
Copying perceived behavior seems to pose a correspon-
dence problem (Nehaniv & Dautenhahn 2002): How is
another’s observed action translated into the observer’s
similar performance? When I copy your hand movements,
I can see my own hands, though my visual perspectives on
the two movements are different. But when I copy your
facial expressions, I cannot see my own face. What infor-
mation and mechanisms are needed to map perception
to similar behavior?
Evidence that newborns copy facial gestures, though
they cannot see their own faces, suggests innate supramo-
dal correspondences between action and perception of
similar action (Meltzoff 1988a; 1990; 1995; 1996; 2002a;
2002b; 2005; Meltzoff & Moore 1977; 1983a; 1983b;
1989; 1997; 1999; 2000). Although further correspon-
dences could be acquired as imitative abilities develop,
skeptics about newborn copying can also be skeptical
about the need to postulate any innate correspondences
(Anisfeld 1979; 1984; 1991; 1996; 2005; Anisfeld et al.
2001; Heyes 2005).
Heyes, who is one such skeptic, argues that sensorimo-
tor associations subserving copying can be acquired
through general-purpose associative learning mechanisms
whereby neurons that fire together wire together. Direct
sensorimotor associations between motor output and
sensory feedback could result from watching one’s own
hand gestures. An indirect route is needed when the
agent cannot perceive her own actions, as in facial
expressions: The sensorimotor association could be
mediated by environmental items such as mirrors, action
words, or stimuli that evoke similar behavior in the actor
and in other agents the actor observes. Moreover, adults
commonly copy infants, performing the associative func-
tion of a mirror. When baby smiles and father smiles
back, baby’s motor output is associated with sensory
input from father’s smile (Heyes 2005, p. 161; Preston &
deWaal 2002, p. 8). Imitation can thus develop from inter-
actions between organisms with associative learning mech-
anisms and certain cultural environments (see Heyes
2001; 2005; see also SCM, Layer 3 in sect. 3.3 here).
Hurley: The shared circuits model
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Common coding for perception and action has been
postulated to explain human copying tendencies. On this
view, perception and action share subpersonal processes
carrying information about (“coding for”) what is perceived
or intended, in which perception and action are not distin-
guished. The differentiation between perception and
action is overlaid on those shared resources, so that they
are informationally interdependent at a basic level. If
capacities X and Y share an information space, their com-
monality is informationally prior to their differentiation.
Meltzoff and Moore (1997) postulate common coding of
perception and action in explaining infant imitation: pro-
prioceptive feedback is compared to an observed target
act, where these are coded in common, supramodal
terms. Innate common coding could initially be for
relations among, say, lips and tongue; more dynamic,
complex, and abstract common coding could develop
with experience of body babbling. Common coding
might also be acquired as in Heyes’s (2005) model.
Wolfgang Prinz (1984; 2005; cf. Bekkering &
Wohlschla¨ger (2002); Preston & de Waal 2002, pp. 4ff.,
9–10) appeals to common coding of perception and
action to explain the normal adult tendency to imitate
and the reaction-time advantage of imitative tasks.
Common coding facilitates imitation, avoiding the corre-
spondence problem and any need for translation
between unrelated input and output codes to solve it.
Prinz associates common coding with what William
James called ideomotor theory, on which every represen-
tation of movement awakes in some degree the movement
it represents (Brass 1999; Prinz 1987). Perceiving
another’s observed movement tends inherently to
produce similar movement by the observer, and primes
similar movement even when it doesn’t break through
overtly. Regular concurrence of action with perceived
effects allows prediction of an action’s effects and selection
of action, given an intention to produce certain effects
(Greenwald 1970; 1972). Thus, representation of an
action’s regular result, whether proximal or distal, can
evoke similar action, in the absence of inhibition.
Other sources also support the view that perception and
action share processing resources. Observing an action
primes the very muscles needed to perform the same
action (Craighero et al. 2002; Fadiga et al. 1995; 2002).
Watching an action sequence speeds the observer’s per-
formance of that sequence; merely imagining a skilled
performance, in sport or music, improves performance – is
a way of practicing – as many athletes and musicians know
(Jeannerod 1997, pp. 117, 119–22; Pascual-Leone 2001).
Similar points concern perception and experience of
emotion: Gordon argues that a special containing mechan-
ism, which isn’t fail-safe, is needed to keep emotion recog-
nition from producing emotional contagion. On his
simulationist theory, only a thin line separates one’s own
mental life from one’s representation of another’s; offline
representations of others tend inherently to go online
(Gordon 1995b; cf. Adolphs 2002; Preston & deWaal 2002).
Common coding theories characterize subpersonal
architectures for copying functionally. What neural pro-
cesses might implement such functional architectures?
Certain neurons directly link perception and action:
their firing correlates with specific perceptions and
specific actions. Canonical neurons (Gallese 2005;
Rizzolatti 2005) reflect affordances (Iacoboni 2005; Miall
2003): They fire when an animal perceives an object that
affords a certain type of action and when the animal per-
forms the afforded action. Mirror neurons fire when an
animal perceives another agent performing a type of
action, and also when the animal performs that type of
action itself; they don’t distinguish own action from
others’ similar actions (see SCM, Layer 3 in sect. 3.3).
Some fire, for example, when a monkey sees the exper-
imenter bring food to her own mouth with her hand or
when the monkey brings food to his own mouth with his
hand (even in the dark, so the monkey cannot see his
hand). Specificity of tuning varies.
How mirror neurons relate to imitation is of much
current interest (e.g., see Frith & Wolpert 2004; Rizzolatti
et al. 2002; Williams et al. 2001). It may be tempting to
think they avoid correspondence problems, thus facilitat-
ing imitation: If the same neurons code for perceived
action and similar performance, no translation is needed.
But things are not so simple. Rizzolatti, one of the disco-
verers of mirror neurons, holds that imitation requires
both the ability to understand another’s action and the
ability to replicate it. On his view, recall, action under-
standing precedes imitation phylogenetically; action
understanding is subserved by mirror systems, which
might be necessary, but are not sufficient, for imitation.
Rizzolatti (2005) suggests that the motor resonance set
up by mirror neurons makes action observation meaning-
ful by linking it to the observer’s own potential actions.
Mirror neurons were discovered by single-cell record-
ing in macaques (Di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Rizzolatti
et al. 1988; 1995), which can emulate but have not been
shown to imitate in a strict sense (cf. Voelkl & Huber
[2000] on marmoset imitation). Evidence for human
mirror systems (Craighero et al. 2002; Decety &
Chaminade 2005; Decety et al. 1997; Fadiga et al. 2002;
Hari et al. 1998; Iacoboni et al. 2005; Rizzolatti et al.
1996; Ruby & Decety 2001) includes brain imaging and
demonstrations that observing another person move
primes the muscles needed to move in a similar manner
(whether or not movements are goal directed; Fadiga
et al. 1995).
Rizzolatti (2005) describes mirror neurons in monkey
frontal brain area F5 as part of a circuit including parietal
area PF and visual area STS (superior temporal sulcus).
He regards a similar human brain circuit as a control
system: Sensory results associated with certain movements
are compared in PF to observed target movements,
enabling imitative learning (cf. Iacoboni 2005, with
regard to locating the comparator in STS). Differently
structured mirror systems may explain different copying
capacities across species. In monkeys, mirror neurons
appear to code for the goals or results of performed or
observed actions.5 By contrast, human mirror systems
include specific movements that can be means to achiev-
ing goals (Fadiga et al. 1995). Recall how the difference
between mirroring ends versus means of action matters
for the view that action understanding precedes imitation
phylogenetically. If seeing someone reach for an apple
produces motor activation associated with the same goal
in the observer (though not necessarily with the same
movements in the observer), that could provide infor-
mation about the observed action’s goal directness. But
it wouldn’t provide information about how to achieve the
goal by means of the observed movements, as in imitation.
Hurley: The shared circuits model
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Brain imaging suggests a division of labor in the human
mirror system: Its frontal regions tend to code for goals of
action, whereas its parietal regions tend to code for means
(i.e., movements; Iacoboni 2005). (Monkey parietal mirror
neurons seem to be goal–related; Fogassi et al. 2005;
Nakahara & Miyashita 2005.) One theory of how this div-
ision of labor enables imitation relates signals generated by
these brain regions to comparator circuits for instrumental
motor control combining inverse and forward models.
Inverse models estimate the motor plan needed to
achieve a goal in a given context. They can be adjusted
by comparison with real motor feedback, but this is slow.
It is often more efficient to use real feedback to train
forward models, which anticipate the sensory effects of
motor plans, associating action with its perceived results
(as do mirror neurons). Forward models combine with
inverse models to control goal-directed behavior more effi-
ciently. Forward models can predict the results of imita-
tive motor plans for comparison to observed action, and
motor plans can be adjusted until a match obtains
(Flanagan et al. 2003; Iacoboni 2005; Miall 2003;
Wolpert et al. 2003).
Thus, mirror neurons are arguably part of the neural
basis for true imitation, though not sufficient for it.
Monkey mirror neurons code for ends rather than
means. Human mirror systems, by contrast, have articu-
lated structure: some regions code for goals, whereas
others code for specific movements that are means to
goals. It has been suggested that human mirror systems
enable imitation (not just emulation) because they code
for means as well as ends (unlike the macaque’s system),
and that mirror neurons contribute predictive forward
models to subpersonal comparator control circuits.
2.3. Functions
Human brains differ most from chimp brains in expanded
areas around the Sylvian fissure which subserve imitation,
language, and action understanding – where many mirror
neurons are found (Iacoboni 2005). Can mirror systems
illuminate the functions of imitation in relation to distinc-
tively human capacities – for language, or for identifying
with others and understanding the mental states motivat-
ing their actions? The relationships among capacities for
imitation, language, and mindreading are important for
understanding phylogeny and human development. Does
development of either language or mindreading depend
on imitation? If so, at what levels of description and in
what senses of “depend”? Or does dependence run the
other way? Or both ways, dynamically? Answers may
differ for language and for mindreading. Issues about
relations between imitation and mindreading entwine
with issues about whether mindreading is best understood
as theorizing about other minds or as simulating them.
I shall survey some hypothesized functions of imitation
in language, cultural evolution, cooperation, and mind-
reading. The first three topics, discussed briefly, provide
context for SCM and illustrate its broader relevance to
understanding what is distinctive about human minds.
Mindreading is directly related to SCM and so is discussed
more fully.
2.3.1. Language. It has been suggested that “mirror
neurons could . . . be an important neural stepping stone . . .
to spoken language” (Miall 2003, p. 1). Mirror systems
for action goals include Broca’s area,6 a main language
area of human brains, which is active during imitative
tasks. Moreover, transient virtual “lesions” to Broca’s
created by transcranial magnetic stimulation interfere
with imitative tasks (Heiser et al. 2003; Iacoboni 2005).
Nativism about language might view Broca’s as the best
candidate for an innate language module (M. Iacoboni,
in discussion). But discovery that Broca’s subserves
mirror systems and has some role in enabling imitation
has generated new arguments about how language acqui-
sition could build on capacities for action understanding
and imitation, in either evolutionary or developmental
time frames, exploiting imitative learning rather than, or
in addition to, innate linguistic knowledge (Arbib 2005;
Arbib & Rizzolatti 1997; Iacoboni 2005; Rizzolatti &
Arbib 1998; 1999; Stamenov & Gallese 2002). (On
language and social learning, see Baldwin 1995; Barkley
2001; Christiansen 1994; 2005; Christiansen & Kirby
2003; Deacon 1997; on establishing shared reference to
objects through joint attention, via gaze following and
role-reversal imitation, see Tomasello 1999.)
What features of imitation and human mirror systems
might language build on? First, I suggest, flexible articu-
lated relations between means and ends in imitative learn-
ing could be an evolutionary precursor of arbitrary
relations between symbols and referents. Decoupling a
particular bodily movement from a given result and treat-
ing it as a potential means to various possible results in
varying circumstances (see SCM, Layers 2 plus 4, in
sects. 3.2 and 3.4) may be a step toward treating it as
lacking an intrinsic function and so available for an arbitra-
rily or conventionally assigned communicative function.
Second, mirror systems provide a common code for
actions of self and other, and thus for language production
and perception; by enabling intersubjective action under-
standing, mirror systems may be the basis for the intersub-
jective parity, or sharing of meaning, essential to language
(Arbib 2005; Iacoboni 2005).
Third, the flexible recombinant structure of ends and
means in imitation may be a precursor of recombinant
grammatical structure in language (Arbib 2005). The
latter may result when creatures with recombinant imita-
tive skills learn to pursue their goals by recombinant
manipulation of external symbols.
Fourth, finding recombinant units of action in streams
of bodily movement has parallels with finding linguistic
units (e.g., words) in continuous acoustic streams of
speech (Byrne 2005). The modular structure of skilled
action facilitates flexible recombination. Patterns of
action organization could be learned in program-level
imitation,7 despite variation in implementational details,
by using mirror mechanisms plus mechanisms for
parsing behavior modules. Behavior parsing and the
recombinant structure of program-level imitation may be
precursors of human capacities to perceive underlying
structures of intentions or causes in the surface flux of
experience – and perhaps of syntactic parsing and the
recombinant structure of language.
2.3.2. Cultural evolution. A more fundamental question
is: Why might evolution favor neural structures that
enable various forms of copying to begin with? Suppose
individuals vary in behavioral traits that are not genetically
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heritable, so some reproduce more successfully than
others. Their offspring may benefit by acquiring behaviors
from their successful parents by copying, as well as geneti-
cally. By copying reproductively successful parents, off-
spring can acquire nonheritable behaviors associated
with appropriate environmental conditions. If individual
learning is costly, copying may contribute more to
genetic fitness.
If true imitation requires mirror circuits for means and
ends to be linked in ways that give social learning recom-
binant flexibility, it should be harder to evolve than move-
ment priming or emulation. And, indeed, it is found in
fewer species. But wouldn’t this rare development from
other forms of copying to imitation be maladaptive?
Recall the short-term disadvantage of children compared
to chimps in two-action paradigms: Children have a
greater tendency to imitate even inefficient models,
whereas chimps have a greater tendency to emulate and
find more efficient means to attractive goals (Nagell
et al. 2003; Whiten et al. 2005b). Despite this, could the
stronger imitative tendency be adaptive long-term?
Yes: via the ratchet effect (Tomasello 1999). Gifted or
lucky individuals may discover efficient new means to
goals – means that are not readily rediscoverable by inde-
pendent trial-and-error learning. These would be lost
without recombinant imitative learning, which preserves
and disseminates valuable instrumental innovations, pro-
viding a platform for further innovation. Once imitation
evolves genetically, it provides a mechanism of cultural
and technological transmission, accumulation, and evol-
ution. The effects of imitative copying and selection inter-
twine with those of genetic copying and selection; culture
and life coevolve (see and cf. Baldwin 1896; Barkley 2001,
p. 21; Blackmore 1999; 2000; 2001; Boyd & Richerson
1982; 1985; Dawkins 1976/1989; Deacon 1997; Dennett
1995; Gil-White 2005; Henrich & Boyd 1998; Henrich &
Gil-White 2001; Hurley & Chater 2005a, part 4).
The capacity for selective imitation may have an import-
ant role in underwriting the ratchet effect (Harris & Want
2005). Imitation with selective inhibition has the advan-
tages of theft over honest toil: Instead of letting hypotheses
die in his stead, a selective imitator lets others die in his
stead, reaping the benefits of success without unusual
native wit while avoiding the costs of trial and error. Imi-
tative social environments may in turn generate pressure
to prevent successful techniques being appropriated cost
free by competitors, resulting in capacities for covert or
simulated action, shielded from potential imitative theft
(Barkley 2001, pp. 9, 18–21).
2.3.3. Cooperation. As well as being subject to automatic
copying influences, humans often deliberately select
a behavior pattern to imitate because it is associated
with certain traits or stereotypes, even if they themselves
don’t exemplify these traits or stereotypes. This can be
benign and contribute to moral development (J. Prinz
2005); perhaps I can become virtuous, as Aristotle
suggested, by behaving like a virtuous person.
But, like automatic copying, deliberate selective
imitation does not always operate benignly. Selective imi-
tation can provide “Machiavellian” social advantages
(Byrne & Whiten 1988; Whiten & Byrne 1997). It can
steal not only instrumental successes but also cooperative
benefits from competitors. Suppose information about the
mental states of others is not transparently available.
A cooperative group can share certain behaviors by
which members identify one another, obtain cooperative
benefits, and exclude free-riding noncooperators. Coop-
erators may copy such identifying behaviors from other
cooperators.
Noncooperators could invade such a cooperative group
by selectively copying its identifying behaviors. They could
thus induce cooperation from group members while
failing to cooperate in return, deceptively obtaining coop-
erative benefits without paying the costs. Free riding via
deceptive copying partially appropriates cooperative
benefits based on in-group behavioral copying. While
greenbeard genes could produce genetically determined
analogues of such free riding (Dawkins 1982, p. 149),
selective copying provides the evolutionary advantages of
flexible free riding, which is not dependent on genes for
specific behaviors.
How can cooperative benefits be defended against free
riding through deceptive copying? An arms race between
behavioral signaling and deceptive copying in cooperative
games arguably produces pressure for imitative and mind-
reading abilities. As a result, certain solutions to coopera-
tive games, which require mindreading rather than mere
behavior prediction, may become available. Mindreading
can be based on behavioral evidence yet still have func-
tional advantages over behavior prediction (Hurley
2005a).
To elaborate: To counter invasion by increasingly soph-
isticated deceptive mimics, mutual recognition processes
among cooperators would move progressively further
from copying and detecting superficial behaviors and
toward more subtle and covert imitation and detection
of underlying mental causes of behavior. Mere behavior
reading would move toward ever-smarter reading of beha-
vioral evidence for intentions. Mere copying would in turn
become more creative and flexible, with means/ends
structure: imitation. This arms race could produce
capacities for mindreading and intersubjective identifi-
cation via covert mirroring, albeit based on subtle beha-
vioral perceptions (cf. Krebs & Dawkins 1984).
The advance from cooperation plus deceptive copying
via imitation to mindreading is significant for enabling
cooperation and obtaining its benefits. Certain solutions
to collective action problems effectively require recogniz-
ing and identify with others’ mental states. A simple
self-referential mirror heuristic8 for non-iterated Prison-
ers’ Dilemmas (PDs) says: cooperate only with any
others you meet who act on this same rule (Howard’s
mirror strategy [Howard 1988]; Danielson’s self-same
cooperation [Danielson 1991; 19929). When another
player doesn’t share your mirror heuristic, you don’t
cooperate with him. Famously, Tit-for-Tat can outperform
Defection in iterated PDs, where given players meet
repeatedly; but mirror heuristics outperform Defection
even in non-iterated PDs, where given players don’t
meet again.10
Mirror heuristics effectively require mindreading: dis-
covering another player’s intention, not simply predicting
his behavior (Danielson 1992, pp. 75–82; Schmitt &
Grammar 1997).11 They are conditional metaheuristics:
they explicitly condition cooperation on the other’s operat-
ive heuristic itself, not on his predicted behavior. (Tit-for-
Tat requires not mindreading but memory of a given
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player’s behavior in past games.) Employing a mirror
heuristic requires discerning, more or less reliably,
whether others are operating on a mirror heuristic – a
general intention or rule of choice. Which choices mir-
rorers should make are not determined by predicting
what others will do; mirrorers need to know whether
others have the intentions of a mirrorer before they can
determine what to do. Participants in mirror-based
cooperation must not only be mindreaders, but also be
able to identify, more or less reliably, other mindreaders.
In non-iterated games, the mindreader has not pre-
viously played with the player she is mindreading, so
cannot refer to memories of their past play. In informa-
tionally clouded social environments, mindreading is
based on evidence from observing behavior, which may
be subtle and/or deceptive. But mindreading need not
be foolproof to provide mirror-based cooperative benefits
to individual mirrorers and groups of them; the benefits
would vary with the accuracy of mindreading (cf. Danielson
1992, pp. 157ff.).
What is the difference between genuine mindreading
and mere smart behavior reading? Many social problems
that animals face can be solved via behavior-circumstance
correlations and behavioral predictions, without postulat-
ing mediating mental states. What problem-solving press-
ures are addressed by additionally attributing mental
states to explain observed behavior? (Cf. Call & Tomasello
1999; Hare et al. 2000; 2001; Heyes 1998; Heyes &
Dickinson 1993; Hurley 2006b; Povinelli 1996; Povinelli
& Vonk 2006; Sterelny 2003, pp. 67ff.; Tomasello & Call
2006; Whiten 1996; 1997.)
Mental state attributions may support more flexible
behavior prediction in novel conditions. But mirror meta-
heuristics show that mindreading’s function in enabling
cooperation goes beyond providing better predictions of
behavior. As explained, mirror metaheuristics do not
require predicting other players’ behavior per se, but
rather, ascertaining the heuristic they use. Such mindread-
ing may be done by observing others’ behavior, but that
does not mean that its function is only behavior prediction,
or that it has the same functions as behavior prediction.
Mindreading can function to enable cooperation in a way
that merely predicting behavior cannot (Danielson 1992,
p. 82), even if mindreading is based on behavioral evi-
dence. This is why the emergence of mindreading, via imi-
tation, from an arms race between cooperative and
deceptive copying is significant for enabling cooperation.
2.3.4. Mindreading. What more can be said about the
possible functions of imitation in relation to mindreading?
Human mirror systems may be part of the mechanisms
for understanding observed actions and intersubjective
empathy. Observing another act primes your motor
system to copy, even if overt copying is inhibited. Covert
copying is a kind of process-driven simulation, which
uses offline the processes that would be used actually to
copy the observed action, but it inhibits motor output.
This direct resonance with another’s action provides a fun-
damental similarity between yourself and other agents that
enables the understanding of another’s actions as instru-
mentally structured. Mirror systems also provide a plaus-
ible neural basis for emotional empathy and
understanding (see Adolphs 2002; Decety & Chaminade
2003; 2005; Gallese 2001; 2005; Gallese & Goldman
1998; Goldman 2005; Gordon 1995a; 1995b; Iacoboni
2005; Iacoboni et al. 2005; Meltzoff 2005; Preston & de
Waal 2002; Rizzolatti 2005; Williams et al. 2001).
Within this broad perspective, I shall compare the views
of Gallese, Meltzoff, Gordon, and Tomasello on simulation
theory versus theory theory and on relations between imi-
tation and mindreading. And I will preview how SCM
reconciles opposed views on both topics. An outline
follows.
2.3.4.1. Simulation theory (ST) versus theory
theory (TT).
Gallese views mirror systems as enabling broad interperso-
nal empathy by implementing primitive intersubjective
information, prior to differentiation of self from other.
Meltzoff views early imitation as foundational for the
ability to understand other agents: In imitation my acts
are directly, noninferentially identified with others’
acts; I then associate my acts with my mental states
and infer a similar association in others.
TT accounts of mindreading invoke laws and inferences
about mental states and behavior, whereas on ST
accounts mindreaders use their own psychological pro-
cesses offline to attribute similar mental states or
actions to others.
Underived similarity between one’s own and others’ acts is
shared ground between Meltzoff’s TT account of mind-
reading based on early imitation and ST accounts based
on inhibited copying.
Gordon criticizes first-person- to third-person-inference
accounts of early imitation’s role in mindreading, for
taking the self/other distinction for granted.
In Gordon’s ST view of how mindreading involves offline
imitation, “constitutive mirroring” “multiplies the first
person” by reference to a shared scheme of reasons.
First reconciliation of ST and TT: Foundations of inter-
subjectivity and the self/other distinction can be pro-
vided by simulative mirroring (SCM’s layers 3 and 4),
although richer self/other and other/other distinctions
depend on interpretation, theorizing, and inference
(layer 5 and beyond).
2.3.4.2. Relations between imitation and action
understanding.
Tomasello and Carpenter’s view that imitation depends on
action understanding contrasts with views of action
understanding as depending on imitation.
Second reconciliation, concerning relations between imi-
tation and action understanding: Simple mirroring, of
goals or movements, can express a fundamental inter-
subjectivity, enabling simple forms of action under-
standing and providing elements of more complex
imitative mirroring with flexible instrumental structure,
which in turn contributes to more articulated, instru-
mentally structured understanding of other agents and
their minds (layers 3 and 4).
2.3.5. Simulation theory (ST) versus theory theory
(TT). On Gallese’s (2001; 2005) shared manifold hypoth-
esis, mirror systems enable various aspects of interperso-
nal understanding and empathy. Mirror systems develop
from the way biological control systems model interactions
between organisms and their environments. They provide
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the neural basis of a primitive intersubjective information
space or “shared manifold” that is prior to a self/other dis-
tinction both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, yet
preserved in human adults (SCM’s layer 3 incorporates
this feature). The shared manifold underwrites automatic
intersubjective identifications across different perceptual
modalities and action, but also for sensations and
emotions: There is evidence of mirror mechanisms for
pain and disgust, and hearing anger expressed increases
the activation of muscles used to express anger.
Empathy involves a common scheme of reasons under
which persons, self and others, are intelligible, rather
than recognition that others’ bodies also have minds.
Meltzoff (2005) argues that early imitation and its
enabling mechanisms begot understanding of other
agents, not vice versa. In his view, ability to understand
other minds has innate foundations, but develops in
stages, in which imitation plays a critical role. Infants
have a primitive ability to recognize being imitated and
to imitate, and hence to distinguish people from other
things and recognize equivalences between acts of self
and other. This initial bridge between self and other pro-
vides privileged access to people that we don’t have in
relation to other things; it develops in three stages. First,
own acts are linked to others’ similar acts supramodally,
as evidenced by newborns’ imitation of others’ facial ges-
tures. Second, own acts of certain kinds are linked bidirec-
tionally to own mental states of certain kinds, through
learning. Third, others’ similar acts are linked to others’
similar mental states. This early process is conceived not
as formal reasoning, but as processing the other as “like
me.” It gets mindreading started on understanding
agency and closely associated mental states: for example,
intentions, emotions, and desires. Meltzoff emphasizes
that mindreading isn’t all or nothing. (Tomasello [1999]
makes similar claims for nonhuman animals.) Understand-
ing mental states further from action, like false beliefs,
comes in later development.
Meltzoff’s view of mindreading is usually put in the
theory theory (TT) rather than simulation theory (ST)
category, but it has ST as well as TT aspects. TT regards
commonsense psychology as a proto-scientific theory. It
represents knowledge as laws about mental states and
behavior that can be known innately or discovered by
testing hypotheses against evidence. Specific mental
states and behaviors are inferred from other mental
states and behaviors by means of such laws; the process
does not depend on copying. On ST, mindreading starts
with taking another’s perspective and generating
“pretend” mental states or behavior that match the
other’s. These offline states are not objects of theoretical
inference. Rather, they are entered into the simulator’s
own psychological and decision-making processes, which
are held offline to produce further simulated mental
states and behavior that are then assigned to the other.
Further behavior by the other can be predicted, or
mental states attributed that explain his observed beha-
vior. Such simulation is an extension of practical abilities
rather than a theoretical exercise: it copies the other’s
states and uses the copies in the simulator’s decision-
making equipment, instead of using laws to infer the
other’s states (Davies & Stone 1995a; 1995b).
Meltzoff’s three-stage process can be restated in expli-
citly TT terms. First, innate equivalence between my
own and others’ acts (exploited by early imitation and rec-
ognition of being imitated) provides a fundamental, under-
ived similarity between some acts (by myself) and other
acts (by another). Second, first-person experience provides
laws linking one’s own acts and own mental states. Third, it
is inferred that another’s acts and mental states are law-
fully linked in the same ways as my similar acts and
mental states are linked. Proceeding through stages 2
and 3, we find inferences from first-person mind-behavior
links to similar third-person links as in traditional
arguments from analogy.12 “The crux of the ‘like-me
hypothesis’ is that infants may use their own intentional
actions as a framework for interpreting the intentional
actions of others” (Meltzoff 2005, p. 75). For example,
12-month-old infants follow a model’s “gaze” significantly
less when the model’s eyes are closed rather than open,
but only similarly refrain from following the “gaze” of a
blindfolded model after they are given first-person experi-
ence with blindfolds.
However, as Meltzoff points out (personal communi-
cation), there is no first-person to third-person inference
at stage 1. The initial bidirectional self-other linkage,
expressed in early imitation and recognition of being imi-
tated, is via a supramodal common code for observed and
observer’s acts that’s direct and noninferential (Meltzoff &
Moore 1997). Stage 1 of Meltzoff’s view thus has important
common ground with ST: In covert offline copying, direct
noninferential resonance with another’s action with inhib-
ited motor output enables understanding of the other’s
action. But such direct noninferential resonance can also
occur in overt copying, as Meltzoff postulates; copying
can provide information for understanding another’s
actions, even when not inhibited and serving other func-
tions. Mindreading’s foundation at Meltzoff’s first stage
is noninferentially direct, not theoretically derived. His
view shares this nontheoretical basis, at its first, online
copying stage, with ST views of mindreading as based on
offline copying, though they diverge on how mindreading
develops further. If mindreading develops in stages, theor-
etical inference can enter later, increasing with
development.
While Meltzoff’s theory theory involves first-person to
third-person inference, Gordon’s “radical” simulation
theory (see Gordon 1986; 1995; 1995a; 1996; 2002;
2005) explicitly rejects it, and provides a different view
of the relations between imitation and mindreading. In
constitutive mirroring, a copied motor pattern is part of
the perception of another’s action, though overt move-
ment may be inhibited. Gordon finds constitutive mirror-
ing in Gallese’s primitive intersubjective “we”-space, the
basis of empathy that implicitly expresses similarity of
self and other rather than their distinctness. When consti-
tutive mirroring imposes first-person phenomena,
a process of analysis by synthesis occurs whereby another’s
observed behavior and the self’s matching response – part
of the very perception of the other’s behavior – become
intelligible together, in the same process. When I see
you reach to pick up the ringing phone, your act and my
matching response are made sense of together within a
scheme of reasons that is fundamentally common to
persons. As Gordon (2005) puts it, I don’t infer from the
first to the third person, but rather multiply the first
person. To understand what I or another believes, per-
ceives, or intends, I look out at the world and the
Hurley: The shared circuits model
10 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:1
reasons it provides, though in the case of others I imagina-
tively recenter to the other’s perspective (Gordon 1995a).
Gordon criticizes first-person to third-person inference
in Meltzoff’s account not because it attributes similarity to
one’s own and others’ acts or experiences, but because it
requires that they be identified and distinguished. In
Meltzoff’s stage 1, there is innate equivalence between
acts of self and other; this stage may involve constitutive
mirroring, as in Gallese’s primitive shared manifold. But
later stages of Meltzoff’s account, where analogical infer-
ence occurs, require that self and other also be distin-
guished: If this kind of act by me is linked to my mental
states of a certain kind, then a similar (as per stage 1)
kind of act by another is also linked to her mental states
of a similar kind. Gordon explains that I cannot infer ana-
logically from a to b unless I can distinguish a from b. He is
skeptical that infants have this capacity, though mature
imitative mirroring may involve such inference (Gordon
2005).
Pure ST views of mindreading are standardly criticized
for lacking resources to explain how mature mindreaders
distinguish and identify people and track which actions
and mental states are whose. Gordon suggests that mul-
tiple first persons are distinguished and tracked in the per-
sonal-level process of making others intelligible, avoiding
incoherence under the common scheme of reasons (see
also Hurley 1998, part 1; 1989). Mental states that don’t
make sense together are assigned to different persons.
Can this be done in pure simulation mode, without theo-
rizing? Simulation supposedly uses practical abilities
rather than theorizing about actions. How does interpret-
ing an action to make sense of it differ from theorizing
about it? When I use practical reason offline in interpret-
ative mindreading, I don’t formulate normative laws from
which I make inferences; rather, I activate my normative
and deliberative dispositions. As Millikan might say
(Millikan 2005), my thought about another’s action isn’t
wholly separate from my entertaining that action.
SCM will suggest a reconciliation between ST and TT.
The fundamental similarity between self and other is
understood in terms not of theorizing but mirroring
(as in Gallese’s shared manifold, Gordon’s constitutive
mirroring, Meltzoff’s innate self-other equivalence, and
SCM’s layer 3). Such primitive intersubjectivity persists
into adulthood, providing a basis for mature empathy
and mindreading, as Gallese holds. The informational
origin of the self/other distinction is understood in terms
of monitoring whether mirroring is inhibited (layer 4).
As mindreading develops, it also employs a richer self/
other distinction, as when children come to distinguish
imitating from being imitated (see Decety & Chaminade
2005), or to attribute beliefs different from their own to
others. Mature personal-level mindreading requires abil-
ities to distinguish, identify, and track multiple other
persons, to assign acts and mental states to them in an
interpretative process, and to entertain multiple possible
acts by multiple other persons (layer 5). If decentering
from me-here-now creates a trail to others and other poss-
ible actions, mature mindreading creates multiple branch-
ing and interacting trails. Negotiating these, by using the
full range of distinctions and identifications required by
mature mindreading, probably demands theoretical
resources, even though the subpersonal enabling foun-
dations of intersubjectivity are found in mirroring, and
of the self/other distinction in monitored simulation.
SCM explains how mirroring and simulation can provide
foundations for mindreading on which theorizing builds.
2.3.6. Relations between imitation and action
understanding.How are imitation and action understand-
ing related to each other? On imitation-first views, imita-
tion underwrites early mindreading abilities. Gallese,
Meltzoff, Gordon, and Goldman stress the contribution
of imitation to understanding other agents. By contrast,
understanding-first views emphasize the way imitative
learning depends on action understanding and intention
reading (Carpenter et al. 1998; Rizzolatti 2005; Tomasello
& Carpenter 2005). Recent paradigms with children
where the demonstrated action is unsuccessful or acciden-
tal (Meltzoff 1995) distinguish imitation from other forms
of social learning more clearly than the two-action method
does. If the observer copies what was intended even
though it wasn’t achieved, as opposed to copying only
the observed movements or the observed though unin-
tended result, that suggests the observer understands the
intentional structure of the observed action. Tomasello
and Carpenter argue that intention reading is needed to
explain what is copied by imitators when the modeled
behavior is the same across conditions while the
modeled intention varies. In their view, results from
various paradigms are most parsimoniously explained by
holding that children use their understanding of intentions
to imitate.
Imitation-first and understanding-first views are not
necessarily opposed; each may tell only part of the story.
SCM provides a framework for their reconciliation,
accommodating both views at different points in its
layered architecture. Different types of copying, and
covert forms of each that enable corresponding types of
understanding, can dovetail over evolution and develop-
ment, building on one another reciprocally, with increas-
ing instrumental structure in both action and
understanding over successive stages. A simpler form of
copying can precede a simpler form of understanding,
which precedes a more complex form of copying, which
precedes a more complex form of understanding (the
ordering can be interpreted phylogenetically or ontogen-
etically). Start, say, with goal mirroring and emulation.
Covert goal mirroring can then enable understanding
the goals of observed action. Such goal understanding,
along with mirroring of movements, may be needed for
instrumentally articulated imitation (understanding first).
But richer instrumental understanding, of how observed
means contribute to observed ends, may involve covert
imitation (imitation first). In SCM, self-other similarities
expressed by mirroring, whether more or less structured,
are informationally prior to the self/other distinction
required for understanding action as another’s.
3. Part 2. The shared circuits model
The shared circuits model (SCM) shows how subpersonal
resources for control, mirroring, and simulation can
enable the distinctively human sociocognitive skills of imi-
tation, deliberation, and mindreading. The model has
intertwined empirical and philosophical aims. One aim is
to provide a unified framework for the various strands of
Hurley: The shared circuits model
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empirical evidence and theorizing surveyed thus far.
Another is to illustrate the philosophical view that embo-
died cognition can emerge from active perception, avoid-
ing the “classical sandwich” architecture, which insulates
central cognition from the world between twin buffers of
perceptual input and behavioral output (Hurley 1998;
2001). It does this, recall, by addressing a higher-order
theoretical question, about how it is possible for subperso-
nal processes to enable certain personal-level abilities: in
particular, how it is possible to build subpersonal
resources for sociocognitive skills on those for active
perception.
SCM thus provides a generic heuristic framework for
specific first-order hypotheses, about how particular socio-
cognitive capacities map onto specific layers of the model
or develop in phylogenetic or ontogenetic time. SCM itself
does not articulate specific first-order hypotheses, but
does make some general predictions: for example, of
neural systems for mirroring based on those for instru-
mental prediction, and of the priority of online over
offline mirroring. Nor is SCM exclusive; important work
in enabling persons’ cognitive capacities is done by other
processes, including linguistic processes. The point is to
illustrate how it is possible for important cognitive
resources to emerge from active perception. Although
SCM is therefore somewhat abstract, in accord with its
higher-order theoretical aim, I suggest in this target
article how it lends itself to more specific empirical predic-
tions, and hope the commentaries will offer suggestions as
well. Details follow, layer by layer.
3.1. Layer 1: Basic adaptive feedback control
SCM begins with specific comparator feedback control
systems. A comparator system generates outputs that are
means to a target, by establishing an instrumental associ-
ation between outputs and their results. For example,
a thermostat compares a target signal with an input
signal. If they don’t match, system output is adjusted and
the resulting change in input signal or feedback is
tracked. Input continues to be recompared with target
and output readjusted, to minimize mismatch to target.
The elements of such control are (Fig. 1):
1. A target or reference signal (e.g., target room temp-
erature for a thermostat).
2. An input signal (e.g., actual room temperature), the
joint result of elements 3 and 5.
3. Exogenous environmental events (e.g., nightfall).
4. A comparator, which determines whether target and
input signals match and the direction and degree of any
mismatch or error (e.g., the room is still five degrees
below target temperature).
5. The output of the control system (e.g., the level of
heat output), regulated by comparison between target
and input signals (e.g., heat output is increased if
measured room temperature is below target).
6. A feedback loop by which output has effects on suc-
ceeding input signals (e.g., measured room temperature
rises when heat output increases).
Feedback control is adaptive; output is adjusted to com-
pensate for changing exogenous influences, keeping
sensed input close to target. Under different exogenous
influences, feedback calls for differing outputs to achieve
the target; when the weather changes, a thermostat
adjusts heat output to maintain the target temperature.
Feedback at layer 1 operates in real space and time, and
therefore can be slow (e.g., a room takes time to warm
up after the heat is turned up). A control system
implements a mapping from the target, in the context of
actual input, to output, thus specifying the means for
approaching the target in given circumstances. Inverse
model is engineering terminology for this instrumental
mapping.
Net sensed input results from the system’s output plus
independent environmental influences. In organisms,
reafferent feedback carries input resulting from the organ-
ism’s own activity, whereas exafferent input results from
exogenous events. Reafference includes visual and pro-
prioceptive inputs resulting from movements of one’s
hands, movement through space, manipulation of
objects, and so on. Exafference includes visual inputs
resulting from environmental events, such as movements
by others in a social group. However, at layer 1, infor-
mation distinguishing reafference from exafference is not
available.
Feedback control is a cyclical and dynamic process, with
no nonarbitrary start, finish, or discrete steps; input is as
much an effect as a cause of output (Marken 2002;
Powers 1973). Control depends on dynamic relations
among inputs and outputs. Information about inputs is
not segregated from information about outputs; this
blending of information is preserved and extended in the
informational dynamics of further layers. Perception and
action arise from and share this fundamental informational
dynamics (Hurley 1998; 2001).
Specific means/ends associations or instrumental map-
pings can be chained (output A is the means to controlled
result B, while B in turn is the means to controlled result
C, and so on) or organized into hierarchies. There are
independently determined evolutionary, developmental,
and individual differences in the grain and complexity
of the possible control sequences and hierarchies of
different creatures.
3.2. Layer 2: Simulative prediction of effects for
improved control
Real-time feedback can be slow and produce overshoot-
ing. Control functions can be speeded and smoothed by
adding simulative predictions to a comparator system
(Grush 2004; Miall 2003): Instrumental output-result
associations can then be activated predictively, simulating
the effects of specific outputs for informational purposes.
Figure 1. Layer 1: Basic adaptive feedback control.
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Over time, associations are established between output
and subsequent input in certain contexts, so that copies
of motor-output signals can evoke associated input
signals. An inner loop maps copies of output signals
directly onto “expected” input signals – means to results
(Fig. 2; new aspects italicized). Forward model is engin-
eering terminology for this mapping; copies of output
signals in organisms are called efference copy. This subper-
sonal process simulates feedback – predicts the results of
output on input. Prediction can occur during actual action,
to smooth a behavioral trajectory by anticipating feedback,
or prior to action, to provide information about alternative
possible actions (layer 4).
A general improvement in instrumental control results.
A control system with predictive simulation no longer
need await actual feedback. A thermostat can turn the
heat down before the target is reached, avoiding over-
shooting; hand movement can be initiated in accord with
predictions of retinal signals based on eye movements.
When real and simulated results don’t match, a local
switch can default back to actual feedback control while
predictive simulations are fine-tuned to improve sub-
sequent predictions.13 For purposes of online instrumen-
tal control, the system need not monitor continuously or
access globally whether it is using actual or simulated
feedback.
Comparisons can now be made not just between targets
and actual results of action, but between the latter
and anticipated results. This permits reafference to be
distinguished from exafference: Information about the
organism’s goal-directed behavior can be distinguished
from information about environmental events. Consider
the familiar ambiguity: When my train pulls out of the
station, I register movement relative to the train on the
next platform, but this does not itself provide information
about whether my train or the neighboring train is moving.
Comparison of predicted feedback from action (efference
copy) with actual feedback provides resources to resolve
an analogous subpersonal ambiguity (between reafference
and exafference), and hence to distinguish the self ’s
activity from environmental events.14 This subpersonal
information can contribute to enabling the personal-level
distinction between action of the self and perception of
the world. The perception/action distinction emerges
from subpersonal informational dynamics between
world-to-animal inputs and animal-to-world outputs.
However, perception and action don’t map, respectively,
onto input and output (Hurley 1998). Rather, layer 2
inherits unsegregated information about inputs and
outputs from layer 1, and uses this blended information
in enabling the perception/action distinction. Perception
and action share these basic informational dynamics and
processing resources. SCM thus provides a dynamic
process version of a common coding view of perception
and action (sect. 2.2).
However, the system does not yet provide information
about similarities between the agent’s actions and actions
by others, nor information distinguishing the agent’s
actions from similar actions by other agents (as opposed
to distinguishing the agent’s actions from environmental
events in general). This suggests that a basic distinction
between action by self and perception of world, associated
with instrumental control functions, can be available to
creatures still lacking intersubjective information, a self/
other distinction, or mindreading abilities. There are
more and less fundamental layers of information about
self (self in SCM is neutral between persons and other
animals).
Some general predictions derive from layer 2. First,
neural mechanisms that implement sensorimotor affor-
dance associations (such as canonical neurons [sect. 2.2])
are predicted. Suppose an animal typically acts in ways
afforded by certain kinds of object: for example, eating
a particular food in a specific way. Copies of motor
signals for eating movements will be associated with a mul-
timodal class of exafferent and reafferent inputs deriving
from such objects and the agent’s eating of them. Cells
mediating this sensorimotor association could thus have
both sensory and motor fields and carry information
about objects’ affordances. Second, deficits in predictive
simulation functions should be associated with deficits
in distinguishing self from world and action from percep-
tion.15 A specific first-order prediction relating to layer 2
might be that capacities requiring information that dis-
tinguishes self from world are phylogenetically prior to
capacities for social learning and action understanding.
3.3. Layer 3: Mirroring for priming, emulation, and
imitation
SCMnext postulates that instrumental output-result associ-
ations can be activated bilaterally, from effect to cause, as
well as from cause to effect. Not only do copies of motor
signals predictively simulate input signals (layer 2), but
input signals can evoke corresponding motor signals.16
To put it more technically, not only does efference copy
produce simulated reafferent input in forward models,
but input signals can evoke mirroring efference or motor
output. Mirroring in effect runs the predictive simulations
of forward models in reverse (Fig. 3).
Observed actions are thus mirrored in the observer; if
mirroring is sufficiently strong and not inhibited, overt
copying results. (Mirroring is here a functional subperso-
nal rather than neural description of behavioral priming
produced by observing action, and may be implemented
in neural mirror systems.) Mirroring within specific
control structures of differing grain and structure would
enable different copying capacities, observed across
various social species: mirroring of basic movements in
priming (Rizzolatti’s “low-level resonance”), mirroring of
goal-directed action or emulation (Rizzolatti’s “high-level
resonance”), and even full-fledged imitation (if mirrored
Figure 2. Layer 2: Simulative prediction of effects for improved
control.
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elements of control structures are sufficiently articulated
and flexibly linked to provide the information needed for
social learning of novel means to a goal [see further on
in this section]).
Note the intimate relationship between the sharing of
circuits for self and other and for action and perception:
Layer 3’s shared informational dynamics for intersubjec-
tivity presupposes layer 2’s shared informational dynamics
for perception and action, which builds on layer 1’s
generic informational dynamics for sensorimotor control.
SCM explicitly builds shared resources for self and other
on those for action and perception. It thus integrates
W. Prinz’s shared information for perception and action
(though in terms of functional dynamics rather than
coding) with Gallese’s primitive intersubjective “we”-
centric information. By bringing together information
about motor causes of one’s own and others’ similar
observed actions, mirroring enables simulation of
means/ends associations from either direction: Observed
action retrodicts motor activation in the observer via mir-
roring of causes, which are associated with further results
via simulative prediction of effects. But although mirroring
makes information about action’s instrumental structure
accessible bilaterally (from acting and from observing
others act), mirroring does not yet distinguish own
action from observed action. At layer 3, self and other
share informational resources: intersubjective information
is subpersonally prior to the self/other distinction
(as Gallese holds [sect. 2.3]).
Instrumental mapping and mirroring both map input to
output; SCM distinguishes them functionally (neural
implementations may overlap). Instrumental mappings
have control functions: given certain inputs, they select
motor outputs that in turn produce inputs matching a
target. Although mirroring exploits instrumental control
structures and also produces motor outputs, given
certain inputs, it does not itself select outputs as means
to inputs that match observed action – or any other
target (cf. Peterson & Trapold 1982). Rather, SCM postu-
lates, mirroring is a by-product (via reversal) of predictive
simulations, which do have instrumental control functions.
However, the resulting automatic copying tendency has
evolutionary functions, and copying can be exapted for
cognitive functions associated with imitation, action
understanding, or signaling; these in turn can enable
advanced social (“Machiavellian”) forms of instrumental
control (see sects. 2.1 and 2.3). Whether specific mirroring
capacities are adaptive depends on their potential
functions for different social species under different evol-
utionary pressures.
How could mirroring arise? Consider first movements
that produce visual reafference. When creature A sees
her own hand movements, associations form between
copies of motor signals for these movements and visual
reafference from these movements. Cells mediating this
association can acquire congruent sensory and motor
fields. These cells would also fire if creature A receives
similar visual inputs from creature B’s similar hand move-
ments; the cells wouldn’t distinguish observer’s action
from observed action producing similar inputs. So, like
mirror neurons, they would fire both when A acts and
when she observes such similar action by B. They
mediate associations between copies of motor signals
and a class of inputs including both characteristic reaffer-
ence from the agent’s movement and similar exafference
from others’ similar movements.
How could mirroring arise for movements not seen by
their agents? This requires a correspondence between
one’s own and others’ similar acts, without reafferent feed-
back from own acts in the same modality as observations of
others’ acts. Facial movements normally produce proprio-
ceptive rather than visual feedback: How can one’s own
facial movements be associated with visual information
about similar observed facial movements, to enable
copying of facial expressions?
Several answers are possible (sect. 2.2), all compatible
with SCM. Some supramodal correspondences may be
innate (as in newborn copying; Meltzoff 2005; Meltzoff &
Moore 1997). Some may be acquired through experience
with mirrors, or with being imitated (Heyes 2005). Some
could be established via stimulus enhancement, as
follows. Suppose a creature repeatedly sees conspecifics
act a certain way; their actions draw its attention to the
typical objects of their actions, which evoke in the observer
an innate or previously acquired response. An indirect
association results between visual observations of others’
actions and one’s own similar action. This isn’t copying
initially; the object independently evokes others’ and
own similar acts. But the indirect, object-mediated associ-
ation between own and others’ similar acts may become
direct with repetition. Cells mediating it could thus
acquire similar sensory and motor fields, so that observing
another’s act primes similar action by the observer. There-
fore, stimulus enhancement could develop into copying,
and an indirect link via an enhanced stimulus into a
direct sensorimotor mirroring link.17 SCM is neutral
about whether such correspondences are innate, acquired,
or both.
SCM does not describe one all-inclusive structure, but
has multiple instances for specific movements and
results, at various points along different means/ends
chains (cf. Fogassi et al. 2005; Wolpert et al. 2003). The
ends/means distinction is relative and applies along
spectra of means/ends links in which basic movements
are means to proximal results that are means to more
distal results. Such control spectra can vary in grain.
SCM could apply at successive points along a control spec-
trum, or between spectra (with the right neural connec-
tions); one circuit’s target could be the means to next
circuit’s target. A network of control spectra could
support hierarchical control and flexible recombination
Figure 3. Layer 3: Mirroring for priming, emulation, and
imitation.
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of means and ends. With mirroring added, it could enable
movement priming, emulation, or imitation.
SCM predicts that capacities for specific kinds of
copying and social learning will vary across species and
development with
(A) the grain and complexity of instrumental control
capacities, and
(B) which of these have associated mirroring functions and
how richly and flexibly they are linked (see discussion
following; Csibra 2005).
How do these two influences operate?
(A) Different animals are equipped to different degrees
with capacities for instrumental control and associated
predictive simulation. This variation reflects potential
means/ends chains of differing grains and lengths and
with differing degrees of lateral connectivity to enable
novel combination of means and ends as instrumentally
appropriate. Animals suitably equipped with control func-
tions by evolution and development could form chains of
simulative predictions, resulting in information such as:
this tail movement has that effect on weight over legs,
facilitating this movement trajectory in relation to that
gazelle, and so on – with eating the prey later in the
chain. A similar chain could lead from knee movement
to winning a slalom race.
Mirroring operates such instrumental associations in
reverse. Mirroring the cause of another’s movement, or
resulting relationship to an object, could enable movement
priming, goal emulation, or even full-fledged imitation
(if instrumental control and associated mirroring functions
are sufficiently articulated and flexible). Combined with
further information distinguishing self from other (layer 4),
simulative mirroring can provide information to enable
understanding of others’ observed movements as instru-
mental actions with intentional, means/end structure.
Simpler control and predictive simulation capacities, with
shorter, coarser, means/ends chains, limit correspondingly
an animal’s potential for mirroring and related functions.
Whether observed movement primes copying or is
recognized as goal-directed depends on, inter alia, the
instrumental capacity potentially available for mirroring
and simulative functions. Mirroring and simulation might
provide information about the goals of certain observed
movements, given fine-grained, complex means/ends
associations, but not given coarser control capacities. No
doubt a monkey can move her hand to grasp a piece of
sushi and move it to her mouth to eat it. But I can move
my hand to operate chopsticks to pick up sushi to dip it
in soy sauce and then move it to my mouth to eat it, in
order to impress my boss; given associated simulative mir-
roring functions, I may start to resent you for eating the
last piece of sushi as soon as you reach for your chopsticks.
(B) While mirroring of instrumental associations can
provide information about the instrumental structure of
observed movements, mirroring does not itself determine
which instrumental associations, or predictive simulations
thereof, are in place and hence potentially exploitable by
mirroring. Control processes can be neurally distributed,
with components of an articulated mean/ends chain pro-
cessed in different brain areas – control of fine move-
ments versus gaze versus posture versus whole body
movement versus external objects. Some such neural
areas may have mirroring as well as predictive simulation
capacities, whereas others do not. Whether mirroring is
associated with particular control structures will vary
across species and development, as a result of evolutionary
and developmental processes, yielding different capacities
for copying and for generating information about goals of
observed actions.
We can understand the enabling of movement priming,
goal emulation, or imitation in terms of mirroring that
exploits different control structures. Mirroring associated
with more basic means/ends links (Rizzolatti’s ‘low-level
resonance’) predicts priming of basic movements; mirror-
ing associated with less basic means/ends links predicts
priming of less basic movements or results of more basic
movements. Finger movements are means to chopstick
deployment; when I can control chopsticks, chopstick
deployment is a means to sushi eating, which could be a
means to some further social result. Suppose I eat sushi
by deploying chopsticks by moving my fingers a certain
way. You watch. If seeing me move my fingers generates
mirroring motor activation, then you are primed to move
your fingers similarly. Such movement priming predicts
interference if you watch me doing X while you are
doing Y.
If you can already control chopsticks, less basic mirror-
ing and prime chopstick deployment can occur. Such
priming could be goal-mediated: Your chopstick deploy-
ment could mirror mine when sushi-eating results (even
if no sushi is visible), but not when the results are unre-
lated to sushi (cf. Umilta` et al. 2001). Goal emulation
could be enabled by mirroring midway along a control
spectrum of proximal results of movements (rather than
basic movements themselves) that are in turn means to
more distal results (cf. Rizzolatti’s “high-level resonance”).
Such midway mirroring would generate motor activation
associated with a corresponding midway goal for the
observer (rather than with similar basic movements in
the observer). As well as enabling emulation, this would
contribute information for understanding observed
action as goal directed (layer 4).
The phylogenetically rare capacity for imitative learning
requires flexible means/ends associations; priming and
emulation, respectively, provide its ends and means com-
ponents (sect. 2.1). Articulation within and linkages
between mirror circuits determine whether mirroring
enables imitative learning. An animal with mirror circuits
along a chain of means/ends associations may never
have used a certain means to a given goal. But if an
observed novel means to that goal is mirrored, and
neural links permit specific mirroring activations to be
flexibly combined with targets, that goal and those mir-
rored means may be newly associated, capturing infor-
mation about novel instrumental structure in observed
action and enabling imitative learning. You might learn
to use chopsticks by watching me; emulation plus trial
and error would be bettered by mirroring that primes
your finger movements towards those you see me make
that are associated with the target of chopstick
deployment.
Children’s greater imitative tendencies, compared with
chimps, may depend not on the presence versus absence
of a mirror system, but on articulated relationships
among multiple mirror circuits, permitting recombinant
structure in social learning (sect. 2.1; cf. Barkley [2001]
on recombinant structure in executive functions and
their relation to imitation). SCM predicts correctly that
Hurley: The shared circuits model
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imitation should be found in fewer species than is move-
ment priming or emulation separately, because imitation
additionally requires linkages supporting flexible instru-
mental associations between mirrored means and ends at
a relatively fine grain. Flexibly linked mirror circuits
could also generate behavioral building blocks combined
in program-level imitation of sequential or hierarchical
structure. And they could allow infants to form three-
way associations among observed behavior by parents
(who have survived to reproduce, so may have adaptive
behaviors, not all of which are heritable), observed cir-
cumstances of such parental behavior, and infants’ own
similar behavior, enabling contextual imitation: act like
that, when the environment is like this. A network of
linked mirror circuits could also permit mirroring acti-
vation to spread and generalize automatically, as in chame-
leon effects (see sects. 2.1 and 2.3).
Some general predictions derive from layer 3. First,
neural systems are predicted that implement mirroring
functions and don’t distinguish own and others’ actions.
Mirror neurons need not individually implement mirror-
ing and simulation functions. Specific hypotheses might
concern how mirror neurons with varying sensorimotor
congruence contribute to the functions of mirror systems
(cf. Csibra 2005). Second, functional associations are pre-
dicted between deficits in mirroring and in predictive
simulation for control, which reflects shared circuits for
these functions. Third, implementational associations are
predicted between neural mirror systems and neural
systems for comparator control and predictive simulation
(sect. 2.2). Fourth, automatic behavioral priming and
copying tendencies are predicted at varying grains, reflect-
ing the articulation and complexity of control functions
across species and development (as in movement
priming, emulation, human infant copying, human per-
ceptual induction effects, imitative interference and reac-
tion-time effects, and chameleon effects). Overt automatic
copying tendencies should be greater where inhibition is
weaker, that is, in young children or imitation syndrome
patients (sect. 2.1). Fifth, the phylogenetic rarity of imita-
tion as opposed to movement priming and emulation is
predicted (sect. 2.1).
Another thought: Recall that canonical neurons mediate
sensorimotor affordance associations; for example,
between copies of motor signals for eating and a class of
inputs associated with objects that afford eating and the
eating of them. As a result of such associations, observing
an object may prime action it affords and produce a ten-
dency to automatic action on affordances where inhibitory
function is reduced – in young children, utilization syn-
drome patients, or subjects with attention deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder (Barkley 2001, p. 15; Lhermitte 1983; 1986;
Rietveld, in preparation). Whether inhibitory functions
are specific to imitation or action on affordances is a
further question (Brass et al. 2003).
3.4. Layer 4: Monitored output inhibition combined with
simulative prediction and/or simulative mirroring
Information about the instrumental structure of observed
action provided by a flexibly articulated network of mirror
circuits can not only enable imitative learning, but also
contribute to enabling the understanding of another’s
actions as instrumentally structured, including in novel
or complex ways. SCM’s layer 4 introduces the capacity
to inhibit actual output and monitor this inhibition while
instrumental associations are activated. This capacity for
monitored inhibition could combine with layer 3’s mirror-
ing to enable action understanding. Or, it could combine
with layer 2’s online predictive simulations to enable
offline instrumental deliberation. Or both.
Take instrumental deliberation first. Layers 2 and 4
could combine functionally to distinguish actual from
possible actions. At layer 2, simulative predictions
improve online control of ongoing action. This online
function does not require the control system to monitor
whether it is currently using actual or simulated feedback,
as long as it can switch between them as needed to achieve
the target. However, simulative predictions of results
could also function offline, with actual motor output inhib-
ited. Multiple simulative predictions could provide infor-
mation about results of alternative possible actions,
rather than anticipating results for ongoing action. Simu-
lated results of alternative possible actions could be com-
pared for the closest match to a target prior to actual
action. Layers 2 plus 4 could thus provide information
for “trials and errors in the head” (Millikan 2006) prior
to actual trials and possibly fatal errors, allowing simu-
lations to die in a chooser’s stead. They could thus
enable counterfactual instrumental deliberation and
choice among alternative possible actions.
Enabling these capacities requires more than compar-
ing simulated results of different acts with a target. It
also requires monitoring whether motor output is inhib-
ited, to track the distinction between actual and possible
actions. The predicted results of actual actions will call
for a very different response to the predicted results of
possible actions. A creature unable to distinguish these
two types of predictions wouldn’t be long for this world.
(Barkley 2001). Layer 4’s monitored inhibition provides
a basis for this distinction: Simulated results with output
inhibition provide information about possible actions,
whereas simulated results without output inhibition
provide information about actual actions. Multiple predic-
tive simulations provide information about the conse-
quences of various actions by the agent, whereas
monitoring of output inhibition provides information
that these are possible actions, not actual ones.
Whether such a subpersonal informational structure
corresponds directly to the personal-level sense of ability
to do otherwise – of having alternative possible actions
open to choice – is a further question. The point here is
to explain how information for an actual/possible distinc-
tion and counterfactual practical reasoning emerges in
SCM. Although this information concerns agency, it may
provide a basis, when combined with language, for coun-
terfactual reasoning in theoretical contexts.
Now consider action understanding. Layers 3 and 4
could combine functionally to distinguish self from other –
more precisely, to distinguish one’s own action from
another’s. At layer 3, observing another’s action primes
similar action by the observer, through mirroring. At
layer 4, the observer’s similar action is inhibited; observed
behavior isn’t actually copied. Copying behavior can be
beneficial (especially for young organisms), but unselective
overt copying would often have disastrous results for
copiers; a prey that chases predators won’t survive for
long. The capacity to inhibit copying is adaptive and
Hurley: The shared circuits model
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should be expected to evolve (Barkley 2001). Offline mir-
roring simulates in the observer the causes of observed
action, reversing the direction of simulative prediction:
Instead of simulating feedback that would result from
motor activations, mirroring simulates motor activation
that would produce results similar to those observed,
with actual motor output inhibited. Simulative mirroring
can thus provide information for understanding the instru-
mental structure of observed actions. In effect, offline
copying enables action understanding (Fig. 4).
Mirroring of means/ends associations for observed
actions isn’t enough to enable understanding action as
another’s. This also requires monitoring as to whether
motor output from mirroring is inhibited, to separate
information about others’ actions from information about
one’s own. Layer 3 doesn’t do this job. But use of infor-
mation about actions to understand others has different
consequences, and makes different demands on sub-
sequent behavior, than does use of information about
actions actually to copy them. Therefore, it would be adap-
tive to track the distinction between own and others’
actions. Layer 4’s monitored inhibition provides an infor-
mational basis for this distinction, which overlays the
shared informational dynamics for own and others’
actions at layer 3: simulative mirroring with monitored
inhibition provides information about another’s action,
not one’s own. Thus, simulative mirroring can provide
information about the causes and instrumental structure
of observed action, while monitoring of output inhibition
can provide information that such actions are another’s,
not one’s own. This is how information for a self/other dis-
tinction emerges in SCM.
The length and grain of chains of means/ends associ-
ations and the flexibility of linkages between them
should affect not just the types of copying enabled by mir-
roring (as explained at layer 3), but also the types of action
understanding enabled by simulative mirroring. Goal-
mediated simulative mirroring would provide information
about goals of others’ movements, enabling an early stage
in understanding others as acting on intentions (hence, in
mindreading). If mirror circuits are sufficiently articulated
and flexibly recombinant to enable imitative learning, then
monitored inhibition of imitative mirroring would capture
the means/end structure of novel observed action more
fully and flexibly, enabling more sophisticated mindread-
ing. Depending on the articulation of control structures
with associated mirroring, adding layer 4 to layer 3 could
enable different mindreading abilities.
Recall the discussion (sect. 2.3) of imitation-first versus
understanding-first views. SCM reconciles them, by
showing how different types of copying and action under-
standing can be built up, enabled by differently articulated
mirroring structures combined with monitored inhibition.
Mirroring can enable goal emulation without a capacity for
imitation; with monitored inhibition, it can enable under-
standing the goals of another’s action. Instrumentally
articulated imitation may require understanding of goals
plus mirroring of movements; covert imitation can then
enable fuller understanding of the instrumental structure
of observed actions.
Whether such informational structures correspond
directly to personal-level empathic understanding of
another’s actions or to knowledge of other minds are
further questions. Layer 3’s “first person plural” is infor-
mationally prior to layer 4’s self/other distinction. Subper-
sonally, the problem of “knowledge” of other minds is
reconfigured: it is neither one of starting from information
about self and constructing a bridge to information about
others, nor one of starting from information about others
and from these resources generating information about
self. Rather, the similarity of own and others’ acts comes
first, with mirroring. Monitored inhibition then dis-
tinguishes subpersonally between instrumentally struc-
tured action “centered” on self versus “decentered” onto
another; self-centering and other-centering of agency
arrive together. SCM gives concrete subpersonal form to
the interdependence and parity of information about self
and other intentional agents. The subpersonal job that
remains is not to bridge a gap between self and others,
but to track distinctions among them, especially when
multiple other agents are in play.
Is the subpersonal priority of intersubjective infor-
mation reflected at the personal level, and if so, how? Is
the personal-level problem of knowledge of other minds
similarly reconfigured, to avoid both first-person to
third-person and third-person to first-person inferences,
that is, both the argument from analogy and from beha-
viorism? Not necessarily. Further questions arise, about
phylogeny, development, the structure of mature
capacities to understand others, and the epistemology of
such understanding. The role of subpersonal information
in the epistemology of other minds raises general philoso-
phical issues about the roles of reliable information and
justification in knowledge: for instance, can reliable sub-
personal information support knowledge of other minds?
SCM does not in itself answer these questions. Rather, it
provides generic, adaptable tools for framing specific
hypotheses. Care is needed: We shouldn’t assume
an isomorphic projection from the subpersonal level to
the personal level. But we should allow that understanding
subpersonal processes can contribute to understanding
the personal level; this doesn’t require interlevel
isomorphism.
Gordon’s simulation theory (sect. 2.3) suggests
responses to such questions. It has affinities with SCM:
both build mindreading on resources for perception and
action. But there are also differences: In SCM, the priority
of “first-person plural” information over the self/other dis-
tinction is subpersonal, whereas Gordon’s account of how
constitutive mirroring “multiplies the first person” links
Figure 4. Layer 4: Simulative mirroring (or prediction)
combined with monitored output inhibition, enabling action
understanding (or instrumental deliberation).
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subpersonal mirroring directly to personal-level under-
standing of other minds: Observed behavior and mirroring
are made sense of together, under a common scheme of
reasons, and incoherent mental states assigned to different
persons (Gordon 1995a, pp. 56–58, 68; 2002; 2005; cf.
Hurley 1989; 1998).
Actual/possible and self/other distinctions are necess-
ary for much explicit theorizing and for aspects of the nor-
mativity and intersubjectivity of the personal level. SCM
thus helps to understand how features of the personal
level could be informationally enabled by subpersonal pro-
cesses. It suggests that these distinctions share an informa-
tional basis in monitoring of motor inhibition: theoretical
informational resources arise from practical ones. But
SCM does not specify a phylogenetic or developmental
priority between the subpersonal actual/possible and
self/other distinctions, which is left to specific first-order
hypotheses: Layers 2 and 4 could combine even if layers
3 and 4 do not or if layer 3 is missing altogether; and
layers 3 and 4 could combine even if layers 2 and 4 do
not. Hence, in different species or stages of development,
we might find creatures with action understanding but not
instrumental deliberation, or vice versa.
Some general predictions derive from layer 4. First,
there could be deficits in inhibitory capacities although
capacities to copy, or to act on affordances, are intact
(as in Lhermitte’s imitation and utilization syndrome
patients). Second, the priority of mirroring to inhibition
of copying predicts that people with intact inhibitory
capacities should nevertheless retain underlying default
tendencies to copy (as in perceptual induction, imitation
interference effects, priming, and chameleon effects; see
sect. 2.1). In addition, SCM provides generic, adaptable
tools for framing specific hypotheses. A specific first-
order hypothesis might be that capacities for instrumental
deliberation and for understanding others’ actions are
enabled by shared inhibitory resources at layer 4, predict-
ing that deficits in these capacities should be associated
(Frith 1992, pp. 81–83, 93; cf. Barkley 2001). Another
first-order hypothesis might predict pathological dis-
sociations of capacities supported by layers 2 plus 4 from
those supported by layers 3 plus 4. Other specific first-
order predictions might concern the interleaving of
various copying abilities with various types of understand-
ing of others’ actions, in an ontogenetic or phylogenetic
progression leading to imitative learning and mindreading
capacities. Copying without inhibition should come earlier
in such progressions; capacities to inhibit copying and to
distinguish others’ intentional actions from one’s own
should develop together. Yet another hypothesis might
be that adding layer 4’s monitored inhibition of output
to layer 3’s mirroring enables a transition from behavior
copying to mindreading that enables effective use of
mirror heuristics by cooperators (sect. 2.3).
3.5. Layer 5: Counterfactual input simulation
Finally, the system can be taken offline for input as well as
output (Fig. 5). Counterfactual inputs can simulate differ-
ent possible acts by others and their results. Monitored
simulation of inputs to control circuits with simulative pre-
diction and mirroring functions can provide information
distinguishing between others’ actual and possible acts.
This social extension of counterfactual information,
combined with simulation of different possible acts by
self and their results, provides information about how
possible acts by self could result in possible acts by
others with further results, and vice versa. These
combined functions provide enabling information for
strategic game-theoretic deliberation, coordination, and
cooperation. To distinguish possible from actual acts by
others, information is needed about whether inputs are
simulated; so simulation of inputs must be monitored.
Simulative informational resources for strategic in
addition to instrumental deliberation enrich the practical
foundations for more general capacities to manipulate
counterfactual information and theorize counterfactually.
Recall the discussion of TT versus ST in section 2.3.
Again, SCM shows how they can be reconciled. Differen-
tiating and tracking interacting means/ends relations for
multiple possible acts by self and by multiple other
agents make acute informational demands. Despite their
foundational role, simulation mechanisms may be insuffi-
cient to provide information for such multi-agent, multi-
possibility tracking with ramifying paths of decentering.
Meeting these demands, and further demands in differen-
tiating the epistemic states of multiple others, probably
requires SCM’s practical simulative informational basis
for understanding other agents to be supplemented by
language-dependent functions and theorizing. Mindread-
ing, like social learning and instrumental control, is a
graded phenomenon, not all or nothing (Tomasello
1999). Language can build on SCM’s foundational
actual/possible and self/other distinctions to enable inter-
pretative understanding of multiple others with multiple
alternatives and varying beliefs. SCM hypothesizes that
mindreading has practical foundations, in simulative mir-
roring of means/ends relations, but allows that mature
mindreading with all the bells and whistles (including
understanding false beliefs) requires both simulation and
language-based theorizing.
Specific predictions deriving from level 5 could concern
ontogeny or phylogeny. First, since understanding goals
and action is foundational for mindreading, it should be
prior to understanding others’ epistemic attitudes (on phy-
logeny, see Tomasello & Call 1997; on ontogeny, see
Rakoczy et al. 2007). Second, understanding the instru-
mental structure of observed action can precede, and
may be a phylogenetic precursor of, understanding linguis-
tic structure. The instrumental recombinant structure of
imitative learning may combine with learned manipulation
Figure 5. Fifth layer: Counterfactual input simulation enabling
strategic deliberation.
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of external symbols to support the richer recombinant
structure of language. Third, the fundamental transition
from agents “playing against nature,” instrumentally, to
agents playing against one another, strategically, can be
supported by simulative mechanisms. Nevertheless, simu-
lative mechanisms without linguistic capacities may not
enable advanced mindreading, such as multi-person stra-
tegic deliberation or false-belief attribution.
4. Conclusion
SCM describes a functional subpersonal architecture, at a
level above that of neural implementation but below that
of the conscious and/or normative contents of persons’
mental states. I now step back from the details and
review the functional relations among SMC’s layers:
Layer 1: SCM’s starting point is dynamic online motor
control, whereby an organism is closely attuned to its
embedding environment through sensorimotor feedback.
Layer 2: Next, add online predictions of sensory feedback
from ongoing motor output. Online predictive simu-
lation improves instrumental control and provides infor-
mation distinguishing action by the agent from
perception of the world (Table 1).
Layers 2þ 4: Combining predictions of feedback with
layer 4’s capacity for monitored inhibition of output
has further benefits. Offline predictive simulation dis-
tinguishes actual from possible acts and provides infor-
mation about results of alternative possible acts, for
offline/counterfactual instrumental deliberation.
Layer 3: Mirroring reverses layer 2’s predictive associ-
ations, so that observing movements generates motor
signals in the observer that tend to cause similar move-
ments. Various mirroring structures can enable various
forms of copying, with various functions. If mirroring
preserves novel means/ends structure of observed
actions, it can enable imitative learning. But mirroring
provides intersubjective information in a subpersonal
“first-person plural,” without distinction or inference
between own and others’ similar acts.
Layers 3þ 4: Combining mirroring with monitored inhi-
bition of overt copying does distinguish own from
others’ acts. When the goals or means/ends structure
of observed actions are mirrored, this combination pro-
vides information for various levels of understanding of
another’s action.
Note that layer 4’s monitored inhibition can combine
independently with prediction of effects or mirroring of
causes (or both), providing information for various
capacities: see Table 1.
Layer 5: SCM’s last layer adds the function of monitored
simulation of input specifying possible observed actions.
This extends counterfactual information about actions
socially, providing information about possible acts by
others. This function combined with inhibited mirroring
(layers 3 plus 4) of possible actions can generate infor-
mation about possible (as opposed to actual) actions by
others (as opposed to self), and possible causes and
effects of such possible actions. Linguistic and theoretical
resources can be added to simulative foundations,
thereby enabling deft manipulation of combined
actual/possible and self/other distinctions and tracking
of interacting means/ends relations among multiple
possible acts by self and multiple others. Strategic social
intelligence is thus enabled, whereby agents can play
against one another rather than merely “against nature,”
a nonagent.
Specific instances of SCM layers could combine into
sequences, hierarchies, or networks permitting flexible
decomposition and recombination of particular links.
The numbering of layers is largely heuristic and does not
necessarily represent the order of evolution or develop-
ment. First-order hypotheses can map the layers onto
specific phylogenetic or ontogenetic progressions, and
the combination of layers can vary across particular
empirical applications. For example, in the absence of
layer 3’s mirroring function, layers 2 and 4 could
combine to provide information about results of different
possible actions. Nonnegotiable features of SCM are its
explanation of mirroring as an exaptive reversal of online
prediction, and the way the actual/possible and self/
other distinctions arise as online processes are overlain
by monitored inhibition (on impulsiveness as default, cf.
Barkley 2001, pp. 5, 22).
SCM shows how information for important cognitive
capacities of persons can have a foundation in the
dynamic co-enabling of perception and action. Its
layered build-up of functions illustrates a horizontally
modular architecture, in which rich cognitive resources
emerge without a classical sandwich. Specifically,
materials for active perception can generate cognitively
significant resources: the action/perception, self/world,
actual/possible, and self/other distinctions, intersubjec-
tive information enabling social learning and mindreading,
and counterfactual information enabling instrumental and
strategic deliberation.
4.1. Levels versus layers
Unlike some of the work surveyed earlier, SCM dis-
tinguishes neural, functional subpersonal, and personal
levels of description. Each of SCM’s functionally described
layers raises questions at the level of neural implemen-
tation, as well as providing information enabling personal
Table 1. Online/offline by prediction/mirroring
Shared circuits
model’s (SCM’s)
middle layers Prediction Mirroring
Online Layer 2: Online
instrumental
control
Layer 3: Copying,
including imitation
Offline
(with monitored
inhibition)
Layers 2þ 4:
Counterfactual
instrumental
deliberation
(actual acts vs.
possible acts)
Layers 3þ 4: Action
understanding
(own acts vs.
others’ acts)
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level capacities (Table 2). Clarity and progress are served by
distinguishing levels and framing issues explicitly at a given
level, or as concerning interlevel relations. Sliding between
levels on a priori assumptions of isomorphism is unjustified.
Nevertheless, one level can shed light on another. We can
look “down” a level, seeking neural implementations of
aspects of SCM’s functional architecture, or “up” a level,
considering what SCM’s functional architecture would
enable persons to do.
4.1.1. Looking down. SCM’s implementation is distribu-
ted across neural processes and embodied activity in
environments, especially social environments. It predicts
neural systems mediating affordance and mirroring func-
tions, and has a heuristic role in generating specific first-
order hypotheses concerning the following:
The location of postulated comparators and simulators.
The division of neural labor in mirroring ends and means
and in inhibition.
The role of mirror neurons in Broca’s area and their
relation to linguistic capacities.
How the compositionality of imitation relates to the com-
positionality of language.
While SCM is described cybernetically, dynamic systems
theory could represent interactions of its implementing
neural processes and embodied activity over time as evol-
ution of a phase space, and investigate its attractor structure.
4.1.2. Looking up. SCM explains how distinctive features
of the personal level can be informationally enabled. It
provides theoretical resources for addressing further ques-
tions concerning the following:
Table 2. The shared circuits model: Layers and levels
Interlevel
relations Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4 Layer 5
Personal/
animal level:
Adaptive motor
control,
maintain
target against
disturbance
Instrumental
action, self/
world and
action/
perception
distinctions
Social learning,
behavior
copying
(movement
priming,
emulation,
imitation);
intersubjective
empathy;
automatic
priming &
copying &
interference
effects;
chameleon
effects
Deliberation about
own possible
acts
understanding
others’
instrumental
actions, actual/
possible and
self/other
distinctions
Deliberation
about others’
possible acts,
strategic
social
reasoning
about own
and others’
possible acts
Subpersonal
functional
level:
SHARED
CIRCUITS
MODEL
Comparator
feedback-
control
system
Simulative
prediction
(from cause
to effect),
smooths &
speeds
instrumental
control,
shared
information
for
perception
and action
Mirroring, shared
information for
own and others’
actions
Simulative
prediction (from
cause to effect)
and/or
simulative
mirroring (from
effect to cause),
with monitored
inhibition of
output
Monitored
simulation of
input
Subpersonal
neural
level:
Various neural
comparator
systems,
exafference
vs.
reafference
Efference copy,
neural
systems for
sensorimotor
affordances
(canonical
neurons)
Neural mirror
systems
Neural inhibitory
and monitoring
mechanisms
? Neural
imagery
mechanisms
JK&AC: Why the question mark? We think that Susan meant to indicate that the search for the neural basis of layer 5 might begin with
mechanisms that underpin imagery, but that this was just the beginning. Just how the brain might go about simulating inputs was one of the
many open empirical questions that SCM raises, which Susan hoped might be taken up in the commentaries or in future work developing SCM.
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Relations among distinctively human capacities for imita-
tion, deliberation, mindreading, and language;
Relations between personal-level action/perception, self/
other, and actual/possible distinctions, and whether
they reflect subpersonal structure.
How SCM’s layers map onto evolutionary or developmen-
tal stages.
Relations between subpersonal simulation of possible
actions and the personal-level sense of being able to
do otherwise.
Whether knowledge of other minds requires first-person
to third-person inference or can bottom out in reliable
subpersonal information at layer 3.
Whether the subpersonal priority of intersubjective infor-
mation in SCM is reflected in personal-level epistem-
ology of other minds.
Whether social cognition is related to aspects of conscious-
ness, given the roles of comparator and simulation struc-
tures in accounts of consciousness (Frith et al. 2000a;
Gray 2004; Hesslow 2002; Jeannerod 1997; 2001;
Milner & Goodale 1995, p. 64).
Whether SCM can contribute to distinguishing conscious
from unconscious processes.
Whether SCM can extend from instrumental to expressive
action, including facial expressions of emotion and
emotional mirroring (cf. Adolphs 2002; Decety & Cha-
minade 2005; Gallese 2005; Iacoboni 2005; Preston &
de Waal 200218; Rizzolatti 2005).
Whether extending SCM to expressive action can illumi-
nate relations between social cognition and language
or consciousness.
SCM has a cybernetic rather than conceptual structure,
yet can provide information for cognitive skills – for
example, mindreading; deliberation – with personal-level
conceptual structure. It thus probes the kind of intelligibil-
ity to be found in explanations of how subpersonal
resources enable personal-level capacities. By showing
how subpersonal resources for cognition can build on
those for active perception, SCM illustrates that informa-
tionally enabling subpersonal structure need not recapitu-
late personal-level conceptual structure in any explicitly
isomorphic way. It is an empirical question, to be
decided case by case, whether enabling subpersonal struc-
ture corresponds isomorphically to personal-level struc-
ture, conceptual or otherwise. Interlevel isomorphism
should not be required or denied a priori. Personal-level
content can remain distinctively conceptual and norma-
tive, while it nevertheless becomes intelligible how the
minds of persons can arise from interactions of embodied
brains with environments, including social environments.
In explanations of some systems’ dynamical behavior,
higher-level structure corresponds to lower-level structure.
But the dynamical behavior of other, complex systems
cannot be so explained: System behavior can result deter-
ministically from nonlinear relationships among lower-
level factors although its structure does not correspond
to lower-level structure. Brain-body-environment systems
are sufficiently complex and nonlinear that emergent struc-
ture without isomorphic lower-level structure should not
surprise us.
I end by highlighting some noteworthy aspects of this
model:
1. SCM avoids the traditional conception of cognition
as sandwiched between separate perception and action
systems. Rather, it understands perception and action as
enabled by shared subpersonal dynamics, and builds sub-
personal resources enabling cognition on shared resources
for perception and action.
2. Shared processing of actions by self and by others in
social cognition is a special aspect of shared processing of
action and perception in dynamic control. I perceive your
action by means that engage my capacity for similar action,
enabling me to copy or understand your action.
3. These shared resources are prior to self/other and
actual/possible distinctions that provide information for
action understanding and instrumental deliberation. The
shared processing of action and perception in dynamic
control is preserved when an actual/possible distinction
is overlaid via inhibition of overt action. Similarly, the
shared processes of action and perceiving others’ action
is preserved when a self/other distinction is overlaid via
inhibition of overt copying.
4. The subpersonal basis of counterfactual deliberation
and mindreading is simulation of instrumentally struc-
tured agency. Linguistic and theoretical resources can
built on practical simulative foundations to enable more
advanced counterfactual reasoning and mindreading.
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NOTES
1. Enabling subpersonal dynamics can include bodily or
environmental loops, as well as neural processes (on vehicle
externalism, see Hurley 1998; in press).
2. Like Dennett (1991) and Millikan (1991; 1993), I am wary
of projecting properties or structure between the personal and
subpersonal levels. Like McDowell (1994), I use “enable” for a
making-possible relationship between subpersonal and personal
levels and deny interlevel isomorphism requirements (such as a
language of thought requirement). But I allow that enabling
explanations can sometimes contribute to personal-level intellig-
ibility, and find philosophical interest in subpersonal explanations
per se.
3. I use “emulation” in the well-established social learning
theory sense (Call & Carpenter 2002; Tomasello 1998; 1999),
not in the different sense used by Grush (1995; 2004). I, like
many others, use “simulation” to include “emulation” in
Grush’s sense.
4. Cf. Povinelli (2000, Ch. 6), where chimps are not permitted
trials and errors with rake orientations.
5. Paul Harris, at the conference “Perspectives on Imitation:
From Cognitive Neuroscience to Social Science” held at
Royaumont Abbey, France, May 23–26, 2002, suggested an
experiment to assess how far monkey mirror neurons subserve
action understanding. They fire when the monkey reaches for
an apple or she sees the experimenter reach for it. The same
mirror neurons fire when, after a screen has occluded the
apple, the monkey sees the experimenter’s hand reach behind
the screen to where the apple is. They don’t fire when the
monkey sees that there is no apple before the screen descends
and then sees the experimenter’s hand reach behind the screen
in the same way (Umilta` et al. 2001). These neurons thus code
for the action’s goal or result. Harris suggests a variation that
Hurley: The shared circuits model
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provides a neural “false-belief” test. Suppose both monkey
and experimenter see a nut, and see the screen descend to
occlude it. The experimenter leaves the room. The monkey is
permitted to remove the nut. The experimenter returns and
the monkey sees the experimenter reach behind the screen for
the nut, which the monkey knows is no longer there. Will the
monkey’s mirror neuron for “reaching for the nut” fire? This
might suggest the neuron codes for a goal of nut grasping,
since the experimenter “doesn’t know” the nut is no longer
there. Or will it not fire, because the nut isn’t actually there, so
nut grasping cannot result? That is, does the mirror neuron
code for the intended goal of the observed action, or merely its
result? Note that even chimps fail nonverbal false-belief tests
(see Call & Tomasello 1999; Call et al. 2000; and cf. Hare et al.
2000; 2001).
6. Or its monkey homologue. Mirror neurons are also found in
frontal area 6 (Buccino et al. 2001) and posterior parietal cortex,
area PF (Miall 2003).
7. Byrne (1998; 1999; 2002a; 2002b; Byrne & Russon 1998)
argues that this is found in gorilla food processing.
8. Howard (1988) and Danielson (1992) implement mirror
heuristics computationally, avoiding computational loops and
regresses. Danielson’s technique matches quotations of another
player’s program and one’s own; others’ programs are read
offline to determine a match, but not executed (Danielson
1992, p. 82ff).
9. Danielson’s self-same cooperators cooperate just with exact
syntactic copies of themselves. He also discusses more flexible
and selective metaheuristics (Danielson 1992, pp. 130ff, 140).
10. Danielson (1992, p. 45ff) runs Prolog implementations
against one another in tournaments where a heuristic’s stability
against invading strategies does not depend on same players
meeting one another repeatedly (as Tit-for-Tat’s stability does).
Similar points apply to Howard’s (1988) Mirror Strategy.
11. The mindreading needed for mirror heuristics is of inten-
tions rather than beliefs – the ontogenetically and phylogeneti-
cally earlier capacity (Rakoczy et al. 2007; Tomasello 1999;
Tomasello & Call 1997; Whiten 1997, p. 167).
12. Space disallows discussion of Goldman’s (1989; 1992;
2005) important version of ST, which shares this first-person to
third-person feature. Arguments from analogy have been criti-
cized, for example, for generalizing without warrant from one
case (oneself) and on grounds that self-recognition by a subject
requires a contrast with other subjects.
13. Cf. Wolpert (1997), Wolpert and Kawato (1998), Haruno
et al. (2001), and Wolpert et al. (2003) on selection among
forward models; Grush (2004) on continuous combination of
real and simulated input; and Grush (1995) linking motor
control and mindreading. SCM’s layer 2 comparator is similar
to that in Gray’s account of schizophrenia (Gray 1991, pp.
11ff). Layer 2’s predictive mechanisms are similar to those
Grush (2004) argues can be run offline to account for motor
and visual imagery; his commentators discuss possible links to
mirror neurons, but he doesn’t postulate anything similar to
layer 3’s mirroring. See Note 5 on terminological differences.
14. See Hurley (1998, pp. 140ff). Frith explains schizophrenic
auditory hallucinations as involving defects in self-monitoring via
efference copy, that is, failure to distinguish perception from
action via predictive simulation: “Brain structures responsible
for willed actions no longer send corollary discharges to . . .
parts of the brain concerned with perception . . . In consequence
self-generated changes in perception are misinterpreted as
having an external cause” (Frith 1992, pp. 93, 81–83).
15. See Frith (1992, pp. 81–83, 93). Gray’s comparator model
of schizophrenia emphasizes failure to integrate memories of
input regularities with ongoing motor programs, predicting
close association of cognitive and motor disorders (Gray 1991,
pp. 1, 11, 19).
16. Gallese and Goldman (1998, p. 498) suggest something like
this reversal; thanks to Vittorio Gallese for discussion here.
Blakemore and Decety (2001, p. 564) suggest a related reversal
more explicitly. Whether empirical evidence for this hypothesized
reversal will emerge, and what neural mechanisms may under-
write it, are open questions. Perhaps co-firing associated with
the forward model strengthens and unmasks backprojection. Cf.
Oztop et al. (2005), whose model involves no reversal of forward
models or mirroring, but rather prediction and gradient descent.
17. Heyes (2005) suggests a mediating role for words in
acquired equivalence learning, though she allows that the third
term can be nonlinguistic.
18. SCM is what Preston and de Waal call a “perception-
action model” (PAM). They apply PAM to empathy and emotion-
al expression, whereas SCM details the development of mirroring
and simulation from instrumental control.
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Abstract:How can “predictive simulation” – as a conscious phenomenon,
related to goal imagery – be interchangeable with mirroring, which is an
automatic response that, from a first-person perspective, enters
awareness only after the act? The correspondence between perception
of another’s action and execution of one’s similar action may be an
example of a general perception-motor interface that maps perception
onto behaviour or disposition towards action, without the need for
simulation.
We think of a certain result and our muscles produce this result,
though we did not really mean to do this act ourselves. The thought
arouses the movement because it has previously been linked with the
movement. A thought which has previously served as the stimulus to
an act will tend to have this effect again, unless inhibited by some con-
trary stimulus. There is no need of a definite consent to the act, pro-
vided there is nothing present to inhibit it.
— Woodworth (1926, p. 528)
Efference copies are unlikely to play a role in the awareness of
one’s movement. William James (1890) recognised that con-
sciousness of movement is an afferent, not efferent, sensation;
it is a consequence, not antecedent, of the movement itself. He
thought that consciousness of muscular exertion is impossible
without movement being effected somewhere. Thus, our aware-
ness of movement is secondary to the actual occurrence of move-
ment in the physical realm. Motor acts enter awareness not at the
point of execution, but only as they are perceived. Hurley argues
that “copies of motor signals predictively simulate input signals”
(sect. 3.3, para. 1). Yet, if motor output were to be unconscious,
how could an efference copy of motor output simulate sensory
consequences of an action or produce imagery of action effects?
Hurley thinks that through association of an action with its
result, we can anticipate the sensory effects of a motor plan. Cer-
tainly, what precedes goal-directed action is an “anticipatory
image of the movement’s sensible effects” (James 1890). Wood-
worth (1926), too, recognised that voluntary action is preceded
by imagination of some change to be effected, but he also saw
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that such imagery of action effects could not amount to the pre-
diction of action effects. The role of what Hurley calls “predictive
simulation” may not be to provide feedback onto “input signals”
but – by acting as a stimulus – to determine instrumental action
in itself. Already James (1890) considered that thoughts about
actions automatically predispose to these actions; indeed, that
representations of movement induce the movements they rep-
resent. Elsner and Hommel (2001) suggested that perception
of an event that resembles a known action effect can automati-
cally activate the corresponding action. Furthermore, imagery
of the “intended and expected action effects,” representing the
anticipated goal of a voluntary action, can – by acting as a stimu-
lus – elicit the response that produces the “to-be-expected
effect” (Elsner & Hummel 2001). Thus, anticipating the conse-
quences of an action may in itself serve as precipitant for
action. Imagery of a goal can cause goal-directed action, inas-
much as perception of a goal can have this effect.
There may be no need for a comparator mechanism: Percep-
tion and imagery are constructed by attentional mechanisms
already in a way that makes them sufficient determinants of
motor behaviour in accordance with the situation. In order to
determine a motor response, goal perception or imagery is con-
trasted with awareness of body movement and position (as con-
strained by reafferent proprioreceptive and visual sensory
input). Movement plans (intentions), which specify a target and
the movement required to achieve it, are formed automatically –
upon perception of salient events – in the posterior parietal
cortex, following which they activate connected premotor areas,
thus predisposing to a motor response (Colby & Goldberg
1999). The representation of a stimulus in the posterior parietal
cortex allows premotor areas to determine the coordinates of
an action in response to the stimulus, although this does not
imply that an action will be produced (Colby & Goldberg 1999).
The significance of premotor cortex activation during obser-
vation of another’s purposeful action (Grezes & Decety 2001),
which occurs even when the observed interaction is partly
hidden from vision and can only be inferred, may be that it pro-
duces response facilitation (Rizzolatti et al. 2001), which explains
our tendency to imitate an observed movement. During obser-
vation of goal-directed action, the observer may shift attention
to the other’s explicit or implicit goal, whereupon the goal is per-
ceived or imagined; which, in turn, primes motor activity instru-
mental for obtaining the goal. Action understanding was shown to
involve activation in premotor areas – more so than the mere
imitation of others’ actions (Rizzolatti et al. 2001). Therefore,
understanding of observed action, presumably including under-
standing of others’ speech, involves dispositions to own action.
Many social behaviours are automatically induced by the per-
ception of others’ actions (Ferguson & Bargh 2004). People tend
to mimic gestures or adopt the accent of a conversation partner
without being aware of this. Behaviours in a conversation
partner that connote high or low status automatically induce
people to adopt opposite postures that connote submissiveness
or dominance, respectively (Ferguson & Bargh 2004). Conversa-
tional partners use automatic interactive alignment of their
response dispositions on multiple linguistic levels – a process
that is related to imitation. A speaker’s words, sounds, grammati-
cal forms, and meanings activate matching linguistic represen-
tations in the partner and thus automatically influence the
latter’s linguistic productions. Speakers automatically re-use lin-
guistic structures that they have just perceived as listeners
(Garrod & Pickering 2004).
Hurley suggests that mirroring reverses predictive simulation
(Layer 3). Assuming that we simulate “effects of intended acts”
(in the sense of anticipatory imagery of a goal for action), can
we conclude that “causes of observed movements can be simu-
lated” (target article, sect. 1, para. 9), too? Does perception of
another’s movement produce simulation in the sense of con-
scious imagery of a goal or cause of another’s action, or does it
in itself lead to an automatic disposition to act? Hurley considers
that, when observing another’s behaviour, the self’s matching
response is part of the very perception of the other’s behaviour.
In other words, “a copied motor pattern is part of the perception
of another’s action, though overt movement may be inhibited”
(sect. 2.3.5, para. 6). However, perception of others’ behaviour
may not give us conscious access to others’ goals or motivations,
but only indirectly through our automatically elicited behaviour,
including verbal expression. Mirrored behaviour may impress
after its execution as being in tune with others’ attitudes and pur-
suits, inasmuch as it will also appear to be conforming to the
social situation and context in general.
Exposure to others’ traits and stereotypes automatically elicits
patterns of behaviour and attitude in accordance with the primed
traits or stereotypes, whereby subjects are “unaware of any influ-
ence or correlation between primes and their behavior” (sect. 2.1,
para. 13). Indeed, “thinking about or perceiving action automati-
cally increases, in ways participants are unaware of, the likelihood
that they will perform similar actions themselves,” yet why should
this process involve copying “at various levels of generality,” par-
ticularly the copying of goals (sect. 2.1, para. 14)? Social situ-
ations determine our behaviour rapidly and automatically.
When we imitate behaviour patterns associated with others’
traits and stereotypes, we may do so as a way of seeking social
approval, or to display social submission or dominance, although
these are by no means explicit goals. Motivation of social beha-
viour is unconscious and, insofar as one can speak of goals,
these are unconscious, too. The absence of explicit goals in pat-
terns of social behaviour raises the possibility that perceived/
imagined events or objects generally translate into behavioural
dispositions or overt behaviour without preceding reference to
goals, meaning that even instrumental behaviour is proximally
determined by imagination of some change to be effected, not
by explicit goals.
Finally, Hurley argues that mirroring, which produces a “simi-
larity of own and others’ acts” (sect. 3.4, para. 9), is prior to the
self/other distinction (Layer 4). “Monitoring of output inhibition”
is required in combination with simulative mirroring in order to
“separate information about others’ actions from information
about one’s own” (sect. 3.4, para. 6). The assumption that “the
origin of the self/other distinction” lies in “monitoring whether
mirroring is inhibited” (sect. 2.3.5, para 9, emphasis in original)
implies that self experience hinges on others’ presence and is a
social phenomenon even in its most fundamental dimension. It
also demands, rather awkwardly, that there should be a fundamen-
tal difference between agent/world and self/other distinctions.
More parsimoniously, agent/world and self/other distinctions
can be conceptualised on a more basic level of sensorimotor
control, independently from mirroring (Behrendt 2005).
Mirroring cannot account for understanding
action
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Abstract: Susan Hurley’s shared circuits model (SCM) rightly begins in
action and progresses through a series of layers; but it fails to reach action
understanding because it relies on mirroring as a driving force, draws on
heavily criticized theories, and neglects the need for shared experience in
our grasp of social understanding.
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Hurley has addressed the challenging problem of getting from
the subpersonal level to the personal – from casual processes
to knowledge. We agree with her starting point being in action
and her use of layers, but we see two types of problem with
her approach.
One is the error of omission, in that Hurley endorses positions
that have been extensively critiqued. She buys into a reconcilia-
tion of theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), and
thereby inherits the problems inherent in both. We, and
others, have identified fundamental flaws in TT and ST (e.g.,
Carpendale & Lewis 2004; 2006), but they are still taken for
granted and seem to be immune to criticism.
Second, in attempting to forge links between layers, Hurley
makes a series of errors of commission. The layers are bridged
by jumps that fudge the distinction between information and
knowledge. At the level of causal processes we can talk about
information in one sense of the word, such as a digital camera
recording a scene. The camera contains information, but this is
very different from the knowledge that a person might acquire
through observing the same scene. It is knowledge that
Hurley’s model has yet to account for. And this is the start of
her problems.
There are consequences of both types of error. Central to the
transition between layers, for Hurley, is involved the miraculous
shift from copying or “mirroring” to “action understanding.” The
oft-repeated mantra is: “I perceive your action by means that
engage my capacity for similar action, enabling me to copy or
understand your action” (sect. 4.1.2, para. 4). That is, I see an
action, I have a tendency to mirror it, and through this process
I understand the action. We will set aside the problems of how
mirror systems develop and whether they should be thought of
as a source or an outcome of development, and instead point
out that in most circumstances this would not work. For
example, I see pointing, and I have a tendency to imitate it;
that is, a tendency for my arm and index finger to extend. But
this would not help in understanding the action.
Consider the following examples. At a picnic on the beach, my
(Carpendale’s) wife looked at me and pointed to a friend’s bag. It
was clear that she wanted to direct my attention, but why did she
want me to look at the bag? Was there something special about
it? Did she want me to do something with it, get something out
of it? Give it to her? How was I to understand this gesture? If
I copied, or mirrored, this arm movement, it would not help in
understanding her action. A little more information about the
situation might help. We were picking things up, preparing to
walk further down the beach. Yet still I failed to understand
her, although by now readers may be thinking of possible mean-
ings. In fact, I had to ask her what she meant. It turned out that
she knew that the bag was heavy and she wanted me to carry it for
our friend. Given shared experience in helping others, it is, in
fact, reasonable to expect that this gesture might be understood.
This need for experience in shared routines in order to under-
stand gestures is clarified by considering research with
chimpanzees.
Although chimpanzees can follow an experimenter’s gaze
direction and pointing gestures and end up looking at a bucket
where food is located, they do not understand the gesture
(Hare & Tomasello 2004). Chimpanzees do not understand that
the experimenter is trying to tell them where the food is located
because they have never experienced such a form of cooperative
activity with others; they have never had a conspecific indicate
food for them. However, they do have plenty of experience with
competition, and if the event is transformed into a competitive
encounter – if they know they are competing for food with the
experimenter – then if they see the experimenter reaching for a
bucket they immediately know where the food is. So what is
needed in addition to the action in order to understand that
action? The animal needs some experience with that form of
interaction. No amount of mirroring or copying, even if it was
“offline copying,” would help the chimpanzee.
For Hurley, action understanding is a foundation for later
“mindreading,” which she distinguishes from “mere behavior
prediction” (sect. 2.3.3, para. 4); that is, “discovering another
player’s intention, not simply predicting his behavior” (sect.
2.3.3, para. 7). But what else is there to predict other than
people’s action, broadly conceived to include verbal action?
The very term “mindreading” conflicts with her foundation in
action, and to do this Hurley buys into the mysticism of contem-
porary theory and its dualist assumption that new substance is
added in addition to action. She later acknowledges that mind-
reading has to be based on observation of behavior, but, if so,
what is the means by which the transition to it occurs? We
need an account of social understanding that does not rely
upon the crumbling foundations of behaviorism or dualism,
both of which split intentional activity into two parts.
Our point here is that nothing about the physical movement,
whether it is mirrored or not, would help in understanding the
action of pointing in various situations. Instead, what is needed
is experience in similar sorts of routines. This is missing from
Hurley’s model. She does write about various forms of “action
understanding,” so perhaps she has a loophole, and these might
be graded in terms of their complexity. Her intuition about
understanding others’ actions might work in simpler situations
such as seeing another reach to grasp something. But it might
work in such cases only because of the shared experience in
this form of action. This is overlooked in her model and then
she encounters problems with the slightly more complex cases
that we discuss. What are the simpler forms of action understand-
ing and how can the transition from simpler to more complex
forms be accounted for in Hurley’s model? These are crucial
questions. Although layering is a useful metaphor to help us envi-
sage these questions, Hurley’s model does not help bridge these
layers.
Can the shared circuits model (SCM) explain
joint attention or perception of discrete
emotions?
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Abstract: The shared circuits model (SCM) is a bold attempt to explain
how humans make sense of action, at different levels. In this commentary
we single out five concerns: (1) the lack of a developmental account, (2)
the absence of double-dissociation evidence, (3) the neglect of joint
attention and joint action, (4) the inability to explain discrete emotion
perception, and (5) the lack of predictive power or testability of the
model. We conclude that Hurley’s model requires further work before
it could be seen as an improvement over earlier models.
In the shared circuits model (SCM), Susan Hurley provides an
impressive, overarching multi-level, multi-layered heuristic
model to explain how we perceive intentional action, and to
explain imitation and mindreading. Wide-ranging in its coverage
of philosophy of mind, comparative and developmental psychol-
ogy, and neuroscience, the SCM warrants a critical evaluation
from within each of these domains.
The SCM proposes five layers of “functional subpersonal”
description. The author explicitly resists stating any phylogenic
or ontogenic relations amongst them. Our first question is to
ask what, if any, developmental progression exists between
these five layers. Since overt imitation is found in human new-
borns (Meltzoff & Moore 1983b; 1989), does this mean for
example that layer 3 exists at birth? Mindreading abilities are
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typically observed by the age of 3, and appear in layer 5. Is
Hurley’s claim that one cannot pass from layers 3 to 5 without
passing via layer 4? The developmental differences from one
layer to the next are in need of considerable further specification.
Our second question is to ask whether, in humans, any double
dissociations exist among these layers in certain neurodevelop-
mental conditions. These are not discussed in Hurley’s
account. For example, Autism Spectrum Conditions entail defi-
cits in both mindreading (Baron-Cohen 1995a; Frith 2001) and
affective empathy (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright 2004). In con-
trast, psychopathy entails intact mindreading abilities (Richell
et al. 2003) but a deficit affective empathy, since they show
little psychophysiological response to signals of distress when
compared with matched controls (Blair et al. 1997; Prinz 2005).
If these two conditions represent a double dissociation
between mindreading and affective empathy (Blair & Perschardt
2003; Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen 2006), how does the SCM
explain such fractionation? This dissociation would suggest that
intact layers 3 and 4 are not essential for an intact layer 5.
Our third question is regarding where joint attention and joint
action are situated in the model. These emerge by the age of
9–14 months in typically developing infants (Scaife & Bruner
1975). Humans may be unique among primates in developing
joint attention. They use their index finger to point to share inter-
est, without any special teaching, in every culture where it has
been studied (Tomasello et al. 2005). Joint action is also made
possible by joint attention and intention detection. Imagine the
classic scenario of needing to move a heavy log through
a narrow exit, and achieving this with a conspecific but without
using language. Person 1 has to attract the attention of person
2, and then succeed in drawing person 2’s attention to the far
end of the log rather than his own end of it. This would entail
glances and gestures that convey (without words) “I’ll pick up
my end and you pick up your end.” Next, person 1 has to make
clear to person 2 that he wants him to move his end of the log
leftwards, while person 1 moves in the opposite direction,
so as to rotate the log (role reversal). We guess this thought
experiment involving joint action could be achieved effortlessly
between two typical humans from age 18 months – and all
without language – and some relevant data exist to support this
prediction (Carpenter et al. 2005; Phillips et al. 1995; Ross &
Lollis 1987). Other models already exist to account for such coor-
dinated action, such as the shared attention mechanism (SAM)
within the human mindreading system (Baron-Cohen 1995b).
If the SCM cannot account for such a capacity, which arguably
lies at the root of later social cognition, then what does the
SCM add over earlier models? Notice that a mirror-neuron
system might not be up to the task of explaining such joint
action, since this might lead person 2 to move left when person
1 does (to mirror his or her movement), whereas person 1 may
have been intending person 2 to recognise that the goal was to
rotate the two ends of the log in opposite directions to get it
out of the exit. Reading another’s intention during coordinated
action may involve goal representation that cannot be explained
by mirroring alone.
Our fourth question is concerning how the SCM applies to the
processing of facial expressions of discrete emotions. In a recent
neuroimaging study in our lab, involving passive viewing of
dynamic facial expressions of emotion, we found that trait
empathy correlated maximally with different brain regions for
different emotions (Chakrabarti et al. 2006). A similar result
(Lee et al. 2006) showed that different brain regions were maxi-
mally active during explicit imitation of different emotion
expressions. Interestingly, both of these studies found a
common, emotion-independent role for the inferior frontal
gyrus. This could possibly be accommodated by the SCM, with
the assumption that the perception of emotion-independent
facial muscular movement is mapped onto inferior frontal
gyrus activity. However, the finding that both passive viewing
and explicit imitation of different emotion expressions are
associated with activity in different brain regions raises a
problem for the SCM framework, which makes no provision
for how perception of different emotions would recruit layers 4
and 5 to different extents.
Our final concern is the broad question of what testable pre-
dictions the SCM makes. In science, models are useful if they
make novel, falsifiable predictions. While we reiterate how the
SCM provides an impressive review integrating large literatures
relevant to studies on action perception, we conclude that it
leaves questions of central importance unaddressed and it is
not clear how it is an improvement over earlier models.
The neural underpinnings of self and other
and layer 2 of the shared circuits model
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Abstract: Differentiating self from other has been investigated at the
neural level, and its incorporation into the model proposed Hurley is
necessary for the model to be complete. With an emphasis on the feed-
forward model in layer 2, we examine the role that self and other
disruptions, including auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), may have
in expanding the model proposed by Hurley.
In Susan Hurley’s shared circuits model (SCM), we see a model
that is useful in its intended purposes, though somewhat incom-
plete both in application and in description, specifically at the
neural level. Hurley predicts that disruptions within layer 4
could lead to cognitive deficits, specifically in the capacities for
instrumental deliberation and for understanding others’
actions. Although her model is successful in predicting some cog-
nitive dysfunction, she does not note relevant problems that can
arise when a person fails to adequately differentiate between self
and other. Nor does she explore fully the useful role that SCM’s
layer 2, or, more specifically, the feed-forward model that
underlies it, may play both in explicating the self/other delinea-
tion and in encouraging the search for the neural correlates
involved in the dynamic.
For example, Feinberg and Keenan (2005) found that the par-
ietal lobe, as well as the right frontal regions, are critical in dis-
orders of patients suffering from a loss of self. In delusional
misidentification syndrome (DMS), patients consistently and ada-
mantly misidentify persons, places, objects, or events. In delu-
sional reduplication syndrome (DRS), patients reduplicate or
double the misidentified entity. Data from such patients revealed
that the greatest number of cases is associated with right frontal
and right parietal damage. Disturbances of the self/other
relationship are not unique to DMS/DRS, however, but occur
in a number of neurological disorders. For example, patients
with delusions of control confuse self-produced and externally
produced actions and sensations; such delusions of alien control
are hallmark symptoms of schizophrenia. Hyperactivity of the
parietal cortex and cerebellum occurs in such patients, suggesting
that over-activation of a cerebellar-parietal network during self-
generated actions is associated with the misattribution of those
actions to an alien, external source (Blakemore 2003). Another
instance of deficits in the ability to differentiate self from other
that is unexamined yet germane to the target article concerns
auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) and inner speech. Individ-
uals who experience AVHs report hearing speech in the absence
of any external stimulation; that is, they hear in their head a voice
or voices other than their own.
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Although AVHs are classified as a first-rank symptom of schizo-
phrenia, they may not necessarily signify pathology and may best
be understood within the wider context of the development of
inner speech (Jones & Fernyhough 2007a; 2007b). In Vygotsky’s
theory of the social origins of higher mental processes, inner
speech represents the end point of a developmental process in
which external conversation gradually becomes internalized to
form verbal thought (Vygotsky 1934/1987). Like its semi-covert
developmental precursor, private speech, inner speech retains
the dialogic nature of the external discourse from which it
derives. Fernyhough’s four-stage model of the development of
inner speech as conceptualized by Vygotsky suggests two distinct
forms of dialogic inner speech (Fernyhough 2004): expanded
inner speech, where the give-and-take quality of external conver-
sation permeates the verbal mentation; and a condensed variety
of inner speech, where inner speech becomes “thinking in pure
meanings” (Vygotsky 1934/1987), having lost most of the acous-
tics and structure of external dialogue. According to Ferny-
hough’s (2004) theory of AVHs, which draws on Vygotskian
ideas about the developmental significance of inner speech,
AVHs result from the temporary re-expansion of condensed
inner speech, particularly under conditions of stress and cogni-
tive challenge. The acoustic properties of the voices in inner dia-
logue are thus not attenuated but are experienced fully. The
question then is how it is possible that cognition (inner voice)
produced by self may be experienced as produced by other.
The cognitive dysfunction that results in the failure to differen-
tiate self from other in inner speech may be explained by a
forward model similar to the one underpinning Hurley’s layer
2. SCM relies on the forward model of motor control as proposed
by Miall (2003) to postulate the subpersonal process that predicts
the consequences of motor commands and compares them with
the desired state. In her article on delusions of alien control, Bla-
kemore (2003) uses this model to explain how an internal predic-
tor uses information about intentions to enable the distinction
between self-generated and externally generated sensory
events. The forward model is dysfunctional when it cannot accu-
rately predict the sensory consequences of a movement based on
the efference copy of the motor command. This results in sensory
discrepancy and a failure to cancel the reafference or actual feed-
back, so that the self-produced movement feels externally caused
(Blakemore 2003; see also Frith et al. 2000b). Although devel-
oped to explain abnormalities involving overt actions, this
forward model has recently been applied to inner speech
(Jones & Fernyhough 2007b). Jones and Fernyhough’s appli-
cation proposes a direct causal mechanism leading from a mal-
function of the predicted state to the experience of inner
speech as being of alien origin. When the brain either produces
a degraded predicted state or fails to produce a predicted state at
all from the initial inner speech motor command, the conse-
quence is that an emotion of self-authorship is not felt and
instead the inner speech is experienced as authored by an other.
For any model of the mind or cognitive functioning to be com-
plete, it must relate to the brain. Thus, we need to understand the
neural underpinnings of the predicted-state mechanism pro-
posed by the forward model. This may require investigating net-
works, such as the interactions between perceptual and motor
areas (Jones & Fernyhough 2007b). For example, Leube et al.
(2003) have suggested that neurological activity associated with
a deficit in the efference copy mechanism may involve the corti-
cal network that de Vignemont and Fourneret (2004) found
implicated in action attribution, including the prefrontal and
the parietal cortex, the supplementary motor area, and the cer-
ebellum. In terms of AVHs, Shergill et al. (2000) examined func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans of patients with
schizophrenia made while the patients were experiencing AVHs.
They noted that the pattern of activation observed during AVHs
was remarkably similar to that seen when healthy volunteers
engaged in auditory verbal imagery (AVI), which is produced
when one imagines being spoken to by another person.
Specifically, Shergill et al. (2000) observed common activation
of bilateral frontal and temporal gyri, along with right-sided pre-
central and inferior parietal gyri. Increased supplementary motor
area activation was associated with healthy participants generat-
ing auditory verbal images; however, the supplementary motor
area (SMA) was only weakly activated during AVHs. Other
studies have suggested a role for the right anterior cingulate
gyrus (see Jones & Fernyhough 2007a and studies cited
therein). Given that the parietal and cingulate cortices subserve
attention to internal and external bodily space and the attribution
of significance to sensory information, they provide a plausible
neural substrate for the misattribution of self-generated inner
speech to other (see Spence et al. 1997).
Shared circuits in language and
communication
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Abstract: The target article says surprisingly little about the possible role
of shared circuits in language and communication. This commentary
considers how they might contribute to linguistic communication,
particularly during dialogue. We argue that shared circuits are used to
promote alignment between linguistic representations at many levels
and to support production-based emulation of linguistic input during
comprehension.
Hurley’s shared circuits model (SCM) provides a framework for
investigating the role of emulation and imitation in social cogni-
tion. The SCM builds on two recent developments in cognitive
neuroscience: Grush’s (2004) notion of an emulator (originating
from motor control theory) and the discovery of mirror and cano-
nical neurons in monkeys. The target article specifically concen-
trates on the role of shared circuits in imitation, deliberation, and
mindreading. However, it says little about their role in language
and communication, which presumably underpin many of the
cognitive abilities that Hurley focuses on.
Section 2.3.1 of the target article discusses various hypotheses
about how imitation might support language. For example,
Hurley argues that the “flexible articulated relations between
means and ends in imitative learning could be an evolutionary
precursor of arbitrary relations between symbols and referents”
(para. 2) and that “mirror systems provide a common code for
actions of self and other, and thus for language production and
perception” (para. 3). Finally, she suggests that the “flexible
recombinant structure of ends and means in imitation may be a
precursor of recombinant grammatical structure in language”
(para. 4).
However, section 3 contains surprisingly little about the
relationship between the SCM (and its various layers) and
language processing. In fact, it is only when discussing layer 5
(the full-blown model) that language is considered at all. This
is in relation to how imitative learning together with learned
manipulation of external symbols could support the rich struc-
ture of language. Hurley also speculates that language could
assist layer 5 circuits in taking input off-line, thereby allowing
for more advanced mindreading (e.g., in multi-person strategic
deliberation).
By contrast, we suggest that lower layers of the SCM may play
a crucial role in language processing, in particular during
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interactive dialogue, which is the most basic setting for linguistic
communication. Notice that some of the strongest evidence for
perception priming action is from the language domain. For
example, there are now a number of demonstrations of the
priming of articulators during speech perception using transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and electromyography (EMG)
(Fadiga et al. 2002; Watkins et al. 2003). We have argued that,
during dialogue, interlocutors tend to align their mental states
at many levels, and that such alignment is largely a result of
priming (Pickering & Garrod 2004). Indeed, successful com-
munication appears to occur when interlocutors align their
models of the situation under discussion. So it would be surpris-
ing if the “shared circuits” underlying imitation and mindreading
did not also play an important role in this process. In fact, good
evidence suggests that alignment of the situation model is sup-
ported by rapid and largely automatic alignment at many linguis-
tic levels, such as sound (e.g., Pardo 2006), syntax (Branigan et al.
2000), and meaning of expressions (Garrod & Anderson 1987).
Such linguistic priming would arise at layer 3 of the SCM, just as
it does for the chameleon effect (Chartrand&Bargh 1999). Hurley
notes “the intimate relationship between the sharing of circuits for
self and other and for action and perception: Layer 3’s shared
informational dynamics for intersubjectivity presupposes layer
2’s shared informational dynamics for perception and action”
(sect. 3.3, para. 3). We argue that just such a relationship holds
between shared circuits for linguistic representations in communi-
cators and shared informational dynamics for language production
and comprehension (Garrod & Pickering 2004). In other words,
covert and overt imitation (i.e., imitative production) at various lin-
guistic levels promotes alignment or intersubjectivity between lin-
guistic representations at those levels.
It is not only in relation to imitation that dialogue processing
involves shared circuits. There is increasing evidence that
language comprehension like action observation may use
production-based (i.e., action based) emulation. In particular, we
have argued that comprehension uses predictions based on simul-
taneous involvement of components of the language production
system in the form of a Grush-style emulator (Pickering &
Garrod 2007). Such an emulator uses the production system to
make predictions (at various linguistic levels) about the input to
the comprehension system and runs those predictions in real
time. In this way, the system facilitates rapid interpretation and is
robust in dealing with ambiguous or noisy language input. At the
same time, by priming the production system, the emulator facili-
tates the rapid switching between comprehension and production
during dialogue. Although this production-based emulator is used
for comprehending speech, it is built out of exactly the same action-
perception components as used in layer 3 of the SCM.
Incorporating control systems into shared circuits for social
cognition is a welcome theoretical development. Here we have
argued that such shared circuits can also be used to explain
how interlocutors align their linguistic representations during
dialogue, which ultimately supports successful communication.
Indeed, communication is about sharing (with the Latin commu-
nicare meaning “to share” or “to make common”), so it should
come as no surprise that linguistic communication depends
upon shared circuits.
Does one size fit all? Hurley on shared circuits
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Abstract: Hurley’s high level of generality suggests that a control-
theoretic framework underpins all of the phenomena in question,
but this is problematic. In contrast to the action-perception domain,
where the control-theoretic framework certainly applies, there is no
evidence that this framework equally applies to feelings and emotions,
such as pain, touch, and disgust, where mirroring and simulational
mindreading are also found.
Hurley’s target article is pitched at a high level of generality.
It speaks broadly of shared circuits, control, mirroring, simu-
lation, mindreading, and so forth, giving the impression that its
major theses apply equally across all applicable types of cogni-
tion. But there is good reason to doubt that this is accurate,
and it is not entirely clear whether Hurley really intends it.
Important sub-themes of the target article seem principally
aimed at the relation between action and perception – for
example, the falsity of the “classical sandwich architecture”
(sect. 3, para. 1). Is everything she says about action, perception,
and feedback supposed to apply equally to other domains in
which shared circuits, mirroring, and mindreading are found?
The article’s level of abstraction leaves the distinct impression
that the theses advanced at the various layers of analysis cut
across all the domains, but that is dubious.
My chief worry centers on the relation between shared circuits
(or mirroring) and control theory. Hurley is not alone in empha-
sizing such a connection (Gallese 2003; Wolpert et al. 2003).
However, the case for tying the control-theoretic perspective to
shared circuits, mirroring, and simulation is based mainly on
the action-perception domain, where there is specific physiologi-
cal, theoretical, and experimental evidence for efferent copy and
reafferent input. Nothing of this sort exists, however, for a
number of other domains where shared circuits and simulation
are found.
To be specific, mirroring phenomena exist in several areas of
cognition in addition to the motoric: in sensation, including
pain (Jackson et al. 2004; Singer et al. 2004) and touch
(Keysers et al. 2004), and in emotion (most clearly, disgust; see
Wicker et al. 2003). But in these domains, there are no estab-
lished feedback or control-theoretic phenomena of comparable
importance – or any sort at all. Here is a brief review of the
shared circuits (or mirroring) findings across multiple domains.
The shared areas or circuits for action are the premotor cortex
and inferior parietal lobule interconnected with the superior
temporal sulcus (STS)/middle temporal gyrus (MTG); for
disgust, the insula; for fear, (possibly) the amygdala; for pain,
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior insula; and for
touch, the somatosensory cortices. In all cases, observing what
other people do or feel is transformed into an inner represen-
tation of what we would do or feel in a similar, endogenously pro-
duced, situation. In many of these cases, moreover, evidence
drawn from lesion studies and imaging studies indicates that mir-
roring produces mindreading of others’ mental states (Goldman
2006; in press; Goldman & Sripada 2005). However, only in the
case of action is there clear evidence of feedback loops that fit the
control-theoretic framework. So the notion that systematic
relationships between shared circuits, simulation, and mindread-
ing crucially depend on control-theoretic mechanisms is unsup-
ported. Yet that is what Hurley suggests, since her architecture
of social cognition is erected on a control-theoretic foundation.
Hurley writes that “the shared circuits model (SCM) shows how
subpersonal resources for control, mirroring, and simulation can
enable the distinctively human sociocognitive skills of imitation,
deliberation, and mindreading” (sect. 3, para. 1). Her two
bottom layers of analysis highlight adaptive feedback control and
prediction of effects for improved control, and the three higher
layers are explained in terms of these lower-level mechanisms.
She makes no attempt, however, to explain how feedback and
control account for simulational, empathic, or mindreading prop-
erties related to sensation and emotion. Indeed, the latter
are barely mentioned. The explananda listed at her top level, the
personal-animal level, all involve action and behavior; yet the
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social-cognitional phenomena featuring shared circuits include
feelings and emotions rather than just action. If a single unifying
framework underpinning all shared circuits phenomena is feasible,
a different framework seems to be called for.
An alternative approach to many of the same phenomena is the
Hebbian learning approach developed by Keysers and collabor-
ators (Keysers & Gazzola 2006; Keysers & Perrett 2004),
closely aligned with Heyes’s (2005) associative learning approach.
When they are young, monkeys and humans spend a lot of time
watching themselves. Neurons in the premotor cortex respon-
sible for the execution of a hand-grasping movement will be
active at the same time as the visual neurons in the STS
respond to the sight of grasping. Given that the STS and area
F5 are connected through area PF, ideal Hebbian learning con-
ditions are met: what fires together wires together. Hence, the
synapses going from STS grasping neurons to PF and then F5
will be strengthened as the grasping neurons at all three levels
are repeatedly coactive. Given that many neurons in the STS
show viewpoint-invariant responses, the sight of someone else
grasping in similar ways suffices to activate F5 mirror neurons.
The same Hebbian argument can be applied to sensations and
emotions. While seeing oneself being touched, somatosensory
activations overlap in time with visual descriptions of an object
moving towards and touching our body. The Hebbian learning
approach also has the virtue of not assuming that a particular
modality is crucial to shared circuits. Damasio (2003) emphasizes
the importance of somatosensory representations, but somato-
sensory representations do not seem to be important for the rep-
resentation of action or emotion. Analogously, Hurley does not
make a strong case for a single control-theoretic explanation of
all types of shared circuitry or the phenomena arising from
them (e.g., empathy, mindreading). Indeed, she hardly mentions
the existence of emotion and feeling cases. On the surface, these
are just as arresting a set of cognitive phenomena as the motor-
theoretic ones, and equally in need of explanation.
Can it be argued that the Hebbian associationist perspective is
just another version of the control-theoretic one? After all,
control theory also postulates association-based learning. True,
but Hebbian learning does not posit comparable use of neural
comparator systems, forward and inverse models, or other appar-
atus characteristic of control theory. Also, newly discovered prop-
erties of mirroring, such as modulation of mirroring by social
relations between individuals (Singer et al. 2006), aren’t
obviously explainable in control-theoretic terms. But this goes
beyond the present purview.
Imitation as a conjunction
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Abstract: The conjunctive conception takes imitation to be a
combination of observational learning and copying. In the target article,
and elsewhere, this conception generates problems in (1) explaining the
copying of intransitive actions, (2) elucidating the potential functions of
imitation, and (3) recognising when the correspondence problem has
been avoided rather than solved. Hurley’s careful use of subpersonal
and personal levels of explanation shows us how to tackle these and
other questions about imitation.
Rarely does an empirically minded philosopher – or, for that
matter, a scientific specialist – achieve the kind of breadth,
balance, and penetration of a scientific literature evident in
Hurley’s review of research on imitation. In nearly all respects,
the shared circuits model’s (SCM’s) embeddedness in this litera-
ture is a huge asset, to the model and to the field. However, the
model has adopted one feature of this literature – a complex,
conjunctive conception of imitation – that is problematic.
Hurley takes imitation to be a phenomenon in which action
observation causes the observer both (1) to learn an instrumental
relationship between a bodymovement and its effect, and thereby
(2) to perform the observed body movement. Here I shall call the
first of these conditions observational learning and the second
copying. An alternative conception of imitation, increasingly
common in the literature, distinguishes more firmly between
observational learning and copying, and calls the latter imitation.
Empirical evidence and everyday experience confirm that
observational learning and copying can occur independently.
As a spectator at Wimbledon, I can learn about the relationship
between body movement dynamics and ball dynamics without
being able to copy an ace serve. Conversely, when we are
talking, I may copy the way in which you tug your earlobe or
jiggle your foot, without knowing what, if any, are the effects of
these actions (Chartrand & Bargh 1999).
There is no doubt that observational learning and copying can
be linked in the manner assumed by the conjunctive conception
of imitation; observing your action sometimes both enables me to
copy, by showing me a new sequence of movements, and motiv-
ates me to realise this potential, by showing me that the sequence
has a particular, desirable outcome. And the functional proper-
ties of this conjunction have long been of interest to researchers
seeking the origins of distinctively human sociocognitive abilities.
Hurley’s decision to root the SCM in the conjunctive conception
of imitation is, therefore, consistent both with the purposes of the
SCM and with the approach of many scientists in the field. But it
leads to some problems that might be avoided in future develop-
ment of the model if observational learning were more firmly
distinguished from copying.
The first problem, concerning the explanatory range of the
SCM, is openly acknowledged in the target article. Because the
SCM assumes that learning about means-ends relationships is
an essential component of imitation, and because it treats
“ends” as effects of body movement on the world (note the “exter-
nal feedback loop” in layer 1), it is not clear “whether SCM can
extend from instrumental to expressive action” (sect. 4.1.2, para.
1). In other words, the model does not currently account for
copying of intransitive actions, such as facial and hand ges-
tures – a type of copying that includes many paradigmatic
examples of imitation in the colloquial sense, and appears to be
more closely related than copying of instrumental actions to the
functioning of the human mirror system (e.g., Fadiga et al. 1995).
The second problem relates to the functions of imitation.
Section 2.3 of the target article begins with a finely turned pair
of questions: “Does development of either language or mind-
reading depend on imitation? If so, at what levels of description
and in what senses of ‘depend’?” (sect. 2.3, para. 1). (Many of
us, tempted to make crude claims about the evolutionary-
developmental consequences of imitation, would do well to use
this quote as a banner screensaver.) However, having stated
the question so clearly, Hurley is compelled by the conjunctive
conception of imitation to be, on occasions, less lucid in
suggesting and endorsing relationships between imitation and
other sociocognitive functions. Take language as an example.
She distinguishes four senses in which language may depend
on imitation: two, relating to means and ends, that connect
language with observational learning (and possibly with all
goal-directed action) but not with copying; and two, relating to
common coding and parsing of body movement sequences,
that connect language with copying, but not with observational
learning. When copying and observational learning are firmly dis-
tinguished, it is possible to see that one or the other may be
involved in the evolution and/or development of language, but
the conjunctive conception of imitation gives the impression
that, if one is involved, then so is the other.
Commentary/Hurley: The shared circuits model
28 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:1
The third problem is that the conjunctive conception of imita-
tion tends to make researchers lose sight of the correspondence
problem – to forget that copying often requires the observer to
map visual information from action observation onto matching
motor output, under conditions where it is far from obvious
how she could have acquired the information necessary
to achieve this mapping. The classic examples are facial
movements – the sensory input that I receive when I see you,
for example, curling your lip, is in a different modality and
coordinate frame from the sensory feedback I receive when
I produce the same gesture (Brass & Heyes 2005).
The SCM does not neglect the correspondence problem.
Indeed, it is the principal function of layer 3 to solve this
problem, and Hurley and I agree that the solution comes from
associative learning (e.g., Catmur et al. 2007; Heyes 2001).
However, under the influence of the conjunctive view of imita-
tion, which focuses attention on the impetus or motivation for
copying, rather than on its epistemic base, Hurley lets other
models off the hook a bit too easily. Explaining imitation with
reference to mirror neurons, or to the common codes postulated
by ideomotor theory, does indeed “avoid” the correspondence
problem, and that is entirely reasonable given that neither
mirror neuron research nor ideomotor theory is intended primar-
ily to explain copying/imitation. However, it is important to
recognise that avoiding is very different from solving. Mirror
neurons and common codes merely move the correspondence
problem from the personal to the subpersonal level. Instead of
asking how the observer knows that lip-curling is the same
when observed and executed, we have to ask how mirror
neurons or common codes get this information.
One of the greatest strengths of Hurley’s article is the way that
it gently, but firmly, encourages those of us involved in research
on imitation to clean up our act with respect to levels of expla-
nation. The SCM is a model, not just of imitation-related func-
tions, but of how to respect the three boundaries between
subpersonal (neurological and functional) and personal levels
of explanation. By teasing them apart, Hurley reveals the
complex and sometimes tenuous nature of many pre-existing
hypotheses, illuminates questions for further empirical research,
and leaves us no excuse for muddled thinking about the mechan-
isms and functions of imitation.
Shared circuits, shared time, and
interpersonal synchrony
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Abstract: The shared circuits model (SCM) is a useful explanatory
framework that can be applied to interpersonal synchrony by
incorporating temporal dynamics. Temporally precise predictive
simulations and mirroring enable interpersonal synchrony. When
partners’ movements are highly synchronous, the self/other distinction
can be blurred.
The shared circuits model (SCM) presented in Susan Hurley’s
target article provides a useful framework for understanding imi-
tation, deliberation, and mindreading. The shared informational
dynamics of perception/action and self/other not only enable
copying and understanding others’ actions, but also enable inter-
personal synchrony. The temporal dynamics of perception and
action are essential in interpersonal synchrony, and incorporating
these aspects could further elucidate two key facets of the SCM:
prediction and the self/other distinction. The temporal precision
of predictive simulations, integration, and mirroring enables
interpersonal synchrony. Tightly coupled interpersonal syn-
chrony can blur the self/other distinction and potentially
increase interpersonal empathy.
Interpersonal synchrony and imitation are examples of social
coordination, but differ in temporal aspects. Synchrony, by
definition, occurs in shared time, whereas imitation occurs
after some delay. The time course in imitation has been investi-
gated. Meltzoff (1988b), for example, employed deferred imita-
tion as a measure of memory in infants. In order to investigate
perception/action links more directly in imitation, Iacoboni
et al. (1999), for example, utilized immediate observation-
execution, and thereby mitigated intermediary processes such
as memory and interpretation. The delay can and must be
excised completely in joint action and synchrony tasks that rely
on prediction.
In order to synchronize actions with another person, one
cannot simply react to their partner’s actions; instead, one must
predict what the other will do and then plan and execute accord-
ingly (Sebanz et al. 2006). In a joint task requiring precise tem-
poral coordination, Knoblich and Jordan (2003) had partners
track a circle on the screen with each partner controlling one
tracking direction. Successful tracking required anticipatory
coordination. The results showed that anticipatory coordination
can become as effective with timing feedback from a partner’s
action, as when performing the task alone. Action planning was
based on the prediction of the joint effects of self and other.
This supports the notion of shared representations for self and
other and that predictive simulations of others’ actions are inte-
grated with temporal precision.
Similar predictive mechanisms enable interpersonal synchrony
in ensemble music performance. Musical synchrony is extremely
precise despite the common expressive timing deviations from
isochrony (e.g., Rasch 1988). Keller et al. (2007) suggest that
such precision is possible by predictively simulating the actions
of others. In their study, pianists synchronized more precisely
with recordings of themselves after a delay of several months
than with recordings of others. Presumably, the predictive simu-
lations were more accurate for self-generated performance
because they were carried out on the same perception/action
system (with all its idiosyncratic constraints). As Hurley writes,
“I perceive your action by means that engage my capacity for
similar action” (sect. 4.1.2, para. 4, point 2); and when I perceive
my own action, this resonance would be strongest.
The tendency to synchronize with others is well established
(e.g., Schmidt et al. 1990). A recent electroencephalographic
(EEG) experiment provided evidence for mirror system involve-
ment in interpersonal synchrony (Tognoli et al. 2007). In this
interpersonal finger-tapping study, two EEG oscillatory com-
ponents, whose topographies were consistent with the mirror
system, distinguished coordinated from uncoordinated tapping.
The authors suggest that the EEG component during phase-
locked coordination could be associated with mirror system
enhancement, whereas the component during uncoordinated
tapping could be associated with mirror system inhibition.
Although the movements and visual input were the same in
both cases, the purported mirror system rhythm emerged only
when self/other activity was coupled in time.
With shared circuits for perception and action and for self and
other, we must somehow distinguish self-produced from other-
produced action. However, in interpersonal synchrony, this dis-
tinction can become difficult. One way to distinguish self from
other is based on the predicted efference copy (SCM’s layer 2):
If predicted and actual sensory consequences of an action
closely correspond, then the action can be attributed to the
self. Temporal correspondence is a key factor in attributing
actions to oneself (Sato & Yasuda 2005). But when another’s
movement is similar to one’s own in both form and timing,
sensory consequences from the other’s movement overlap with
one’s own movement prediction and therefore can render self/
other attributions ineffective. Another basis for distinguishing
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self-produced from other-produced actions is based on moni-
tored output inhibition (SCM’s layer 4). Observing another’s
action maps onto one’s own action system and primes similar
action, but motor output is inhibited, so the action is not
overtly copied. This monitored inhibition during mirroring
infers that the observed movement is externally generated,
whereas lack of motor output inhibition infers that the movement
is self-generated. However, during interpersonal synchrony,
mirroring others’ actions is not associated with motor output
inhibition; hence, one may attribute others’ actions to oneself.
In interpersonal synchrony, these mechanisms for distinguishing
self-generated from other-generated actions are less effective,
which in essence blurs the self/other distinction.
Mirror systems and shared intersubjective information prior to
distinguishing self and other provide a plausible neural basis for
interpersonal empathy (Gallese 2001). Mimicry can lead to
affiliation between people because of shared self/other codes
as suggested by Chartrand and Bargh (1999). By extension, inter-
personal synchrony could produce even stronger affiliation
effects because the representational overlap additionally incor-
porates temporal alignment. Recent data from an interpersonal
finger-tapping study support this notion (Hove & Risen, sub-
mitted). The degree of temporal synchrony between co-actors
predicted subsequent affiliation ratings. Similarly, ensemble
musicians and coupled dancers often report affiliation and
empathy with partners. Indeed, Walter Freeman (2000) pro-
posed that music and dance evolved as a technology of social
bonding. Shared representations, accurate predictions, and tem-
poral alignment can lead to interpersonal empathy and
understanding.
In summary, the temporal dynamics during interpersonal syn-
chrony offer an avenue to elucidate the SCM’s key aspects of pre-
dictive simulation and the self/other distinction. The precise
time-course of predicting and integrating other’s actions via
mirror systems enables interpersonal synchrony. This synchrony
can render self/other distinctions ineffective and thereby poten-
tially increase interpersonal empathy. The inclusion of temporal
aspects could make the SCM an even more inclusive explanatory
framework.
Mesial frontal cortex and super mirror neurons
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Abstract:Depth electrode recordings in the human mesial frontal cortex
have revealed individual neurons with mirror properties. A third of these
cells have excitatory properties during action execution and inhibitory
properties during action observation. These cells – which we call super
mirror neurons – provide the neural mechanism that implements the
functions of layers 3þ 4 of the shared circuits model (SCM).
The process of monitored output inhibition at layer 4 of the
shared circuits model (SCM) predicts inhibitory and monitoring
mechanisms at the neural level. The question that SCM leaves
unresolved is whether, among these inhibitory neural mechan-
isms, there may be some neurons that are specialized in the inhi-
bition and monitoring of mirroring cells. Clearly, layers 2þ 4
cannot be exclusively implemented by specialized inhibitory mir-
roring neurons. Indeed, the function of offline predictive simu-
lation distinguishing actual from possible acts can be applied to
all sorts of potential actions, including those directed at inani-
mate objects (say, a mug), which we plan for ourselves when
we are alone (say, in our office). The neural mechanisms
implementing layers 3þ 4, however, could be either general-
purpose inhibitory mechanisms that may also be applied to the
inhibition of overt copying or specialized inhibitory mechanisms
for mirroring.
We have performed depth electrode recordings in the mesial
wall of the human frontal cortex in patients with epilepsy under-
going pre-surgical evaluation of the foci of epilepsy (Mukamel
et al. 2007). From a total of 14 patients, we have recorded the
activity of approximately 500 neurons located in three sectors
of the mesial frontal cortex: the ventral and dorsal sectors of
the anterior cingulate cortex and the pre-supplementary motor
cortex (SMA)/SMA proper complex. Activity from individual
human neurons was recorded while subjects were performing
and observing hand-grasping actions, performing and observing
facial emotional expressions, and during control conditions.
Mirror neurons were defined as follows: Reliable firing-rate
changes were measured during execution and during observation
of hand-grasping actions or of facial emotional expressions, but
not during the control conditions. We found that approximately
12% of all recorded mesial frontal neurons had mirror properties.
Individual neurons with mirror properties were observed in all
recording sites in the mesial frontal cortex. This suggests that
mirror neurons are widespread in the human frontal lobe.
Among these cells, approximately 50% were mirror neurons for
hand-grasping actions, whereas the other 50% were mirror
neurons for facial emotional expressions. One-third of mirror
neurons had excitatory responses during both action execution
and action observation. This is the most typical pattern of
firing-rate changes observed in monkeys. One-third of mirror
neurons, however, had inhibitory responses during both action
execution and action observation. This pattern has also been
occasionally observed in monkeys, but much less frequently.
The remaining third of mirror neurons in the human frontal
cortex had a pattern of firing-rate changes that has never been
observed in monkeys, at least not so far. The large majority of
mirror neurons (more than 80%) have excitatory responses
during action execution and inhibitory responses during action
observation. Few of these neurons have the opposite pattern,
with decreased firing rate during execution and increased firing
rate during observation. We call these cells super mirror
neurons (Iacoboni & Dapretto 2006), not because they have
super powers, but because they seem to have a modulatory
role over activity in more “classical” frontal mirror neurons,
that is, those mirroring cells located in the lateral inferior
frontal cortex (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004).
The mesial frontal areas we recorded from are anatomically
connected with the lateral inferior frontal areas containing “clas-
sical” mirror neurons (Rizzolatti & Luppino 2001). The physio-
logical properties of the mirror neurons in mesial frontal cortex
and the anatomical connectivity between these areas and the
lateral inferior frontal cortex containing classical mirror
neurons suggest that this mesial frontal mirror neuron system
has prevalently inhibitory functions, such that overt copying is
inhibited. In line with other models (Iacoboni 2008), SCM
suggests that this inhibition of overt copying allows the distinc-
tion between the actions of self and other. Several imaging
studies that investigated the neural basis of complex self-
related concepts have suggested a critical role of mesial frontal
areas in implementing such concepts (e.g., Uddin et al. 2007;
Vogeley & Fink 2003). Taken together, these theoretical con-
siderations and empirical data support the view that the practical
simulative foundations of the SCM’s subpersonal functional level
may be used to build explicit reasoning and theoretical
deliberation.
The physiological properties of the human mesial frontal
mirror neurons and their widespread anatomical location
support the concept of pervasive mirroring. A fundamental way
of connecting with others and even defining the self is by
means of mirroring people (Iacoboni 2008).
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Flexibility and development of mirroring
mechanisms
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Abstract: The empirical support for the shared circuits model (SCM) is
mixed. We review recent results from our own lab and others supporting
a central claim of SCM that mirroring occurs at multiple levels of
representation. By contrast, the model is silent as to why human infants
are capable of showing imitative behaviours mediated by a mirror
system. This limitation is a problem with formal models that address
neither the neural correlates nor the behavioural evidence directly.
Hurley’s shared circuits model (SCM) is an ambitious attempt to
systematize a large body of recent research. One key prediction is
that mirroring should occur at multiple grains, or levels of rep-
resentation in the motor hierarchy. Recent results from our
own lab, as well as others, confirm this prediction. Several
studies have shown that mirroring is dependent on the presence
of the observed action in one’s own motor repertoire (e.g., Calvo-
Merino et al. 2005). We recently used this finding to examine the
level of abstraction at which mirroring occurs, and whether this
can be manipulated by instructions (Longo et al., in press).
We used a paradigm developed previously (Bertenthal et al.
2006) in which participants observe a video image of a hand at
rest with fingers spread apart. The hand is shown from the per-
spective of someone else facing the participant; the participant
responds by pressing a button with the right index finger if the
stimulus finger appearing farther to the left moves, and with
the right middle finger if the finger father to the right moves.
With a left hand as the image, the stimulus and response
fingers match anatomically (e.g., index finger response to an
index finger movement); with a right hand, the stimulus and
response fingers differ anatomically (e.g., index finger response
to a middle finger movement). Responses are faster when there
is an anatomical match between the stimulus and response
fingers than when there is not, reflecting mirroring, or automatic
imitation, of the perceived finger movements.
We used this paradigm to investigate the representational level
of abstraction at which mirroring occurs by presenting images of
a computer-generated model of a hand, the joints of which could
be configured flexibly, enabling us to present finger actions which
were either biomechanically possible or impossible. Importantly,
the impossible actions were impossible only in terms of the
manner in which they were performed (i.e., the joints bent in
impossible ways), but were perfectly possible in terms of what
was performed (i.e., tapping a surface). Thus, these actions are
impossible at one level of the motor hierarchy (i.e., movements),
but possible at a higher level (i.e., goals).
In a first experiment, in which no mention was made of differ-
ent types of movements, comparable automatic imitation of poss-
ible and impossible actions was observed, though participants
generally were aware of the difference between the stimuli.
This suggests that mirroring involves a common representation
at the level of goals. In a second experiment, in contrast, in
which attention was explicitly drawn to the manner in which
the actions were performed by mentioning the two types of
movements during instructions, automatic imitation was comple-
tely eliminated for the impossible, but not possible, movements.
This latter result suggests that actions were being coded at the
level of movements. Together, these results demonstrate that
mirroring can occur at more than one level of the motor hierar-
chy, either in terms of goals or in terms of movements – what
Rizzolatti et al. (2002) referred to as high-level resonance and
low-level resonance, respectively.
Similar relations between mirroring and motor ability as those
just described have been observed in young infants (e.g., Longo
& Bertenthal 2006; Sommerville et al. 2005). These developmen-
tal findings are also relevant to our evaluation of the SCM
because Hurley acknowledges evidence of mirroring by human
infants, but her model remains agnostic as to its origins and pre-
requisites. By contrast, we contend that the evidence reveals that
mirroring or imitation is present from birth, but limited to actions
already available to infants.
We (Longo & Bertenthal 2006), for example, used the Piage-
tian A-not-B error to examine mirroring in 9-month-old infants.
This error reflects the tendency of infants at this age to perseve-
rate in searching to a location where they have previously found a
hidden object (A), even after having seen it hidden at a new
location (B). We found that infants “perseverated” in reaching
to the A location, even when they had merely observed an exper-
imenter retrieve the object there, but had not reached them-
selves. Furthermore, infants were significantly more likely to
perseverate when the experimenter had reached ipsilaterally
(without crossing the body midline), than when they had
reached contralaterally (across the midline). This pattern reflects
the difficulty infants of this age show in performing contralateral
reaches – what Bruner (1969) referred to as the “mysterious
midline barrier” – and demonstrates that mirroring in
infants – as in adults – is systematically related to motor skill
level. Whereas our results show an effect of action observation
on motor performance, the flip side of mirroring is reported by
Sommerville et al. (2005), who show that manipulating infants’
ability to perform actions alters their perception of those
actions when performed by another agent.
Although such results show that mirroring mechanisms are
operative quite early in human ontogeny, strong inferences
regarding the origins of such abilities must come from studies
of younger infants still. In this light, the numerous experiments
demonstrating imitation of facial and manual gestures by
human neonates are key, suggesting that the neural circuits
necessary for mirroring are present at birth. Indeed, given
the reported lack of imitation in adult chimpanzees and
monkeys, the finding of neonatal imitation in neonates of
both species (e.g., Myowa-Yamakoshi et al. [2004] and Ferrari
et al. [2006], respectively) is especially striking. Such neonatal
imitation disappears over the first few months of life in
humans as well as primates, suggesting that rather than reflect-
ing a precocial social-communicative ability, overt mimicry rep-
resents an inability to inhibit automatic priming of motor
representations. This pattern highlights the fact that at least
some forms of imitation are not abilities reflecting long-term
learning over time, but are rather automatic tendencies which
must be inhibited in order to interact effectively with the
environment.
Thus, there is a clear developmental progression of inhibitory
control over mirroring responses. Whereas neonates show overt
automatic imitation, reflecting very weak inhibitory control,
older infants do not compulsively imitate, but are biased in
their overt search behaviour by previously observed action. Mir-
roring in adults is more implicit still, generally manifesting itself
in priming of motor responses, rather than their overt imitation
(though overt imitation has been reported when attention is
diverted [e.g., Chartrand & Bargh 1999; Stengel 1947]). This
pattern suggests that much of the development of mirroring
responses reflects changes in inhibitory control, rather than
changes in mirroring representations, per se.
In conclusion, the model proposed by Hurley is in the tradition
of competence versus performance models. The difficulty with
such a model is that it provides a mere skeletal structure that
has to be fleshed out in greater detail. Until some critical mass
of details has been provided, the validity and usefulness of this
model will remain an issue.
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Failure, instead of inhibition, should be
monitored for the distinction of self/other
and actual/possible actions
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Abstract: I suggest that layer 4 of the shared circuits model (SCM)
should monitor the failure of performing an action, instead of output
inhibition, to obtain actual/possible and self/other distinctions. The
target article’s assumption of selective inhibition leaves some questions
unanswered, such as the criteria for the selection. Monitoring failure
can answer these questions because failure does not require selection.
It also provides a basis for more likely explanation for the phylogenetic
and ontogenetic origin of both monitoring and output inhibition.
Susan Hurley has assembled an impressive work describing the
model of social cognition. In particular, I was surprised and grat-
ified that the theory we have proposed can be fit into the shared
circuits model (SCM) hypothesis without inconsistency. We have
been studying mathematical models for mutual and recursive
mindreading relations (Makino & Aihara 2003; 2006; Makino
et al. 2005), and we have proposed the self-observation principle
(SOP), stating that, to achieve mindreading, one needs to develop
a prediction model of the observation of movement of oneself,
which can be driven only from the observation of oneself
without an efferent copy of motor commands. The SOP can be
regarded as a natural extension of the predictive simulation
circuit in the SCM’s layer 2 and can provide the basis of the
“first-person plural” mirroring system in layer 3. I am happy
that our work can be placed within the common framework pro-
vided by the SCM.
However, from the aspect of SOP, I found one possible point
of improvement for the SCM, namely, monitoring output inhi-
bition. Although I agree that human adults have selective inhi-
bition of imitation, as demonstrated in Lhermitte’s imitation
syndrome (Lhermitte 1986), the same may not be true for a phy-
logenetic (and possibly ontogenetic) explanation. In the follow-
ing, I discuss why it may be better to avoid monitoring
selective inhibition, and I propose an alternative: that is, monitor-
ing the failure to perform actions.
It is clear that the output inhibition in the SCM needs to be
selective. The target article assumes that the mirror/canonical
neurons in layer 3 hold the representation of actions, without
information on whether it is the action of oneself or the observed
action of another. Hence, the output inhibition, which operates
somewhere in the route from the representation of actions to
their motor outputs, needs to be selective; otherwise, no action
could be performed at all.
However, the target article does not discuss what causes this
selectivity in inhibition. Two questions remain unanswered: (1)
Upon what criteria is the inhibition selected? (2) Why is the
monitoring on the output inhibition, rather than on the selection
of inhibition, when the latter would be an easier alternative?
Regarding question (1), the criteria cannot depend on the self/
other distinction because it is introduced by monitoring the inhi-
bition. One possible criterion might be the estimation of benefit;
that is, an action is inhibited if it is estimated to be non-beneficial
or hazardous. However, I am skeptical that a creature that cannot
distinguish its own action from that of another would be able to
distinguish its own benefit from that of others.
I argue that both the questions are answered if one assumes
that failure of performing actions, instead of output inhibition,
is monitored. It is not difficult to imagine a failure to perform
an action. Consider a creature with a primitive, immature
mirror system, in a phylogenetically transitional phase from
layer 2 to layer 3. The primitive mirror system would be activated
when observing another’s action, and produce some weak and
partial representation for the action within the shared circuit.
In cases where the representation is close enough to the full rep-
resentation for the observer’s equivalent action and the contex-
tual input matches with the action (including posture and other
environmental conditions), as well, the shared circuit would
cause the represented action to be performed, resulting in
priming or imitation. These cases would be rare, however,
because the mirror system is still primitive. In most cases, a par-
tially represented action or mismatched contextual input would
cause the incomplete performance of action, resulting in
failure. If the representation is weaker, or if the context is too
distant (that is, if the mismatch is too big), then the shared
circuit would totally fail to trigger the action, and, as a result,
no imitation would occur at all.
As an answer to question 1, failure gives a good criterion for
inhibition. If a creature has only a partial representation or mis-
matched context for an observed action, it would be more likely
to bring undesirable results for itself; so the creature would be
better off inhibiting the imitation of the action. Failure in trigger-
ing the action implements this in a simple way.
Question 2 is also answered because the failure is not con-
trolled or selected. One can know the failure of action not by
monitoring the control signal, but by monitoring the result of
the action, including motor output and its reafferent feedback
input. Note that this requires a change in the SCM, which orig-
inally monitors only the motor output, but I believe that this
change is consistent with the design of the SCM.
Moreover, the phylogenetic origin of both the monitoring and
the output inhibition can be explained better if one assumes that
the action failure is monitored. I suggest that the failure is mon-
itored as a result of exaptation from the detection of the predic-
tion error. This may be more likely because error detection
within the learning of simulative prediction in layer 2 is essen-
tially the same information process as failure monitoring. The
failure monitoring can also explain output inhibition in
humans. Since it is better to inhibit actions that are about to
fail, it is reasonable to assume phylogenetic development of the
output inhibition function by using monitored inhibition. Such
an inhibition would naturally be extended to be more selective,
possibly by using self/other distinction.
The discussion so far, about the inhibition of mirrored action in
layer 3, can be applied to the inhibition of simulated action in
layer 2. The same questions, about the criteria for selecting inhi-
bition and the reason not for monitoring selection, will be
answered by assuming failure monitoring. Failure would occur
in a primitive version of instrumental deliberation in layers
2þ 4, which might sometimes succeed to take the simulated
action in advance, but would fail in most cases because of
partial representation of the action or contextual mismatch.
In such cases, the action should fail to avoid undesirable
results, but the failure would be monitored. Later in phylogenetic
time, the monitored failure is used to distinguish actual from
possible actions, as well as to selectively inhibit simulated
actions to be actually performed.
My point is that layer 4 should not depend on inhibition.
Rather, failure monitoring can be used for both the actual/poss-
ible and self/other distinction. This provides a more concrete
basis for the SCM than does the original formulation, which
uses monitored inhibition for these distinctions.
Some predictions, different from those in section 3.4 of the
target article, derive from failure monitoring. First, if some
species have copying without inhibition, they rarely show such
copying, unlike patients with imitation syndrome or echopraxia.
Second, there may be creatures with capacities to inhibit
copying, but not with self/other distinction. Another hypothesis
might include that the imitation probability depends on contex-
tual difference.
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Abstract: Through the second year, children’s copying behaviour shifts
from a focus on emulating to a focus on imitating. This shift can be
explained by a change in focus from copying others to satisfy cognitive
motivations to copying in order to satisfy social motivations. As elegant
and detailed as the shared circuits model (SCM) is, it misses this
crucial, motivation-based feature of imitation.
There have been considerable advances in the comparative study
of primate social learning during the last two decades. As Hurley
outlines, one of the key findings to emerge in this time has been
the clear and consistent documentation of differences in the ways
human children and chimpanzees respond to another’s modelled
actions. Young children tend to fixate on copying the specific
behavioural means used by the demonstrator (i.e., the person
modelling the target actions), even if a simpler method is avail-
able. By contrast, chimpanzees tend to focus on outcomes, pre-
ferring to discover their own means of bringing about the
demonstrated end result. This difference is representative of
the oft-debated distinction between imitation and emulation.
Hurley presents a detailed, thought-provoking model that is
aimed, in part, at identifying the possible neural underpinnings
of these alternative approaches to social learning. But as
elegant as her model is, it misses a crucial component of
human imitation: motivation.
A critical means of distinguishing imitation from emulation is
to identify whether an observer preferentially aims to reproduce
the specific behavioural means a demonstrator used to bring
about an outcome or whether she chooses to use her own
means. Does the observer focus on copying actions or outcomes?
This notion of separating actions from outcomes when evaluating
copying behaviour was presaged by Uzgiris (1981), who drew
attention to what she saw as two core functions of copying beha-
viour: a cognitive function that promotes learning about events in
the world and an interpersonal function that promotes children’s
sharing of experience with others. According to Uzgiris, young
infants are primarily driven by a need to acquire new skills and
behaviours and, as such, when they are shown how to do some-
thing, they focus on what was done (i.e., the outcome).
However, as they move into their second year, infants become
increasingly motivated to engage in social interaction and
hence, as a means of realizing the congruence that exists
between themselves and others, they begin to focus on the way
something was done (i.e., the means used). To put it another
way, young infants emulate out of a motivation to learn about
the world, whereas toddlers show an increasing proclivity for imi-
tation based on a desire to interact with, and to be like, others (for
a similar view on why adults imitate, see Dijksterhuis 2005).
Recent studies have provided evidence for this proposal of an
age-related shift when copying from a focus on outcomes to a
focus on actions (Nielsen 2006; Tennie et al. 2006). In a cross-
sectional study, Nielsen (2006; Experiment 1) tested 12-, 18-,
and 24-month-olds. An adult demonstrated how to open a
series of novel boxes (which contained a desirable toy) by using
a miscellaneous object to activate a switch located on the front
of each box. The 24-month-olds imitated in attempting to open
the boxes by using the object, as was shown to them. In contrast,
the 12-month-olds emulated the demonstrator’s actions and only
attempted to open the boxes with their hands (18-month-olds
showed reactions that were intermediate between the older
and younger age groups). In a follow-up experiment (Nielsen
2006; Experiment 2), 12-month-olds did imitate the adult’s
object use, but only after she had “attempted but failed” to acti-
vate the switches by hand. Thus, it appears that 12-month-olds
did not fail to imitate because they could not use the object,
but rather because they did not interpret this action to be the
most efficient alternative available (see also Gergely 2003;
Gergely et al. 2002).
Following Uzgiris (1981), I reasoned that the 24-month-olds
might persist in imitating a demonstrator’s inefficient object
use in order to satisfy social motivations. Testing this interpret-
ation, Nielsen et al. (in press) compared the responses of
24-month-olds to live and videotaped demonstrators on the
boxes task used in the Nielsen (2006) study. The rationale for
using videotaped demonstrators was that they can act in a
social and engaging manner but, by virtue of the medium, do
not afford opportunity for spontaneous, contingent interaction.
If the social motivation hypothesis is valid, children should be
less inclined to imitate when the opportunity for social inter-
action is reduced. They should be less inclined to imitate a video-
taped adult than one who is available for interaction. This is
exactly what happened. The children imitated the adult’s object
use significantly less when she appeared on video compared to
when she was “live” (Experiment 1). Critically, in a second exper-
iment, when given the opportunity to interact with the adult on a
TVmonitor via a closed-circuit system (i.e., where socially contin-
gent interaction could take place), the amount of imitation chil-
dren exhibited returned to “live” levels, indicating that it was
the nature of their interaction with the demonstrator that
affected the children’s copying behaviour, not the medium.
Hurley makes a laudable effort at trying to account for human
imitative behaviour by integrating complex motor ability and a
capacity for goal reading into the shared circuits model (SCM).
Both elements are certainly crucial in determining how we
copy others. Nevertheless, as attested to by the previously dis-
cussed studies, human social learning can be strongly impacted
by interpersonal motivations. These motivations are all too fre-
quently neglected in discussions of, and attempts at explaining,
imitation. Unfortunately, the SCM is no exception. There is
focus on the way in which a capacity for imitation may get devel-
oped and, in layer 5, on how this could then lead to a faculty for
understanding other minds. But this is not the same as acknowl-
edging the strong interpersonal motivations that can drive imita-
tive behaviour in the first place.
A growing number of experiments have provided remarkable
insights into the neural substrates of imitation. The SCM offers a
means of unifying much of this literature and promises to make a
major contribution to the field. Nevertheless, one must not lose
sight of the fact that human copying behaviour is extremely
complex. Its expression is affected by multiple factors and here I
have tried to draw attention to interpersonal ones. If we continue
to ignore these factors, our understanding of the mechanisms that
lie at the heart of human imitation is destined to remain incomplete.
What kind of neural coding and self does
Hurley’s shared circuit model presuppose?
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Abstract: Susan Hurley’s impressive article about the shared circuit
model (SCM) raises two important issues. First, I suggest that the
SCM presupposes relational coding rather than translational coding as
neural code. Second, the SCM being the basis for self implies that the
self may be characterized as format, relational, and embodied and
embedded, rather than by specific and isolated higher-order cognitive
contents.
In her impressive article, Susan Hurley offers the shared circuit
model (SCM) as the common structure underlying perception
and action, which, as such, can provide the foundation for the
overlapping and shared dynamics between self and other.
Without going into further details here, I comment on two
important conceptual questions raised in Hurley’s remarkable
account. First, the SCM raises the question of the kind of
neural coding that must be presupposed in order to make the
SCM and its shared dynamic between perception and action
possible. Second, the SCM raises the question of the character-
ization of the self that is supposed to be based upon the SCM.
The term code describes a mean or measurement that captures
and reflects teleogically meaningful activity in a system; this mean
or measurement is implemented in certain rules and mechanisms
that guide and format the system’s processing of various contents
(see deCharms & Zador 2000; Friston 1997). For instance, these
rules and mechanisms may format and guide the neural proces-
sing of perceptual contents and action contents. Hurley’s SCM,
which assumes a shared dynamic and structure between action
and perception, implies a common code for perception and
action. Referring to the theory of event coding (TEC) by
Hommel et al. (2001), Hurley mentions that there might be
common coding between action and perception; but she does
not elaborate on it in further detail. The TEC (Hommel et al.
2001) claims that perceived events (perception) and to-be-
produced events (action) are equally represented by integrated
networks and so-called event files (Hommel 2004; see also Noe¨
2004). What remains unclear, however, is the exact format
(e.g., the formal structure) according to which these event files
are coded.
Since these “event files” are supposed to be common to both
action and perception, there can no longer be translation
between the two for a couple of reasons. First, translation pre-
supposes different formats (i.e., formal structures) between
action and perception – or else, translation would not be
needed. Second, a need for translation would imply that event
files are not shared between perception and action. Accordingly,
there must be a different kind of coding than what I call transla-
tional coding, in order to account for Hurley’s SCM. How must
incoming or outgoing stimuli be coded in order to allow for the
SCM and the assumed common structure of perception and
action? I suggest that rather than the stimuli themselves being
coded, be they either perceptual or action related, it is the
relation between different stimuli that is coded. That is, it is
not the incoming stimulus of some perceived event that is
coded in isolation but rather its relationship to actually generated
motor stimuli and vice versa. Such a relationship can be coded
only if translational coding is replaced by what I call relational
coding (Northoff 2004). Relational coding assumes that the
stimuli are formatted according to their relationship to other
stimuli as, for instance, incoming sensory stimuli are set and
coded in relation to outgoing motor stimuli, and vice versa.
Hurley suggests that the SCM provides the basis for constitut-
ing and distinguishing self and other. One would consequently
assume that relational coding might also provide the format
according to which self and other are coded. This implies not
only that self and other are based upon the relation between per-
ception and action but that our self is essentially a rather basic
and relational function that is always already set in relation to
others and the environment. Rather than attributing some
special contents like higher-order cognitive contents to the self,
this implies that the self may be considered some kind of specific
format that allows for stimuli to be set in relation to each other,
which in turn implicates relation of the stimuli to the respective
organism and ultimately to the environment. Instead of consider-
ing the self as a special encapsulated entity or function, our self
may then be essentially relational so that one may speak of a rela-
tional self. This would be well compatible with recent suggestions
of self-related processing, which implicates a subcortical-cortical
midline network (Northoff et al. 2006; in press). Self-related pro-
cessing concerns stimuli that are experienced as strongly related
to one’s own person.
Without going deeply into abstract philosophical consider-
ations, I would like to give a brief theoretical description of
what I mean by the terms experience and strongly related,
while to one’s person is meant very simply as an organism. Experi-
ence refers to phenomenal experience such as, for example, the
feeling of love or the smell of a rose. The term strongly related
points out the process of associating and linking interoceptive
and exteroceptive stimuli with a particular person. The main
feature here is not the distinction between diverse sensory mod-
alities, but rather, the linkage of the different stimuli to the indi-
vidual person, that is, to his or her self. What unifies and
categorizes stimuli in this regard is no longer their sensory
origin but the strength of their relation to the self. The self-
stimulus relation results in what has been called mineness;
Lambie and Marcel (2002) speak of an “addition of the ‘for
me’” by means of which that particular stimulus becomes
“mine,” resulting in “mineness.”
In sum, I suggest that Hurley’s assumption that the SCM pro-
vides the foundation for self and other presupposes (1) a different
concept of the self that characterizes the self as format, relational,
embodied, and embedded (see also Clark 1997; 1999); and (2)
self-related processing rather than by specific contents, a
special isolated entity or function, and higher-order cognitive
processing. In other terms, Hurley’s SCM provides a highly fruit-
ful starting point for reconceptualizing our notion of self and to
abandon philosophical and psychological substance-, entity-, or
cognitive-based models of self – and, at the same time, for
gaining some insight into the hitherto unknown mechanisms
of neural coding.
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Abstract: The target article discusses a model of how brain circuits
mediate social behaviors such as imitation and mindreading. Hurley
suggests potential mechanisms for development of shared circuits.
We propose that empirical studies can be designed to differentiate the
influence of genetic and learning-based factors on the development of
shared circuits. We use the mirror neuron system as a model system.
The target article describes several possible scenarios for the
development of “shared circuits.” For example, this mechanism
could be “hardwired” by genes or acquired through learning,
or a combination of both. We discuss the evidence for each
claim and then suggest experiments that may disentangle the
factors contributing to the development of shared circuits by
using the mirror neuron system to illustrate our strategy.
As discussed in the target article, studies designed by Meltzoff
and Moore (1977) provided evidence for neonatal imitation in
infants as young as a few hours of age. Specifically, these
infants imitated mouth opening, tongue protrusion, and hand
opening. The researchers suggest that the pattern of imitation
is not likely the result of conditioning or innate releasing
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mechanisms. They suggest that this early imitation implies that
human neonates have an innate ability to equate their own
unseen behaviors with gestures they see others perform.
However, it is possible that the actions investigated by Meltzoff
and Moore (1977) were not, as suggested, based on an innate
shared circuit, but rather could have been a reflex in response
to a smile – like a sneeze in response to pepper. One way to
find out would be to test whether infants can mimic an asymme-
trical smile or another uncommon action. This would eliminate
the “reflex” explanation and implicate a more sophisticated hard-
wired mechanism based on preexisting rules of translating visual
appearance of the body into motor output, leading to accurate
imitation.
This type of shared circuit may also be based on a form of
associative learning. For example, every time the monkey’s
motor command neuron fired to reach for a peanut, the visual
appearance of the monkey’s hand reaching activated visual
neurons, such that the firing of the two neurons (motor and
visual) become linked through Hebbian association. The net
result is that the motor neuron itself is activated by the visual
image of peanut grabbing, even if the visual image is of
another monkey’s hand.
This Hebbian association hypothesis has been suggested by
those who argue against the claim that mirror neurons are per-
forming a complex remapping of other’s representations onto
one’s own motor system. There are reasons for rejecting this
argument (Ramachandran & Oberman 2007). First, given that
only a portion of F5 neurons have “mirror” properties, why do
these neurons “learn” while others do not? If mirror neurons
were set up purely through Hebbian associations, one would
predict that all neurons in that region would have mirror proper-
ties, but this is not the case. This shows that there are specialized
mechanisms and hardwired constraints that characterize the
subset of neurons we refer to as mirror neurons. Additionally,
the Hebbian hypothesis cannot account for the facial mimicry lit-
erature, because, when an infant smiles, the brain receives no
visual feedback on which to build an association. It is still possible
that this behavior is reflexive and the mirror neuron system may
not be mediating it; however, the Hebbian hypothesis is no better
at explaining this behavior.
It is also possible that these shared circuits take time to develop.
They may require pre-existing hardwired scaffolding that is then
“educated” by learning before being fully functional. This does
not speak to whether the development results in the motor
neuron being converted into a “mirror neuron,” capable of doing
a complex self-other algorithm, or whether a motor neuron is
simply responding to the visual stimulus as a result of Hebbian
associative processes. Thus, the question of innateness/learning
and the question of the nature of the computation that is being per-
formed are logically separable. Furthermore, the necessary empiri-
cal studies to answer these questions have yet to be conducted.
To answer the question of innateness, one could record from
area F5 (a region already known to contain mirror neurons) in
a newborn macaque and expose the monkey to several actions,
including actions that he will likely be exposed to early in life
(e.g., peanut breaking, grasping, etc.), as well as novel actions
that are unlikely to be based on pre-existing hardwired mechan-
isms. If neurons in F5 respond to both the familiar and novel
actions the first time they are presented, that would argue for
an innate system that does not depend on Hebbian association
mechanisms. If F5 neurons respond only to the familiar
actions, then the same argument could be made for these find-
ings as was made for the findings by Meltzoff and Moore, that
the brain is hardwired to respond to certain evolutionarily rel-
evant actions. Finally, if no F5 neurons respond to the obser-
vation of any actions in newborn monkeys, this would argue
against mirror neurons being innate.
To test whether mirror neurons are capable of creating a self-
other metarepresentation or simply a motor neuron that has
made an associative link to a visual representation, a different
type of study would need to be conducted. One possible study
would be to record from an F5 mirror neuron in an adult
macaque while he watches either another monkey grasp a
peanut or himself reaching for a peanut. In the “self” condition,
it would be important that the monkey not actually reach for the
peanut (enlisting other motor and sensory systems), but instead
that the monkey be presented with an optically reversed image
so that the inactive monkey has the visual perception of its
“own” hand moving. If it is true that these neurons are set up
through Hebbian associative processes, the “self” condition
should elicit a greater response than the other condition, as
this “egocentric view” is what the association was built on.
If the metarepresentation hypothesis is correct, however, the
“other” condition should elicit a greater response.
There are currently several possible mechanisms for the devel-
opment of a mirror neuron system. It is our prediction that, like
other systems in the brain, these types of “shared circuits” are
neither purely learned nor purely innate, but a result of both
hardwired and learned processes. Indeed, the circuitry under-
lying mirror neurons may provide an ideal model system for
exploring how nature and nurture interact to create the human
body and mind.
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Abstract: True to its sensorimotor inspiration, Hurley’s shared circuits
model (SCM) describes goal-states only within a homeostatic
mechanism for action control, neglecting to consider other functions of
goals – namely, evaluation and motivation. This restriction thwarts
Hurley’s project of identifying the information resources enabling social
cognition. In order to master intentional behavior, deliberation, and
action understanding, we need to be more than just “control freaks.”
The notion of goal conflates three different functional roles:
control, evaluation, and motivation (Miller et al. 1960;
Rosenblueth et al. 1968). Goals describe target-states that deter-
mine appropriate adjustments in the agent’s behavior, for
example, via the comparator mechanism described at layer 1 of
Hurley’s shared circuits model (SCM) (control function). Goals
also indicate valuable states that, even when not pursued,
measure how well the current situation agrees with the agent’s
interests, that is, how “good” or “bad” the world is (evaluation
function). Finally, goals constitute anticipatory drives for the
agent’s conduct, providing teleological reasons to perform or
refrain from performing certain actions (motivation function).
Possibly because of Hurley’s enactive/embodied inspiration,
the focus in her article is solely on the control function of
goals. The SCM describes how increasingly sophisticated
control mechanisms enable richer forms of social cognition,
when paired with mirroring to provide information on the
actions of others. More specifically, the sensorimotor control
loop is suggested as the basis for understanding the intentional
structure of actions. Although this project is valuable in its own
right, we doubt it can ever succeed without first incorporating
the motivational and evaluative dimension of goal-states
(Castelfranchi 1998; Csibra & Gergely 2007).
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Indeed, all functions of goal-states are necessary elements of
the processes described by the SCM, although they are not yet
properly analyzed. When current input is confronted with a
target-state, the system is assumed to know what features of
the environment are adequate as targets. But how does it
know? In mechanical artifacts, for example, the boiler-thermostat
system, the target is set by another agent. In adaptive biological
systems, some basic target-states are “set” by evolution, but
most of the goals relevant for the system are actually self-
determined. Hence, some questions arise: How does the agent
select a state of affairs as an appropriate target? Why do we
use certain results as frame of reference for action control,
rather than others?
The answers require invoking the evaluative function of goals:
Starting from simple biologically determined goals (e.g., nutri-
tion, proximity to conspecifics), the agent starts appraising posi-
tively certain environmental configurations (e.g., food on the
table), while perceiving others to be negative (e.g., being iso-
lated). The former are selected as potential target-states,
whereas the latter are labeled as things to be avoided, possibly
generating other target-states to ensure that they are indeed
avoided. These more specific target-states may then acquire eva-
luative autonomy, if they prove successful over time in satisfying
the agent’s basic needs.
Here it is worth emphasizing that evaluation and motivation
are not exclusive features of personal-level goal-states (desires
and intentions). On the contrary, these functions apply also to
basic, subpersonal needs, as discussed. Hence, appeals to the
functional level of explanation favored by Hurley cannot get
the SCM off the hook of this criticism. Evaluation and motivation
characterize both personal and subpersonal goal-states, and yet
they go unnoticed in the SCM.
Significantly, the target-state is the only component that never
changes its dynamics through the five layers of the SCM. This is
tantamount to saying that the model does not care for goal gener-
ation and goal revision. It being so, can the SCM really claim to
enable deliberation and goal-based action understanding? Can
we be satisfied with the characterization of deliberation as compari-
son of alternative predictions – Millikan’s “trials and errors in the
head” (Millikan 2006) – while nothing is said about how we
compare different goals to choose our future conduct? The SCM
reduces deliberation to deciding how to achieve a given end,
whereas it remains silent on deciding what to achieve. This is a
badly maimed picture of human deliberation: whenever decisions
are made, the what is at least as important as the how.
As for understanding the intentional structure of action, this
implies appreciating that intentions justify teleologically the
observed behavior (i.e., motivating and controlling it; Dennett
1987), and that success or failure in achieving goals matters to
the agent, that is, the world will be affectively appraised against
them (Frijda 1986; Ortony et al. 1988). Moreover, mindreading
should provide information on the goal of the observed action,
that is, the target-state in the SCM (Gallese & Goldman 1998;
Gallese et al. 1996). But there is no evidence that the model is
capable of explaining anything of the sort: Mirroring, paired
with action inhibition at layer 4, associates input with covert
motor activation, which in turn associates with simulative predic-
tion of the next input. Nothing of this, however, associates with
the target-state, that is, the proper goal the system should recog-
nize in the action of another agent. So it is doubtful that the SCM,
in its present form, describes the informational resources
enabling goal-based action understanding.
How could the SCM be amended to rectify these shortcom-
ings? First, it should accommodate the possibility that multiple
targets are active, so that facing the same input might yield diver-
gent pressures on the agent’s conduct. Even simple organisms
confront similar dilemmas, when a certain action (e.g., eating
in the open) can have conflicting results (e.g., foraging vs.
exposure to predators). Without allowing for multiple targets,
the SCM could never claim to enable proper deliberation, that
is, choosing the ends as well as the means. Second, the target-
state must be incorporated in the dynamic loop of action and per-
ception to provide a grasp on goal dynamics (Castelfranchi &
Paglieri 2007). Targets are abandoned, either in favor of better
options or because they are satisfied (cyclically or permanently),
while other targets emerge, either for instrumental reasons or
because something unexpected and rewarding interests the
agent. This requires supplementing the comparator mechanism
with new functions, including the possibility of registering a mis-
match between actual input and target without taking action –
because evaluation of the world need not always trigger an
attempt to change it. Third, the SCM must modify its interpret-
ation of mirroring to account for goal understanding: To this
purpose, target-states must be adequately included in the
mirror circuit.
Ironically, the moral seems to be that the embodied/enactive
perspective on social cognition should take the problem of “mind
detachment” more seriously. If the aim is to prove that higher
cognitive processes are grounded in bodily actions, better argu-
ments are needed to show how mental states, goals among
them, become increasingly detached from actions, in phylogen-
esis as much as in ontogenesis (Pezzulo & Castelfranchi 2007;
Tomasello 1999). This is indeed a noble quest – one that the
SCM has successfully pioneered, but still falls short of having
completed.
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Abstract: The shared circuits model (SCM) relies on well-regarded
theories of perception-action, mirror neurons, and forward models, but
the functional/informational level of the model limits its ability to
explain complex behavior such as true imitation. Data from our lab and
others confirm the more general details of the model, accepted by
most, but specify the neural mechanisms involved in perception-action
processes.
The shared circuits model (SCM) has much in common with
existing models of complex behavior and relies on some known
properties of the nervous system. For example, most researchers
no longer hold a pure version of the “sandwich model” and
assume that perception and action overlap at the level of rep-
resentation. Similarly, most agree that imitation exists on a con-
tinuum, with complex forms of true imitation relying on and
evolving from more simple forms of reflexive imitation.
In addition, there is general agreement that mirror neurons
and forward models are relevant to questions about how we
bridge the intersubjective divide and model others as we do our-
selves. Therefore, most of Hurley’s theoretical review is consist-
ent with existing theory and data on the mechanisms of complex
interpersonal phenomena, making it unlikely that anyone will
take issue with the basic premises of the model; on the flip
side, this also means that the model is limited in its ability to
stimulate new directions for the field.
The five-layer model is the unique contribution of the model.
However, I think that this part of the model suffers from being
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pitched at the functional/informational level. This is unfortunate
and unnecessary given that much of the theory relies on very
specific mechanisms for motor control and perspective taking
that are precisely defined and empirically supported. Hence,
the model could have been aimed at a functional neuroanatomi-
cal level, which would have made it more specific and more
accurate.
The model also seems both underspecified and overspecified.
In places where the literature is most agnostic on how certain
processes work, Hurley is also agnostic. For example, the
model intermixes concrete and abstract concepts (such as
“targets,” which can be either motor goals or life plans) without
specifying whether we use the same neural processes for both,
or just use analogous processes when planning to reach for a
cup or to overthrow the government. In contrast, the formulation
of the model into five discrete layers seems ill-fated, limiting the
ability of the model to accord with the structure and functions of
the nervous system. For example, layers 1 and 2 likely overlap a
great deal in the brain because both require the cerebellum and
act in concert to control action (cf. Wolpert et al. 1998). Conver-
sely, there is no reason from phylogeny or ontogeny to assume
that these two layers of control are primary to or evolved
before the mirroring mechanisms of layer 3. Layer 2 focuses on
visual and tactile feedback from the periphery, which are actually
slow forms of feedback that forward models were designed to
surpass. Layer 4 focuses almost entirely on “monitored inhi-
bition” to segregate activation related to self and other, but it is
unclear which type of inhibition is inculcated here (spinal,
brain stem, frontal?), and there are many other ways in which
self and other activation can be differentiated. Thus, it seems
that there are ambiguities and inconsistencies in the model that
could have been rectified by making more specific reference
to the existing data on how the brain processes information.
Our lab seeks to understand the ways in which people process
and understand the emotions of others. Like Hurley, we believe
that basic emotion processing and related intersubjective
phenomena, such as empathy, rely on an evolutionary conserved
and basic perception-action mechanism (PAM) whereby percep-
tion of the emotional state of another automatically activates
one’s own representations for the state and situation (Preston
& de Waal 2002).
Supporting Hurley’s general rejection of the sandwich model,
functional imaging work on empathy has found overlap between
self and other processes in regions associated with subjective
feeling states (Jackson et al. 2006; Lamm et al. 2007; Preston
et al. 2007; in preparation b; Singer et al. 2004; 2006). Further
supporting Hurley’s application of perception-action processes
to simulation, we have also found almost complete overlap in
the neural substrates associated with imagining a personal past
emotional experience and “trying on” the experience of another
subject; however, we also found differences in self and other pro-
cesses, which would not be predicted by the SCM, but are expli-
cit in the PAM (Preston et al. 2007). In this study, the overall
level of brain activation and autonomic arousal were much
higher in the self-condition than the other-condition, and sub-
jects recruited additional regions of visual association cortex
when imagining another’s scenario. These data suggest that
online simulation of actual, personal events can differ in both
quality and quantity from that of hypothetical events. Impor-
tantly, however, we found these differences between self and
other only when subjects could not relate well to the situation
of the other; there were no differences in neural patterns or auto-
nomic arousal when subjects selected scenarios to which they
could relate strongly (Preston et al. 2007).
This latter interaction reflects an important and overlooked
point about the processing of other’s actions and states: Perception-
action mechanisms require that the subject have an existing
representation for the action or state of the other. Thus,
monkeys do not have mirror neurons for hand manipulations
they do not understand, babies do not imitate gestures that
they cannot make, and people cannot resonate with an unfamiliar
emotional state and cannot predict your response to a truly novel
situation.
We have striking pilot data to support this emphasis on per-
sonal representations, as individuals with depression perceive
and respond to the distress of others differently than their non-
depressed counterparts – they are less personally distressed by
the sadness and hopelessness of hospital patients, and they are
more likely to feel empathy and offer help to patients with par-
ticularly high need (Preston et al., in preparation a).
In another behavioral study, we have found that the mere per-
ception of an emotional facial expression not only activates mir-
roring in a subject’s facial muscles (cf. Dimberg & Oehman
1996), and primes the same valence in the subject (cf. Murphy
& Zajonc 1993), but also rapidly activates the semantic-level rep-
resentation for the specific emotion (e.g., “fear”) (Preston &
Stansfield, in press) – this finding is not predicted by models
that exclusively rely on motor-based, facial feedback, or mirror-
ing of emotion processing, but it is obvious from basic facts
about how information is processed from perception to concept
retrieval.
It is exciting and promising to have many researchers agreeing
on some basic tenants about how behavior is instantiated – how-
ever, as with all complex problems, the devil is in the details. In
order to make additional headway from here on out, we must
look to the data.
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Abstract: It is argued that the multilayered model offered by the shared
circuits model (SCM) falls short of capturing an essential aspect of social
cognition, namely, its distributed nature. The SCM therefore falls short
of modeling emergent social cognition and behavior.
Disciplinary perspectives cut the same realities in different ways,
and so it is with philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, inter alia.
At times, these disciplined languages cross their linguistic bar-
riers and reach out to systematize knowledge at a level that super-
sedes the specific limitations imposed by their indigenous
language and competence. And, even then, the particular slice
of reality that we focus upon is conditioned by presuppositions
about the nature of the beast we are examining.
The shared circuits model (SCM) provides a tour de force of
portraying a multilayered account of social cognition, which is
somewhat specifically grounded on imitation, whereby imitative
learning is seen as a sophisticated form of social cognition.
While social cognition appears to be a central construct for the
SCM, the entire model is focused on an analysis at the individual
level. It is this aspect of the SCM that we intend to complement
in our commentary by drawing attention to the importance of dis-
tributed processes taking place between two or more individuals
and the emergent quality of social cognition. Indeed, much of
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what is presented with the SCM has convergences with a social
cognition model we advanced (Semin & Cacioppo, in press
a; in press b), although the social cognition model we have
advanced is cast in a different mold, in particular with respect
to the distributed processes taking place between two or more
individuals.
However, the SCM relies on reception, namely, the construc-
tion of inner neural representations based on observed behavior.
Second, social cognition is restricted to a reproduction metaphor
(e.g., empathy, resonance, imitation, shared representations,
or mindreading). Finally, the model attempts to provide an
answer as to how intersubjectivity is achieved. However, the
model remains at a purely representational level, neglecting
the reciprocal nature and co-regulation of social behavior. The
three R’s (reception, reproduction, and representation) are con-
ceptual consequences of relying on an individual-centered para-
digm. There is a problem when social cognition, especially social
cognition that emphasizes imitation, is centered on the individ-
ual, however. Cognition evolved for the control of adaptive
action, and social cognition evolved for the control of adaptive
interaction in response to evolutionary demands for the organ-
ism’s survival and reproduction, which for humans always takes
place in a social context (Caporael 1997; Fiske 1992), and
involves the co-regulation of action. Imitation of a parent by an
infant is not a solitary event in the service of social cognition.
Instead, the infant’s imitative behavior elicits an imitative or nur-
turant response by the parent, which not only reinforces the
infant’s imitative response but also establishes a connection and
constitutes a co-regulation of action by the parent and infant.
Any depiction of the social cognition of imitation that ignores
the interaction and emergent information between individuals
is incomplete.
Thus, social cognition is not driven entirely by inner pro-
cesses and representations as the SCM suggests, but relies
on resources that are distributed across neural, bodily, and
environmental features (e.g., Agre 1997; Brooks 1999; Hutch-
ins 1995; Kirsch 1995) with the social and physical environ-
ment supporting social action and interaction (Smith &
Semin 2004). As this example illustrates, two or more individ-
uals are capable of (a) joint work to perform a feat that super-
sedes their individual capabilities, and (b) co-cogitation and co-
regulation to achieve this joint feat. Co-regulation encompasses
qualitatively different forms of co-action. The first is entrain-
ment and is exemplified by periodic co-action and occurs in
cycles. This can be illustrated with the example of rhythmic
clapping (e.g., Neda et al. 2000). The second form is non-per-
iodic co-action illustrated by mimicry or imitation (e.g., Char-
trand & Bargh 1999). The third case is exemplified when
people have to perform a complex task requiring interfacing
each other’s actions (as in open-heart surgery or playing
tennis). The third case entails the execution of complementary
actions, namely coordination, in the pursuit of accomplishing a
task (e.g., successful surgery, winning in tennis).
Entrainment, mimicry, and coordination can obviously all
occur simultaneously and to different degrees during social inter-
action. Take, for instance, a dialogue. Any dialogue features a
variety of instances of multimodal coordination, entrainment,
and mimicry. A dialogue can simultaneously manifest coordi-
nation as in the case of turn taking in a conversation (e.g.,
Sachs et al. 1974), or introducing a new topic, at a syntactic
level (e.g., syntactic priming; Bock 1986; 1989; Bock & Loebell
1990) or at an affective level (e.g., mood contagion; Neumann
& Strack 2000). Simultaneously, it is possible to see cyclically
occurring instances of affective facial expressions (e.g.,
Dimberg et al. 2000) and breathing movements (e.g., Furuyama
et al. 2005). Coordination and entrainment can converge when
joint behavior is goal driven (e.g., playing tennis versus choral
singing): It can be consciously accessible or escape conscious
access (two people moving a heavy object versus emotional
contagion), or a combination of both.
If the aim of the SCM is to fully understand the bases of emer-
gent social cognition and behavior, then it has to incorporate a
level of analysis of interacting dyads and beyond.
Goals are not implied by actions, but inferred
from actions and contexts
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Abstract: People cannot understand intentions behind observed actions
by direct simulation, because goal inference is highly context dependent.
Context dependency is a major source of computational intractability in
traditional information-processing models. An embodied embedded
view of cognition may be able to overcome this problem, but then the
problem needs recognition and explication within the context of the
new, layered cognitive architecture.
Susan Hurley proposes a layered cognitive architecture to model,
among other things, the human capacity for understanding
people’s actions. We applaud the effort because we believe cog-
nitive science can benefit from pursuing alternatives to the tra-
ditional cognitive-sandwich account, especially when it comes
to higher cognition (Haselager et al. 2003; van Rooij et al.
2002). We do see one potential problem with Hurley’s con-
ception of how layers 3 and 4 of the shared circuits model
(SCM) implement our ability to understand the goals that drive
people’s actions.
According to the SCM, people understand why people act by
“mirroring” the “means/ends structure of observed actions”
(sect. 4, para. 5 [layer 3]). From reading the target article, it is
less than clear what mechanism underlies the activity of mirror-
ing, but Hurley seems to have in mind a non-inferential mechan-
ism in which goals and actions are directly coupled. According to
Hurley, this is made possible by the fact that humans can reverse
the direction of the goal – action associations generated by their
own goal-directed actions. As a result, Hurley argues, “observing
movements generates motor signals in the observer that tend to
cause similar movements” (sect. 4, para. 5 [layer 3]). When the
motor outputs are inhibited to prevent overt copying, then the
system is able to engage in a form of “mirroring [that] simulates
in the observer the causes of observed action” (sect. 3.4, para. 5,
layer 4 of the SCM).
This conception of inferred goals and their relationship to
observed actions is not unproblematic. It seems implausible
that a simple one-to-one association between action and goal
can account for the intelligent ways in which humans infer
goals from observed actions. Research shows that the goals that
people infer depend in complex ways on the context in which
the actions are observed. For example, the action “pushing a
button with one’s head” can suggest the goal “that the button
be pushed” (e.g., when the person’s hands are occupied
holding a towel), or the goal “that the button be pushed with
the head” (when the hands are free to do the pushing as well).
Even infants are sensitive to such contextual factors, leading
them to push the button with their hands after seeing an adult
push it with her head while holding a towel in her hands, but
pushing the button with their heads when the adult’s hands
were free during the action (Gergely et al. 2002). These obser-
vations underscore the problematic nature of Hurley’s idea that
“observing movements generates motor signals in the observer
that tend to cause similar movements” (sect. 4, para. 5 [layer 3]).
From the perspective of motor plans, after all, pushing a
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button with the hand is very dissimilar from pushing it with the
head, yet infants will “copy” observed actions of adults in dissim-
ilar ways if appropriate given the context.
Two defenses of the SCM could be formulated at this point:
First, one could propose that the action-goal associations in the
SCM are not necessarily one to one. That is, multiple goals
could become associated with one and the same action
(e.g., picking up a pen could be associated with writing, pointing,
giving, etc.), and multiple actions could become associated with
one and the same goal (the goal to go to work can be associated
with walking, biking, driving, etc.). By “mirroring” one could then
retrieve multiple (hypothetical) goals for any given observed
action. Although it is conceivable that our brains build complexes
of action-goal associations, the question remains how it selects
which of the – potentially very many – possible goals is the
most plausible or likely goal in the current context. It is known
that context sensitivity of such abductive inferences can lead tra-
ditional information-processing models into the problem of com-
putational intractability, be they logicist (Bylander et al. 1991),
connectionist (Thagard 2000), or Bayesian models (Cooper
1990). It remains a challenge for the SCM, or other layered archi-
tectures, to incorporate abductive inference processes that can
circumvent this classical intractability problem (e.g., Cuijpers
et al. 2006).
Second, one could argue that from the perspective of the
observer, two actions do not constitute one and the same
observed action if the context of the actions differs. The argu-
ment could go as follows: the notion of “observed action” is to
be understood to include relevant parts of the context (in our
foregoing example: whether the hands are occupied or not);
then a unique mapping from action-context pairs to goals can
possibly be achieved by a mere “mirroring.” Note, however,
that such a proposal serves only to move the problem from
understanding the role of context in goal inference to the
problem of understanding how people decide which aspects of
the context are relevant parts of the current action. This is one
of the many disguises in which the infamous frame-problem
shows itself (Ford & Pylyshyn 1996; Haselager 1997; Pylyshyn
1987): Figuring out the proper demarcation of what constitutes
an “action” is computationally no less challenging than finding
the most likely goal in a set of possible goals.
By claiming that goal understanding involves in part an infer-
ential process, we do not mean to suggest that the process is
necessarily conscious, controlled, or reasoned in any way.
The mechanism can be highly automatic, unconscious, and
even build on associative principles. Its implementation may
involve the so-called mirror neuron system (Newman-Norlund
et al. 2007), but it may also draw upon different neural
systems, depending on the nature or complexity of the inferential
task (e.g., de Lange et al., submitted). We see it as a challenge for
future research to reconcile functional, computational, and
neural explanations of goal inference in a way that explains how
people can effectively and efficiently make plausible inferences
about other people’s goals and intentions in contexts of real-
world complexity. So far, traditional information-processing
models have failed in this pursuit, due to the apparently insur-
mountable problem of computational intractability. This is not
the place for a full sketch of our views, but we would like to
suggest that an embodied embedded view of cognition may
prove useful in addressing this problem. First of all, Hurley’s
layered (rather than “sandwiched”) view of the cognitive archi-
tecture may invite an alternative, nontraditional conception of
the inferential task posed to the brain (e.g., van Dijk et al., in
press). Secondly, properties of world and body can serve as cog-
nitive resources that may reduce the computational complexity of
the inferential task (van Rooij & Wareham, in press).
In sum, Hurley’s model is to be welcomed as a nontraditional
model of action understanding, but the mechanisms behind
layers 3 and 4 need clarification in view of the computational pro-
blems they are supposed to be solving. Embodiment and
embeddedness may help to provide clues for such clarification,
although currently this is more a way to formulate the challenge
than to answer it.
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Abstract: Three related issues are addressed. First, Hurley treats
emulation and imitation as a straightforward dichotomy with emulation
emerging first. Recent conceptual analyses and “ghost” chimpanzee
experiments challenge this. Second, other recent chimpanzee experiments
reveal high-fidelity social transmission, questioning whether copying
fidelity is the brake on cumulative culture. Finally, other cognitive
processes such as pretence need to be integrated.
Susan Hurley’s target article is an extraordinary achievement.
I cannot judge her contribution from the perspective of philoso-
phers, but she has done those of us working on the empirical
sciences side of the topics she reviews a great service by pulling
together potentially mutually relevant discoveries and developing
specific models of how they might form evolutionary or develop-
mental cascades. Having said this, my three sets of comments are
rather along the lines of: “here are yet more empirical findings
with which any modelling needs to be consistent.”
1. Imitation and emulation. Hurley presents imitation versus
emulation as a clear and straightforward dichotomy, with
imitation emerging at a higher level in the shared circuits
model (SCM). However, recent analyses in animal social
learning studies have dissected emulation into several different
categories, some of which overlap with imitation under the
general heading of “copying” (Whiten 2006). For example,
when a chimpanzee matches whichever of two forms of tool
use they see (Whiten et al. 2005a), some level of copying is
implicated, and even if the matching to the model is in how
the tool moves rather than the bodily actions involved, it is not
so clear why this should not be regarded as a form of imitation
(copying what the model does with their tool) rather than
emulation (copying only the model’s effects in the world – how
the tool operates). Turning to the empirical evidence, I would
argue there is far less direct evidence for emulation in
nonhuman animals than Hurley implies. Rather, emulation is
often ascribed to an animal as a default explanation when the
animal evidences social learning that goes beyond mere
stimulus enhancement, but shows little or no imitative fidelity.
Positive evidence for emulation is harder to come by. If one
sees emulation as learning specifically about the environmental
results of actions alone, then one experimental design recently
developed becomes particularly significant in this regard. This
is the “ghost” experiment in which we discover what observers
learn from seeing only an action’s environmental effects, which
is what an emulation hypothesis suggests they are learning
about. In a recent experiment of this kind we obtained the
striking result that chimpanzees failed to learn the complex tool
technique involved (Hopper et al. 2007), despite having
demonstrated earlier that they would copy the particular one of
two such techniques they see performed by a chimpanzee
(Whiten et al. 2005a). In short, for learning the most complex
technologies they can handle, chimpanzees seem to need to see
another chimpanzee perform the act. This finding and the
handful of other similar “ghost” studies completed with
children and nonhuman species (for a review, see Hopper
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et al. 2007) may have profound significance for the kind of model
that Hurley has attempted to build, and more generally for
theories of embodied cognition and shared circuits.
2. Imitation and cumulative culture. Hurley embraces the
hypothesis that the evolution of imitation was the critical factor
enabling the emergence of cumulative culture in our lineage.
Some of our recent experimental results question this idea.
These concern the first “diffusion” experiments among
nonhuman primates. These experiments go beyond the usual
dyadic social learning paradigm (“What does B learn from A?”)
to examine transmission at the group level, which is what
culture requires. It is perhaps surprising that this has not been
done before, given that the interest of those conducting the
numerous dyadic studies in the literature is often in the
functional context of cultural transmission. We have now
completed seven such diffusion experiments of various designs
(including Chinese whisper “chains” A to B to C, etc., and also
“open diffusion,” where a model is introduced into a whole
group) with chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys, and in six of
these there has been a significant differential spread of the two
alternative tool use or foraging techniques we seeded in one
founder individual of each group (Bonnie et al. 2007; Dindo
et al. 2007; Hopper et al. 2007; Horner et al. 2006; Whiten
et al. 2005a; 2007). Thus, whether we describe the process as
imitation or emulation, there is sufficient copying fidelity to
sustain different traditions. It is therefore not so clear that the
brake on cumulative culture in nonhuman primates is lack of
copying fidelity. From the completely different perspective of
archaeology, Mithen (1999) makes a similar point: Acheulian
bifaces were complex enough stone artefacts that there can be
little doubt that imitation would have been important in
learning the knapping techniques required to make them, yet
the technology changed little for a million years. Ergo, imitation
was not the magic ingredient needed for cumulative culture.
3. A bigger picture than the SCM. Hurley draws several
different cognitive systems into the SCM, such as imitation and
theory of mind. In the spirit of seeing what may be a bigger
cognitive picture in which these are embedded, I suggest that
the relevance of the developmental theories of Leslie and
Perner also be considered. Leslie (1987) first suggested a
linkage between the capacity for pretence (a form of
simulation) which typically emerges in 18-month-old children
and the origins of theory of mind; Perner (1991) in turn went
on to develop a more elaborate theory explaining this linkage
and a suite of other cognitive capacities including mirror self-
recognition, means-ends reasoning, and understanding invisible
displacements. His theory explained these in terms of an
emerging capacity for “secondary representation,” in which the
child becomes able to simultaneously maintain a grasp on
primary representations of reality (e.g., “This is a banana; I can
see the marble”) and also entertain secondary representations
involving different perspectives on this reality (e.g., “I am
acting as if the banana is a telephone; you cannot see the
marble that I can see”). This is particularly relevant to the
attempt to identify developmental and evolutionary cognitive
networks and cascades, for Suddendorf and Whiten (2001)
reviewed extensive evidence that the great apes show a cluster
of cognitive attributes with similarities to those analysed by
Perner, including the recognition that one is being imitated
and the early stages of theory of mind.
Imitation and the effort of learning
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Abstract: Central to Hurley’s argument is the position that imitation is
“automatic” and requires inhibition. The evidence for this is poor.
Imitation is intentional, involves active comparison between self and
other, and involves new learning to improve self-other likeness.
Abnormal imitation behaviour may result from impaired learning rather
than disinhibition. Mentalizing may be similarly effortful and
dependent upon learning about others.
At the core of Susan Hurley’s thesis lies a claim that imitation is
an “automatic” process. This idea was famously espoused by
William James, who stated that “every representation of a
movement awakens in some degree the actual movement
which is its object; and awakens it to a maximum degree when-
ever it is not kept from doing so by an antagonistic representation
present simultaneously in the mind” (James 1890, p. 1134). This
is referred to as ideomotor theory (Brass & Heyes 2005) and has
been a commonly held position in imitation and mirror neuron
research in the last 10 years. Hurley takes a further step to
suggest that the evolution of inhibitory processes prevents
observed movements from being automatically imitated, and
this underlies the capacity for imitation to serve a simulation
“theory of mind.”
The notion of automatic imitation seems reasonable at a
common-sense level. We often copy others without thinking,
perhaps by adopting their posture or facial expressions as we
chat with them. But, do we really have an urge to imitate all
the actions we observe? And what about those actions that are
novel? Is learning by imitation simply a matter of observing
action and having these observations “awaken” previously latent
action plans already encoded in the observer’s brain?
An alternative view is that imitation is an active and intentional
process. This was the view taken by the Liepmann
(Goldenberg 2003), who conducted the first neurological
studies of imitation at the beginning of the twentieth century.
He saw imitation to be a form of ideomotor praxis, necessitating
the implementation of an ideation formed through action obser-
vation into an intentional motor act. Studies of action imitation
among infants and nonhuman primates would also suggest that
imitation is an effortful and selective process (e.g., Gergely
et al. 2002; Horner & Whiten 2005), partly motivated by the
promise of reward.
Laboratory evidence for automatic imitation comes from
several experiments (Brass et al. 2000; Kilner et al. 2003; Press
et al. 2005) that show an imitative action response to a cue to
be quicker or smoother than when the same response is non-
imitative. For example, the cue may consist of an action executed
by a mechanical object such as a robot hand. However cue sal-
ience may present an intractable problem with these studies
(Aicken et al. 2007; Jansson et al. 2007). Attempts may have
been made to control for differences in stimulus salience by
matching the visual luminance and size of stimuli, but it
remains that a human hand is probably more visually salient
than a mechanical hand. Moreover, Gazzola et al. (2006) found
that viewing a robotic hand activates the mirror neuron system
just as well as a mechanical hand does. This suggests that differ-
ences in action responses to robots and humans cannot be
explained to be the result of differences in ideomotor compatibil-
ity mediated by the mirror neuron system. Brass et al. (2005)
looked at whether inhibition occurs during action observation
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Inhibition
would predict activity in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex,
which monitors conflict and is active during such tasks as the
Stroop test (Amodio & Frith 2006). Brass et al. found activity
only in the inferior parietal cortex, reflecting greater differen-
tiation between self and other.
Williams et al. (2007) used fMRI to compare brain activity
between imitation and a condition where participants were
asked to enact a learnt alternative action to the one observed.
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Even at a liberal threshold, there was no greater activity for the
alternative action compared to the imitation condition. This
demonstrated no evidence of inhibition. In contrast, there was
much greater brain activity during imitation. Clusters of activity
were identified in rostral anterior cingulate cortex and lateral
orbitofrontal cortex. These findings can be understood in terms
of current models of motor control (e.g., Wolpert et al. 2001).
Imitation is another motor skill which relies on actively develop-
ing motor control in an incremental fashion. The effects of any
action plan being executed are experienced as consequences
for sensory feedback, which serve to modify motor planning
functions (cf. the target article). The role of mirror neurons
within our model (Williams et al. 2007) is to respond to the fide-
lity of the enacted action compared to the perceived action. Error
detection results in conflict-related activity in rostral anterior cin-
gulate and a drive to alter behaviour emanating from lateral orbi-
tofrontal cortex. Imitation is therefore an active process of
comparison between self and other, requiring continuous modi-
fication of action planning with an aim of achieving greater fide-
lity between self and others. Imitation is intentional, operates
within a social context, draws on a capacity for social judgment,
and involves new learning.
One form of pathological “automatic” imitation occurs as
echopraxia, described in people with autism or frontal lobe
lesions (Lhermitte et al. 1986) or those institutionalized with
schizophrenia. Such individuals may have increased sugges-
tibility, and impaired capacity for social judgment and flexible
rule learning. Williams et al. (2004) suggested that echopraxia
in children may reflect delayed rather than deviant learning of
imitation skills, because echopraxia places lower demands on
new learning.
Finally, to return to the central theme of Hurley’s article, what
are the implications of this for the relationship between imitation
and mentalizing? The demands placed by self-other matching on
new learning may also have a bearing on whether mentalizing
processes occur automatically or effortfully. Both imitation and
simulation “theory of mind” depend on comparing perceptions
of another individual’s experience with one’s own. Understand-
ing another individual’s thoughts or actions often requires new
learning and perhaps modifying one’s own point of view. Like
many other skills that are practiced daily, imitation and mind-
reading may appear effortless. The evidence and common experi-
ence suggests that it is quite often otherwise.
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Abstract: After offering a brief account of how we understand
the shared circuits model (SCM), we divide our response into
four sections. First, in section R1, we assess to what extent
SCM is committed to an account of the ontogeny and
phylogeny of shared circuits. In section R2, we examine doubts
raised by several commentators as to whether SCM might be
expanded so as to accommodate the mirroring of emotions,
sensations, and intransitive actions more generally. Section R3
responds to various criticisms that relate to the account of
social-learning Hurley proposes in the target article. We
conclude in section R4 by responding to a number of
commentators who argued for the limitation of control theory
as a framework for studying social cognition.
Introduction: Stirring the science
“Shared circuits” was Susan Hurley’s last grand project.
It set the agenda that might, in another possible world,
have allowed Susan and her commentators to begin to con-
verge on a unified and integrated understanding of some-
thing quite fundamental to human thought and reason: our
ability to know the minds of others, and of ourselves.
Susan’s goal was to show one possible way in which a
shared basic information space for perception and action
might be bootstrapped, function by function, into a grip
on self and other, thus providing the essential entrance
ticket to the rich realm of social cognition. This project
would close the circle, showing that the issues concerning
embodiment and dynamics (Hurley 1998) were never that
far away from those concerning social cognition, policy,
and the possibility of responsibility (Hurley 1989; 2003;
2006a).
Susan died before she could see this project into print.
But had she been able to do so, she would have been truly
delighted by the wide array of thoughtful, challenging, and
constructive commentaries that her shared circuits model
(SCM) has elicited. One special source of delight would
have been the sheer interdisciplinary diversity of the
responses. For Susan believed very strongly that a
proper understanding of minds, persons, and reasons
would emerge only from tough, cooperative, interdisci-
plinary work drawing on psychology, philosophy, neuro-
science, social science, and cognitive science. One
measure of the success of SCM is thus its capacity to stir
that larger scientific pot. In that, the treatment (as we
see) succeeds wonderfully. Moreover, there seems to be
significant agreement concerning many of the finer
details of the story. In our response, we try to do three
things: First, we briefly clarify the nature of the story on
offer; second, we highlight (and where possible respond
to) the main critical issues raised by the commentators;
and third, we showcase the exciting range of new sugges-
tions (and additional mechanisms) that the commentary
phase has uncovered. In suggesting the responses that
follow, we are acutely aware of our own shortcomings as
surrogate respondents. Some of the issues raised simply
exceeded our grasp of the subject area, the target material,
or both. Where this has arisen, we have simply remained
silent, and beg the readers’ (and the commentators’)
forbearance.
R1. The nature of the beast
One of the challenges facing an embodied and situated
approach to cognitive science is to map out a path that
might have taken humans from the basic kinds of
capacities for on-line adaptive response we share with
robots and nonhuman animals to distinctively human cog-
nitive abilities, such as the capacity for rational delibera-
tion and the ability to make sense of the purposeful
behaviour of other agents. The shared circuits model
Response/Hurley: The shared circuits model
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:1 41
(SCM) contributes to meeting this challenge. It describes
a set of mechanisms that might have taken humans and
their evolutionary ancestors from active perception to imi-
tation, mindreading, and deliberative, strategic thinking.
Each of the model’s five layers is given a functional
description, which deliberately abstracts away from
details of neural implementation. This is not to say that
the model is silent about implementation issues – it pre-
dicts a common coding for perception and action
implemented by the mirror system, for instance (see
sect. 2.2 of the target article). However, it leaves the
details of how each layer might be neurally implemented
as open questions for further investigation. At least one
commentator (Preston) took the lack of detail at the
neuroanatomical/functional level to be a weakness of the
model. Notice, however, that any explanation of how the
layers of the model are implemented in the brain will
itself most likely be a functional explanation. Preston con-
cedes as much in referring to a neuroanatomical/
functional level of description. Consider, for instance, a
putative explanation of how layer 3 could be implemented
in the mirror system. Such an explanation will identify a
widely distributed neural system that includes amongst
other regions the temporal lobe, the rostral inferior parie-
tal lobule, and the ventral premotor cortex. In virtue of
what do these separate neural regions form parts of a
single neural system that implements a mirror system?
Arguably, disparate neural regions form a part of a single
distributed system because of what they do – because
the cells at these regions have activation profiles that
make a contribution to realising a particular task. It is
true that SCM doesn’t tell us which parts of the brain
coalesce to form the different layers of the model, but it
does purport to describe what sub-tasks these parts of
the brain must perform if they are to contribute to realis-
ing a capacity for action understanding.
In this spirit, we propose interpreting SCM as having
two objectives. First, it offers a task-level description of
action understanding. Second, it identifies possible mech-
anisms that could do the work of accomplishing each of
these tasks. Action understanding is a multi-faceted
capacity, including the abilities to learn novel behaviours
by copying, to predict and explain other’s behaviour, and
to think strategically about one’s social interactions.
Hurley decomposes each of these complex capacities
into more basic sub-tasks. The different layers of SCM
describe possible mechanisms that could perform these
sub-tasks.
Consider SCM’s layer 3 as an example. Layer 3 ident-
ifies a mechanism for mirroring – the kind of behavioural
priming that occurs in us when we observe an action per-
formed by another person. Our observing the other’s
action makes us more likely to perform an action of the
same type, ourselves. Hurley argues that our capacity for
action understanding is facilitated by this tendency to
copy behaviours. As the behaviours we can copy become
more complex, so also does the repertoire of actions we
can potentially understand. Copying behaviour is there-
fore a sub-task one has to be capable of performing if
one is to get into the business of understanding the goal-
directed behaviour of others.
Now consider the mechanism SCM introduces to
explain an animal’s ability to copy behaviour. The mechan-
ism is not new to layer 3 but has already been introduced
at the previous layer to explain amongst other things the
motor system’s execution of fast, fluent sensorimotor beha-
viours. Thus, an explanation is being given of one aspect of
action understanding in terms of the same mechanisms
used to control sensorimotor behaviour. Often, sensorimo-
tor behaviour will require sensory feedback to be made
available faster than the sensory systems can supply.
A way around this problem would be for the motor
system to employ its learned associations between motor
outputs and the sensory consequences of those outputs
to make predictions about what will happen when a
given motor command is executed. In control theory,
these predictive models are called forward models.
At layer 3, forward models are run in reverse, so that a
system can, instead of predicting the sensory consequence
of an action, work out from an observed action the motor
commands that were the cause of this action. Running a
forward model in reverse thus produces a motor
command. Whether the system then carries out this
motor command is a further question. Most of the time,
the execution of motor commands arrived at exogenously
from observing the actions of others will be inhibited.
This makes good evolutionary sense, as Makino (and
indeed Hurley) notes: A creature that copied the beha-
viour of an approaching predator would not be long of
this world.
How does this mechanism of running forward models in
reverse explain an animal’s ability to copy behaviour?
When a forward model is run in reverse, the outcome of
this process will be the production of a motor command.
This explains why, when we observe another acting, we
are automatically primed to perform the same or similar
action ourselves. We have this standing disposition
because running a forward model backwards produces in
us the same motor plan that initiated the action in the
other person.
We can also see now what Hurley means when she
claims that a shared information space for perception
and action can also function as a shared information
space for self and other. Perception and action share a
common information space in part because perceiving
another agent acting causes our motor system to
produce the same or similar motor commands that were
the causes of that agent’s actions. This information space
can also be deployed in action understanding. Say I per-
ceive another person reach for and answer their mobile
phone. My motor system will now run a forward model
in reverse and produce the same or similar motor plan
that led the other person to reach and pick up their
ringing handset. This motor plan is now available to be
used by other subpersonal systems (layer 4 of SCM) to
make sense of the other person’s action and its causes.
However, the information my motor system makes
available doesn’t distinguish between motor plans that
are my own and have been initiated endogenously, and
the motor plans of another person that have been
initiated in me exogenously. In this sense, the information
space that perception and action share is also an infor-
mation space that self and other share. This sharing of
information makes possible a kind of direct, non-inferen-
tial understanding of the action of others. There is no dif-
ficulty at this level of processing about how we acquire
access to information about the causes of another
person’s actions. At this level of processing, the
Response/Hurley: The shared circuits model
42 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:1
information that is used to make sense of the actions of
others is intersubjective – it doesn’t distinguish between
self and other.
So far, we have proposed a way of thinking about each of
SCM’s layers, but of course a good deal of the model’s
explanatory work is accomplished by exploring possible
interactions between the layers. We have already seen
something of how one layer can borrow mechanisms
from an earlier layer and exapt this mechanism for a new
function. Hurley also describes some ways in which
layers might function together to achieve complex tasks
that each layer cannot accomplish on its own. Thus, the
forward models of layer 2 can be combined with a mech-
anism for monitored output inhibition introduced at layer
4 with the result that a system can begin to model possible
courses of action and assess the consequences of these
actions in advance of executing them. A system with
layers 2 and 4 can begin to engage in trial-and-error learn-
ing “in the head.” By combining the mirroring functions
made possible by layer 3 with the monitored output inhi-
bition of layer 4, we get a system that can distinguish
actions that are its own from actions that belong to
another. One difference between motor plans that are
endogenously produced and those that are exogenously
produced by observing the action of another is that the
latter tend to be inhibited. By monitoring inhibited
output, a system could thus acquire information that
could be used to distinguish its own endogenously
produced motor plans from motor plans it finds itself
with as a consequence of layer 3. Moreover, such a
system could use the information made available by
layer 3 to begin to make sense of the other’s behaviour.
Depending on the systems own repertoire of behaviour
and the associations between means and ends that fuel
its forward models, a system combining layers 3 and 4
could use its learned associations to understand the
means/end structure of the other’s behaviour. Layer 5
introduces a capacity for the monitored simulation of
inputs. This can be combined with layers 3 and 4 to gen-
erate information about the possible actions of others
and the causes and effects of such possible actions.
A system with this combination of layers can begin to
engage in strategic thinking and game-theoretic delibera-
tion about the action of others. (For more details on the
role of mindreading in strategic social intelligence, see
Hurley 2005a.)
R2. Linking layers
Many of Hurley’s commentators raised questions that bear
on the interaction among layers we have sketched, and it is
to these questions that we now turn. Chakrabarti
& Baron-Cohen’s commentary raises some challenging
questions about the developmental progression between
layers. Oberman & Ramachandran also wonder how
shared circuits might develop, but they raise questions
about both the ontogeny and the phylogeny of shared cir-
cuits. Are shared circuits hard-wired, learned, or a combi-
nation of both?
Hurley states that she doesn’t take SCM to imply a
single account of the development of capacities for imita-
tion, mindreading, and deliberative thinking. The number-
ing of the layers, she writes, “does not necessarily
represent the order of evolution or development” (sect.
4, para. 9). Rather, the model is intended to provoke
hypotheses that map the layers onto “specific phylogenetic
or ontogenetic progressions” (sect. 4, para. 9). In other
words, Hurley is not committed to a particular answer
about how the different layers might feed into a story
about the development of mindreading capacities.
Nor does she take a firm stand on the question of
whether a capacity for imitative learning is culturally
acquired or forms a part of our innate inheritance.
Hurley believed that questions of this kind would be
settled through close collaboration between science and
philosophy. Hence, she would have very much welcomed
Oberman & Ramachandran’s constructive suggestions
about possible experiments that might answer the
nature/nurture question as it arises for mirroring.
This is not to say that Hurley had nothing to say either in
her target article or elsewhere about these questions.
Indeed, she makes a concrete proposal about how mirror-
ing might have arisen. She begins by telling a Hebb-
inspired story about how cells might come to fire both
for others’ actions that are observed and for actions of
one’s own that are executed. (The story doesn’t originate
with Hurley, but can also be found in Goldman [2006,
Ch. 6] Heyes [2002; 2005], and Keysers & Perrett
[2004]) Suppose the action is one of grasping. Superior
temporal sulcus (STS) neurons that respond to obser-
vations of grasping behaviour might overlap in time with
activity in areas (e.g., PF and F5) that are involved in initi-
ating the grasping behaviour. As a result of Hebbian learn-
ing, the connections between STS and the motor areas will
be reinforced. The effect of this reinforcement will be that
cells in motor areas will fire both when the agent observes
his own movements and when he observes the movements
of others. Clearly, this sort of account is going to work only
for movements that the agent can see himself performing.
In order to account for the copying of facial expressions –
we can assume that an agent will often be able to copy
many facial expression without being able to see his own
face – Hurley introduces a number of different factors.
She concedes that there could be a role for innate supra-
modal correspondence between observed acts and an
observer’s similar acts, of the kind suggested by Meltzoff
and Moore’s (1997) active intermodal mapping (AIM)
hypothesis. Hurley also considers a number of other poss-
ible explanations for mirroring when one cannot observe
one’s own behaviour, including one in terms of stimulus
enhancement (sect. 3.3, para. 7, 8). We won’t repeat the
hypothesis. Suffice it to say that Hurley saw a role both
for learning and for innate capacities in explaining the
emergence of mirroring.
Could a creature understand the action of others but
lack a capacity for mirroring? Conversely, could a creature
have an unimpaired capacity for mirroring but be incap-
able of making sense of the behaviour of others? Answer-
ing these questions promises to have ramifications for how
we think about the relation between mirroring and layers 4
and 5 that do the work of explaining mindreading.
Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen suggest that psychopaths
may have intact mindreading abilities but deficits in affec-
tive empathy. Affective empathy is arguably explained by
the mirroring capacities introduced at layer 3, more on
which in a moment. Thus, psychopaths may present a
case in which we have intact layers 4 and 5 but a
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compromised layer 3. Subjects with autism spectrum dis-
orders (ASDs), on the other hand, exhibit impairments
in mindreading and affective empathy. Perhaps they
provide an example of what can go wrong when layers 3,
4, and 5 are compromised. Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen
present these two cases as an example of double dis-
sociation of mindreading and affective empathy capacities.
However, subjects with ASDs do not display the opposite
profile to that of psychopaths: they do not have intact
capacities for affective empathy but impaired mindreading
skills. Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004), for instance,
found that subjects with Asperger Syndrome scored sig-
nificantly lower than normals in a questionnaire testing
for empathic skills. Psychopathy certainly establishes the
possibility of mindreading without affective empathy, but
ASD does not, as far as we can see, establish the possibility
of affective empathy without mindreading. This casts
doubt on the suggestions that we here confront a clear
double dissociation. But leaving this issue to one side,
we want to focus on Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen’s inter-
esting claim that this body of evidence challenges the
claim that layers 3 and 4 are required for layer 5.
The first response we would make in Hurley’s defence is
that SCM makes no hypotheses about the development of
mindreading abilities, and in particular it does not expli-
citly claim that layers 3 and 4 are necessary for the emer-
gence of mindreading abilities at layer 5. We have just seen
how Hurley left as an open question how the layers of
SCM relate to the development and acquisition of mind-
reading abilities. Nevertheless, it is true that Hurley does
offer an explanation as to how a capacity for mindreading
might get started, and perhaps it is this story that
Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen mean to dispute. We will
first consider whether the explanation Hurley offers
commits her to the claim that layers 3 and 4 are required
for mindreading abilities. Second, we will assess whether
the latter hypothesis is really challenged by the disorders
discussed by Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen.
Is Hurley committed to the claim that layers 3 and 4 are
necessary if a person is to acquire the sorts of mindreading
skills made possible by layer 5? We have already explained
how Hurley took mindreading to begin at layer 4. Prior to
layer 4, the information a creature has available for making
sense of the behaviour of others does not distinguish
between self and other. This information can be used to
(implicitly) recognise and identify agents that behave in
ways similar to me. This recognition of the fundamental
similarity between self and other forms the basis for
empathy. However, mindreading – the interpretation
and prediction of other’s actions – begins with the acqui-
sition of a grasp of the self/other distinction. Once this dis-
tinction is understood, a creature can begin to attribute
mental states to the other – to interpret or “read” the
other’s mind. According to SCM, one acquires an ability
to distinguish self and other by acquiring a mechanism
for monitoring the inhibition of mirroring. The monitoring
of inhibited mirroring allows a creature to identify motor
plans that are not its own. With this understanding in
place, the creature can begin to populate the world with
other perspectives and decentre from its own situation in
the here and now to entertain other possible points of
view. This capacity becomes more powerful in creatures
that possess the representational capacities introduced at
layer 5, and can model not just possible courses of action
but can in addition model possible mappings from
sensory input to motor output. At first glance, then, it
would seem correct to attribute to Hurley the hypothesis
that layers 3 and 4 are required for layer 5. Layer 4
looks to be required for layer 5 since the former supplies
models of the outputs, which are used at layer 5 in the
simulations of complete mappings from inputs to
outputs. Layer 3 seems to be required by layer 4 since it
makes available the bi-directional simulations that are
taken off-line at layer 4. Thus, we might conclude on
these grounds that Hurley is indeed committed to the
hypothesis attacked by Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen.
Although there are strong grounds for attributing this
hypothesis to Hurley, it doesn’t seem to us to be strictly
entailed by SCM. SCM suggests an explanation of how
an animal might come to be able to distinguish itself
from others. If we accept the idea that mirroring provides
information that does not differentiate self from other,
some such explanation is required. However, the cases
discussed by Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen involve indi-
viduals whose capacity for mirroring is impaired. Such
individuals will not need layer 4 to distinguish themselves
from others, since they do not have information at their
disposal for which the self/other distinction fails. They
precisely do not identify with others empathically, nor
do they recognise themselves to be similar to others.
Although they do not need layer 4 to distinguish them-
selves from others, layer 4 could nevertheless continue
to work in conjunction with layer 2 to provide information
about alternative possible courses of action. Layer 4 could
continue to supply simulations of possible actions to layer
5. Therefore, it doesn’t seem out of the question that a
system could exhibit the sort of mindreading abilities
made possible by layers 4 and 5 despite having an impaired
layer 3.
Suppose we nevertheless concede that a fully intact
layer 3 is required for layers 4 and 5. Could an individual
with an impaired layer 3 nevertheless exhibit intact mind-
reading abilities? Possibly. Hurley concedes that even a
creature equipped with the sorts of sophisticated rep-
resentational capacities ushered in by layer 5 might not
have what it takes for full-fledged mature mindreading.
Mature mindreaders can track many different agents,
identifying them in a wide range of different situations.
Hurley suggests that language might well be required for
an “understanding of multiple others with multiple
alternatives and varying beliefs” (sect. 3.5, para. 2).
Suppose a person could acquire mastery of a language
without the use of layer 3 (a possibility challenged by the
claim that imitation is required for the acquisition of
language; but for a defence of this hypothesis, see, e.g.,
Arbib & Rizzolatti 1997; Iacoboni 2005). It would then
be possible for such a person to exhibit high-level mind-
reading skills despite lacking a capacity for mirroring.
Perhaps such an individual could acquire a theory of
mind by learning generalisations relating behaviour, the
environment, and mental states in much the same way as
scientists generate theories based on observations (for an
account of mindreading abilities along these lines, see,
e.g., Gopnik & Wellman 1992; 1994). Gallagher (2005)
suggests that a high-functioning autistic like Temple-
Grandin might deploy exactly this type of theorising strat-
egy to understand the intentions and emotions of others.
Gallagher writes of Temple-Grandin that she “reads
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about people, and observes them, in an attempt to arrive at
the various principles that would explain and predict their
actions in what she describes as ‘a strictly logical process’”
(Gallagher 2005, p. 236). We can imagine a psychopath
acquiring mindreading abilities in much the same way.
We conclude, then, that even if we were to suppose that
SCM entails the hypothesis that layer 3 is required for
layers 4 and 5 (something we are inclined to dispute),
SCM can still handle the case of psychopathy.
What about subjects with ASD? These subjects have dif-
ficulties taking up perspectives that are not their own, and
there is some evidence that this leads to difficulties in imitat-
ing (for a balanced assessment of this evidence, seeGoldman
2005). Hobson and Lee (1999), for instance, showed that
autistic subjects failed to copy behaviours that required per-
spective switching. In one task, the experimenter took a
wooden pipe rack in his left hand and held it against the
upper part of his left shoulder. With his right hand, the
experimenter took a wooden stick and strummed across
the ridges and slots of the pipe rack three times, making a
staccato sound. Of the 16 autistic subjects, 15 ran the stick
over the pipe rack, but only 2 of the 16 held the pipe rack
against their shoulder as the experimenter had demon-
strated. In order to copy the action, the autistic subjects
had to perform the same action in relation to a different
body, their own. First, they had to recognise the relation
between the action and the experimenter’s body. This
required them to switch from their own perspective to
adopt that of the experimenter. Having recognised the
relation of the action to the experimenter’s body, they then
had to switch back and re-enact this relation from their
own perspective. SCM would predict that subjects with
impaired mirroring and mindreading abilities would find
this sort of perspective switching difficult. Subjects with
impaired mirroring abilities will not identify with and recog-
nise others as similar to themselves. Furthermore, when
layers 4 and 5 are damaged, subjects will find it difficult to
detach from their own perspective. This is exactly what we
find in autistic subjects. We conclude that the deficits we
find in subjects with ASDmay also be consistent with SCM.
Hurley tells us that the non-negotiable parts of the
model concern (1) the explanation of mirroring as “an
exaptive reversal of online prediction” and (2) “the way
the actual/possible and self/other distinctions arise as
online processes are overlain by monitored inhibition”
(sect. 4, para. 9). We consider next the commentaries
that challenge each of these claims beginning with the
first of SCM’s non-negotiable claims. Whereas the set of
issues we have just considered relate to the interaction
between layers, the commentaries to which we now turn
question the use that is made of forward models and
sensory feedback introduced at layers 1 and 2 to explain
the capacities for mindreading that come on the scene
with layers 3 to 5.
Goldman worries about the attempt to explain the mir-
roring of emotion, pain, and other sensations by appeal to
lower-level mechanisms of adaptive feedback control and
forward models introduced at layers 1 and 2. He chal-
lenges a core claim of SCM that there are systematic
relationships between the mechanisms used in the
control of sensorimotor behaviour and those that underpin
our mindreading abilities. Similar concerns are voiced in
the commentaries of Heyes, Preston, and Chakrabarti
& Baron-Cohen. Heyes argues that the account of
mirroring at layer 3 may not be readily applied to intransi-
tive actions like facial expressions and gesture. Yet she
points out that much of the evidence for the mirror
system in humans comes from the copying of intransitive
actions, rather than the instrumental actions modelled by
SCM. Preston claims that there are no good reasons
from either phylogeny or ontogeny to claim that control
mechanisms like those found at layers 1 and 2 precede
the mirroring mechanisms of layer 3. Again the worry
seems to be that the appeal to control theory is inadequate
when it comes to explaining the sort of mindreading
involved in understanding others’ emotional experiences.
Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen wonder how SCM applies
to the processing of facial expression. They suggest that
the perception of emotions could recruit layers 4 and 5
to different extents, and that SCM makes no provision
for such a possibility. Preston can be understood as
raising a related concern when she cites evidence in
support of the claim that the perception of emotional
facial expressions activates semantic-level representations
for specific emotions.
We suggest two lines of response. First, it should be
recognised that Hurley never claimed to have identified
a set of mechanisms that can account for every aspect of
social cognition. SCM as it is described in the target
article is offered as an account of the understanding of
instrumental actions – actions that have a means-end
structure. Hurley claims that mechanisms from control
theory can explain this particular type of social cognition.
She claims that there is a systematic relationship
between the control and mirroring of instrumental
actions. If it should turn out that there is no such systema-
tic relationship between control and the mirroring of
intransitive or expressive actions, this would not harm
SCM, which claims only that such a relationship holds
for the case of instrumental actions. It is certainly an inter-
esting question as to whether SCM might be extended to
account not just for our understanding of instrumental
actions, but also for what Hurley calls “expressive
actions.” Indeed, this is one of the questions Hurley
raises in section 4.1.2, and we shall consider this possibility
in more detail shortly. It is surely worthwhile to ask how
many of our higher cognitive capacities can be explained
by appeal to the same basic mechanisms we employ in sen-
sorimotor behaviour. Natural selection often works by
taking mechanisms that already exist and tinkering with
them. It therefore makes good evolutionary sense
to suppose that the very same mechanisms that are used
to control sensorimotor behaviour might also serve a
very different function in making possible mindreading
and social intelligence more generally.
Goldman, Heyes, and Preston suggest, however, that
a different set of mechanisms might be required to explain
emotional mirroring from those described at layer 3. Con-
sider the following example of emotional mirroring.
I watch a couple arguing and I perceive the woman’s
fear at her partner’s anger: I see the fear written on her
face. When I see her fear, the same parts of my brain
are active as when I myself feel fear. Williams et al.
(2001), showed subjects Ekman faces expressing fear,
and found that when fearful faces produced increases in
skin conductance this response was also accompanied by
increased activity in the amygdala. (Ekman faces are
photographs of expressive faces used in emotion
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recognition experiments.) Adolphs et al. (1994) found that
patients with amygdala damage were poor at recognising
fear in photographs depicting facial expressions. As in
the case of mirroring of instrumental actions, seeing a
facial expression of emotion primes us to feel the
emotion ourselves. It would seem, however, that SCM’s
layer 3 cannot explain this type of mirroring. There
doesn’t seem to be anything analogous to a forward
model that could, in the case of emotion mirroring, be
run in reverse. When we feel fear, this feeling manifests
itself in some change in facial musculature. However,
the change in facial musculature we undergo is not a
means to achieving any end. We don’t intend anything in
this case, nor do we act in order to bring about what we
intend. Expressive actions like the facial expression of
emotions do not have a means-end structure, which is
just to say that they are not instrumental actions.
By way of a second response, we want to briefly consider
whether an account of emotional mirroring could be given
which builds on the sorts of control mechanisms Hurley
appeals to explain the mirroring of instrumental actions.
In an unpublished review of Goldman’s (2006) Simulating
Minds, Hurley writes that to understand how control and
mirroring are related outside the context of instrumental
actions and intention reading, an account must be given
of “how instrumental and expressive actions are related.”
She continues, “In my view, mirroring for expressive
action builds on the more fundamental, control-related
mirroring for instrumental action” (Hurley 2007, p. 11).
She doesn’t expand on this comment, but we will try to
fill out what shemight have had inmind, first by contrasting
her view of how simulations are involved in mirroring with
that of Goldman. On the basis of this contrast one of us
(Kiverstein) has developed a somewhat speculative sugges-
tion about how Hurley might have thought about shared
circuits as they arise in the context of emotional mirroring.
Along the way, we will also have some things to say about
how instrumental and expressive actions might be related.
Goldman and Sripada (2005) describe four accounts of
emotional mirroring, and plump for what they call the
unmediated resonance model (also see Goldman (2006,
Ch. 6). According to this model, when we see a person’s
facial expression of emotion, this directly causes in us
a similar emotional state: “observation of the target’s
face ‘directly’ without any mediation . . . triggers (sub-
threshold) activation of the same neural substrate associ-
ated with the emotion in question” (Goldman & Sripada
2005, p. 207). We come to share the emotion that the
other person displays because our observing this display
causes in us an emotional experience of the same type.
We can recognise the other’s emotion on this model
because we come to occupy a state that resembles that
of the target. Goldman and Sripada are proposing here a
simulation-based account of mindreading for the emotions
according to which we simulate the other person’s
emotional state by instantiating a process which, when it
functions properly, results in a state that resembles or
matches the target’s mental state. Simulation is explained
here in terms of the products (mental states and their con-
tents) of a mental process of simulation. If this is correct, it
is by first producing in ourselves a mental state that
matches or resembles the mental state of the target we
are seeking to understand that we become able to work
out which mental state to attribute to the other.
Hurley suggests in her author meets critics review of
Goldman’s book (2007), however, that there is a
process/product ambiguity in Goldman’s account of simu-
lation. One of the lines of evidence Goldman appeals to in
support of his account of emotion experience is the finding
that the same brain areas are active during the experience
of, and the recognition of, emotions. When these areas are
damaged, not only do subjects lack a capacity for a certain
type of emotion, but they also have difficulties in recognis-
ing this emotion on the basis of facial expressions. This evi-
dence suggests a similarity in the neural/functional
processes that subserve emotion experience and emotion
recognition within an individual. Goldman’s account of
emotional mirroring takes this similarity in processes to
be grounds for inferring a similarity in emotion experience
between observer and target. It is this similarity or resem-
blance that forms the basis for the observer’s attribution of
an emotion of a particular type to the target. Hurley argues
that interpersonal similarity of mental state of the kind
Goldman appeals to in his explanation of emotional
mirroring is not sufficient for simulation. Interpersonal
similarity of states does not count as simulation unless
an individual reuses his own mental processes to
drive his mindreading. Thus, Hurley proposes what she
calls the re-use conception of simulation, according to
which we come to recognise and understand what the
other is feeling by using the processes that take place in
us when we undergo an emotion episode of the same
type. It is our re-using this same process that explains
how we come to understand what the other is
experiencing.
Suppose we accept that similarity of emotional state
between observer and target is insufficient for mirroring,
but that in addition what is required for true simulation
is that the observer’s emotion recognition process must
use her own emotion experiencing processes for the
purpose of simulating the other. Now compare the case
of emotion mirroring with mirroring of instrumental
actions. The mirroring of instrumental actions is the
result of learned associations between movement and
the sensory consequences of movement. There will also
be learned associations in the case of emotion expression.
The changes in facial musculature, for instance, will have
sensory consequences. If Adolphs et al. (2000) are right,
there will also be somatosensory changes sometimes
throughout the body that are associated with a given
emotion. So just as in the case of instrumental actions,
there will be associations between the execution of an
expressive action and reafferent feedback.
There is, however, an important difference in the case of
expressive actions that we should mention. In the case of
instrumental actions, associations get set up between
motor plans and visual experiences of one’s own move-
ment, so that when an observer sees similar movements
performed by others the same motor plan is evoked.
(See the Hebbian account of mirroring sketched earlier
and in the target article [sect. 3.3, para. 5].) However,
the reafferent feedback that is available in the case of
emotion expression won’t include visual feedback: We
cannot see our own faces when we express an emotion
(except when we use a mirror), nor do we see any of the
other bodily changes that accompany an emotion experi-
ence. Thus, it would seem we run into the correspondence
problem in attempting to explain emotion mirroring. The
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correspondence problem is of course a quite general
problem for explanations of imitation, and one for which
various answers have been proposed. One approach
invokes general purpose learning mechanisms (see Brass
& Heyes 2005). Another introduces innate special
purpose mechanisms (see Meltzoff 2002b). We have
already seen how SCM suggests that the correspondence
problem may be solved by a variety of different mechan-
isms, but here is not the place to suggest how SCM
might tackle this problem as it arises for the case of
emotions. We flag this as a problem to be solved in
future work that develops an account of shared circuits
for emotional expression.
We now have the ingredients in place to sketch a poss-
ible way in which an account of emotional mirroring
might build on the connection between mirroring and
control that SCM describes. We come to recognise the
other’s emotion experience by re-using our own emotion-
experiencing processes. In the instrumental action case,
the processes for identifying the intentions that are the
causes of an observed behaviour are the same processes
we use to act ourselves. The same is true in the emotion
case: The processes for recognising emotion are the same
as (or better, they overlap considerably with) the processes
that cause the expression of an emotion. Are the processes
that cause the expression of an emotion the same as the
processes that cause intentional action? There may be
some crossover, but there will also be important differ-
ences. As Goldman, Heyes, and Preston note, there is
nothing like a forward model and visual feedback in the
case of emotional expression. This is why we cannot
simply take layer 3 and apply it to the case of emotion
mirroring. Let us, however, ignore these differences for
the moment and focus on some broad similarities.
Our own emotion-experiencing processes will include
motor processes that cause certain facial expressions and
the sensory consequences of these motor processes. The
actions that constitute the expression of an emotion will
be associated with these various kinds of sensory conse-
quence. Hurley argues that perceptual experience (see
Hurley 1998) is the result of tracking relationships
between sensory flows of information and motor beha-
viour (O’Regan & Noe¨ [2001a] propose a similar view).
A similar model would seem to be applicable to emotional
expression. To experience emotion, on this model, is to
track certain invariant relationships between an action
that expresses the emotion (e.g., a facial expression) and
the sensory consequences of this action. This tracking
ability forms a part of SCM at layer 2. We can keep
track of changes in flows of sensory information because
we have learned to associate movements with certain
sensory consequences. It is these associations that form
the basis for the forward models introduced at layer 2
and that are re-used at layer 3. Our suggestion is that
Hurley’s account of perceptual experience might be
extended to emotion experience so that, when we
undergo an emotion episode, what this involves is our
tracking the relationships between an action that is the
expression of this emotion and the sensory consequences
of this action. When we come to recognise the other’s
emotion, we do so by using the very same tracking abilities.
We come to recognise the other’s emotion by re-using the
same processes that form the basis for our own experi-
ences of emotion. We take this to be one way in which
emotional mirroring might re-use mechanisms introduced
at layers 1 and 2 to account for emotion experience.
Hence, we tentatively conclude that emotion experience
doesn’t present an insurmountable problem for SCM.
Rather, it presents an opportunity for the future develop-
ment of the model.
Preston reports a behavioural study (Preston & Stans-
field, in press) she interprets as challenging the sort of
account of emotion experience we have just sketched.
The findings of the study were that perception of an
emotional expression not only results in mirroring but
also, as Preston writes, “rapidly activates the semantic-
level representation for the specific emotion.” Presumably,
by “semantic-level” representation, she means that sub-
jects can identify and recognise the emotion. However,
on the simulation-based account of mirroring, this is pre-
dicted. The idea is that we use the same processes to
recognise emotions that we use to experience emotions.
We turn now to Hurley’s account of how the self/other
and actual/possible distinctions arise out of monitored
inhibition, which Hurley describes as the second non-
negotiable feature of SCM. Preston claims that it might
not be monitoring of inhibited output that generates an
understanding of the distinction between self and other,
and suggests that there are many other mechanisms that
might do this work. She does not, however, say exactly
what she has in mind. Furey & Keenan pursue a
similar worry and ask whether an account might be
given of an understanding of the self/other distinction in
terms of forward models and the work they do in dis-
tinguishing self-caused actions from externally generated
actions. Furey & Keenan discuss the case of auditory
verbal hallucination when subjects claim to hear voices
in their heads. They suggest that the misattribution in
this case might be explained by a malfunctioning
forward model which doesn’t perform its normal function
of enabling the subject to distinguish self-generated inner
speech from externally generated speech. We find this
suggestion very plausible. Furthermore, Furey &
Keenan’s idea of applying forward models and efference
copy to the case of inner speech resonates well with
Garrod & Pickering’s compelling account of the role of
forward models in interactive dialogue. However, we
take this suggestion to show that forward models can
help explain how a subject might acquire an understand-
ing of the difference between self and world. Part of this
understanding will include an ability to distinguish his
own actions from externally caused events, and efference
copy will no doubt have an important role to play in
such an explanation (see, e.g., Blakemore et al. 1999).
Notice, however, that this is not the same problem that
the monitoring of inhibited output was introduced to
solve. At layer 3, we have a single process that is involved
both in the execution of an action by the self and in the
observation of actions performed by others. The infor-
mation space for perception and action is therefore
a shared information space for self and other. Given this,
the problem is then to explain how a creature using infor-
mation that doesn’t distinguish between self and other
could acquire a grasp of such a distinction. The resources
Furey & Keenan describe might yield an understanding of
the difference between self and world and enable normal
subjects to solve the sorts of attribution problems these
commentators describe. However, it is not clear that
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these resources could help a mirroring system to differen-
tiate information that relates to the self from information
relating to others.
Northoff, meanwhile, asks some hard questions regard-
ing the exact form of the neural coding implicated by
Hurley, and suggests that the coding needs to capture
the relations between different stimuli and between
stimuli and motor actions. It seems to us that Hurley
would agree, and that relational coding (insofar as we
understand this notion) is indeed apt for many of the pur-
poses of the SCM. Whether Hurley’s story further
demands, as Northoff suggests, a radically new conception
of the self so as to reflect these relational elements, is a
matter we cannot resolve definitively. But elsewhere
Hurley speaks intriguingly of the self as a “dynamic singu-
larity” itself created out of a system of relations (see Hurley
1998, pp. 206–207).
Makino argues that the self/other distinction arises not
when the motor system monitors its inhibited outputs but
instead from a monitoring of failed actions. He raises some
interesting and important questions about how the motor
system works out which outputs to inhibit, and he suggests
as an answer that the motor system will tend to inhibit
output in cases when it is operating only with partial infor-
mation. This may be one way of making this sort of decision,
but it doesn’t seemobvious to us that all inhibited actions are
ones that would fail were they to be performed. Further-
more, it wasn’t entirely clear to us how to understand the
suggestion of monitoring failed actions. If this consists in
monitoring actions that the system fails to perform, then it
strikes us that this is just another way of talking about moni-
toring of inhibited input. We understand inhibition as the
default principle that the motor system operates on,
because inhibiting actions that the system has a tendency
to copy is adaptive. This default is overridden in some
cases, and the decision as to when this happens will be in
the hands of executive systems in the brain. We will return
to a related issue shortly in our discussion of the commen-
taries by Behrendt andWilliams.
Hove provides some nice examples of what he calls
“interpersonal synchrony” in which monitoring of inhib-
ited output might fail to generate an understanding of
the difference between self and other. In the sorts of
cases he has in mind, our actions are synchronised with
those of another person. Hove asks how we distinguish
our own actions from those of the other in these sorts of
cases. There is no motor output inhibition in the cases
Hove describes, so it doesn’t look like we can appeal to
this mechanism to solve the problem. Hove certainly
raises an interesting problem here, but it seems to us
that the sorts of cases his puzzle arises for are not the
ones layer 4 is introduced to explain. His examples of inter-
personal synchrony do not involve the copying of beha-
viour, so they do not meet Hurley’s definition of
mirroring, where mirroring is the process that occurs
when observing a behaviour primes the observer to
perform the same behaviour himself. We turn next to
questions relating to imitation.
R3. Imitation and mirroring
Williams and Behrendt both discuss the question of
whether mirroring is an automatic process, but arrive at
opposite answers. Behrendt asks how predictive simu-
lation, which he takes to require consciousness, can be
related to mirroring that happens automatically. It is not
clear why Behrendt thinks predictive simulation must be
conscious. Hurley takes layer 2 of her model, which is
the layer at which predictive simulation occurs, to describe
a subpersonal mechanism. Forward models do produce
simulations that may often involve motor imagery;
however, this imagery is not always conscious. Behrendt
notes how movement plans can be formed automatically
upon perception of a salient event. When this event is an
observed action, we have just the sort of mirroring that
layer 3 is introduced to explain. Behrendt points out that
traits and stereotypes can automatically elicit patterns of
behaviour, but again it is just this sort of case that SCM’s
layer 3 was introduced to explain. Behrendt also points
out that our motivation for copying in these cases may
often be social approval. Nielsen provides some exper-
imental results that support this idea. He suggests that
2-year-old infants will commonly be motivated to copy
behaviour because they want to share an experience with
the other, and he describes experiments in which 2-year-
olds were less inclined to imitate when not engaged in
social interaction. We think Hurley would have found
these results extremely interesting, but that claims about
what motivates us to imitate lie somewhat out of the
purview of SCM. It is an important and interesting ques-
tion as to just why we have a tendency to imitate, and it
is a striking finding that this tendency changes as we
develop. SCM, however, seeks to show that there is a sys-
tematic relationship between the control mechanisms we
use in sensorimotor behaviour and the understanding of
instrumental actions. It is a further question as to what
reasons we have for imitating when we do so.
Williams attributes to Hurley the claim that imitation is
automatic. He goes on to make a compelling case for the
view that imitation is an “intentional,” “effortful,” and
“selective” process. Williams describes how imitation
requires continuous modifying of action plans with the
goal of getting the agent’s actions to match the actions of
the model. Hurley is certainly committed to the claim
that the tendency to imitate is automatic, and that the per-
formance of imitative behaviour must be inhibited.
However, this seems to be distinct from the claim that
the performance of imitative behaviour is automatic.
This is precisely not the case. Normally, we copy beha-
viour covertly, not overtly. It is this covert copying which
Hurley claims forms the basis for the simulation routines
we use to understand the instrumental actions of others.
Mature adult humans can sometimes fail to keep imitation
covert when they have suffered damage to their prefrontal
cortex or when their caudate nucleus is overactive (Kins-
bourne 2005, p. 165). Kinsbourne notes:
Echopraxics do not walk through the world twitching in
response to every movement around them. They do not
imitate the rustling of the leaves and they do not imitate cars
screeching to a halt. One elicits echopraxia by being a
doctor, facing a patient, looking somber and purposeful, and
giving the patient tasks. (Kinsbourne 2005, p. 166)
So, even in this case, imitation is not wholly uninhibited.
Williams makes an interesting suggestion about echo-
praxia. As already explained, he rightly stresses the role
of social interaction in imitative learning. He suggests
that echopraxia may be understood as the result of an
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“impaired capacity for social judgement and flexible rule
learning.” Both capacities are required for imitative learn-
ing according to Williams. Thus, when either of these
capacities is damaged, the result is that subjects can no
longer imitate. We think that the executive areas of the
brain responsible for inhibiting imitative behaviour are
also very likely involved in regulating behaviour in accord-
ance with social norms and in flexible rule learning. Thus,
we wonder whether the difference between Hurley and
Williams on this point might not be so great.
Whiten and Heyes both put pressure on the con-
ception of imitation Hurley assumes in her target article.
Whiten objects to Hurley’s account of the phylogeny of
imitation where emulation comes first and imitation only
rarely follows. He rejects what he describes as the “dichot-
omy of imitation or emulation,” arguing that emulation
comes in a variety of different forms, some of which
overlap with imitation. In his ingenious and important
“ghost experiments,” chimpanzees witness only the
environmental effects of the complex use of a tool. If the
chimpanzees were able to learn through emulation, it
ought to be sufficient for them to just observe the goal-
directed action. However, Whiten found that chimpanzees
could learn the complex use of a tool only by perceiving
another chimpanzee (not a “ghost”) use the tool. The sug-
gestion seems to be that, at least for complex techniques,
chimpanzees cannot figure out their own means to achiev-
ing an end. To learn a complex technique, they must copy
both ends and means.
Before we explore some ways in which Hurley might
have thought about the relation between emulation and
imitation, we should briefly note that she was certainly
no sceptic about imitative behaviour in animals. She was
keen to stress just how complex imitative behaviour is,
requiring as it does that an animal execute movements
from its behavioural repertoire in a new way to achieve
some desired result. This requires what she describes as
the “flexible interplay of copying ends and copying
means; a given movement can be used for different ends
and a given end pursued by various means” (sect. 2.1,
para. 5). Hurley doesn’t deny that some animals are
capable of this kind of complex behaviour. She notes, for
instance, that in the artificial fruits experiments chimpan-
zees will imitate selectively only when the method for
opening the fruit is the most efficient. Elsewhere
(Hurley & Chater 2005b), she discusses and seems to
endorse Byrne and Russon’s (1998) finding of program-
level imitation in gorillas and orangutans. Program-level
imitation occurs when animals learn to copy a specific
sequence of behaviours for the performance of a task,
such as the preparation of a particular type of plant for
eating. Thus, although Hurley certainly insists on a distinc-
tion between imitation and emulation, and insists that imi-
tation is phylogenetically rare, she was no sceptic about
nonhuman imitation.
Hurley did, however, insist that the capacity for social
learning varied across species. She identifies two factors
that contribute to this variation (sect. 3.3, para. 9):
(1) The grain and complexity of instrumental control
capacities
(2) Considerations concerning which of the many
control capacities have associated mirroring functions
and how richly and flexibly these mirroring circuits can
be linked
Some animals will be capable of performing instrumental
actions that are more complex than others, where com-
plexity of behaviour is a function of “means/ends chains
of differing grains and lengths” (sect. 3.3, para. 11). An
animal that combines multiple behaviours in ways that
are appropriate to achieving a given end will be capable
of forming predictive models that are much richer in struc-
ture than will an animal that can perform only simple
behaviours to achieve its ends. Mirroring takes the instru-
mental associations between means (a motor program) and
ends (the consequences of performing an action) that
provide the information for predictive simulations and
uses these associations to mirror the cause of another’s
movement. Animals that employ predictive models that
are rich in structure will be capable of mirroring instru-
mental actions that are equally rich in structure. The
potential for social learning in such an animal will be
much greater than that in animals that are only capable
of simple behaviours and predicting the consequences of
those simple behaviours. Hence, Hurley concludes that,
“Mirroring and simulation might provide information
about the goals of certain observed movements, given
fine-grained, complex means/end associations but not
given coarser control capacities” (sect. 3.3, para. 13).
Animals whose behaviour has a rich means/end structure
will be capable of complex forms of mirroring, and it is this
mirroring that forms the basis for social learning. Animals
whose behaviour lacks this structure will be capable only
of movement priming or perhaps of goal emulation.
Heyes questions what she describes as Hurley’s con-
junctive conception of imitation. According to the conjunc-
tive conception, imitation requires both (1) observational
learning, as when an agent learns an instrumental relation-
ship between a bodily movement and its effect, and (2)
a capacity for copying, where this involves the ability to
perform the observed body movement. Heyes suggests
that observational learning should be distinguished from
copying. It is not clear to us whether she thinks copying
is sufficient for imitation. We would question such a
claim. Copying seems to be a type of behaviour that
could be manifested by creatures that are only capable
of what Hurley calls stimulus enhancement: The action
of another animal draws the observing animal’s attention
to a stimulus, and the stimulus then triggers an innate or
previously learned response. Copying also seems to
occur in cases of movement priming, when observing
a bodily movement primes an animal to perform a
similar movement, but not as a means to an end. It
seems to us that copying has to go together with observa-
tional learning if the animal is to be correctly described as
having learned through imitation – that is to say, by per-
forming some sequence of movements from its beha-
vioural repertoire in a new way so as to achieve a
desired result. We would not describe an animal as
having learned through imitation if the animal doesn’t
understand the instrumental relationship between per-
forming some bodily movements and achieving its ends
or goals.
Longo&Bertenthal describe experiments that seem to
challenge the connection SCM describes between mirror-
ing and imitation. They argue that in some contexts the
motor system will just copy movements and in other con-
texts themotor systemwill copy goals. They describe a para-
digm in which subjects are shown a computer-generated
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hand performing movements, some of which are possible
and others of which are impossible. They found that sub-
jects attempt to copy both the possible and impossible
movements unless their attention is explicitly drawn to
the manner in which the movements are being performed.
It is not clear to us what the instrumental action is in this
experiment. What are the means and ends? What is the
computer-generated hand moving its hand to do? Given
that it is unclear what the goal of the movement is in this
case, it is hard to assess whether subjects were just
copying the movements in the first set-up and the goals in
the second (once their attention was drawn to the manner
in which the movement was performed). We think it
would be interesting to run the same experiment again,
but this time to have the computer-generated hand expli-
citly perform movements with the end of achieving some
goal. In one case, the end could be performed by means
of biomechanical movements that are impossible for the
human hand, and, in the second case, by movements the
human hand could perform.
R4. Beyond shared circuits
Apart from the large raft of questions concerning the
details of the inter-layer transitions, relations, and inter-
actions, a number of commentators raised questions of
scope. How much can the shared circuits model, with its
strong commitment to a single kind of model and mechan-
ism (a control-theoretic account of simulation and mirror-
ing, pursued through a cascade of stepwise refinements)
really explain? As the advertising would have it, the
model aims to reach and illuminate “imitation, delibera-
tion, and mindreading.” But does it really have the
resources to do so? More accurately, just how much of
our understanding of the minds, goals, and intentions of
other agents can be explained using the kinds of resources
Hurley so ably displays?
In much this vein, Carpendale & Lewis worry that the
model “fails to reach action understanding because it relies
on mirroring as a driving force.” Their key charge is that
mechanisms of mirroring are simply too unintelligent to
yield much in the way of action understanding. I may
see you point at something, and that may automatically
activate a pointing tendency in me (even if it is inhibited),
but what does that tell me about why you are pointing?
What is missing, they suggest, is “experience in shared rou-
tines.” Carpendale & Lewis are right, we think, to identify
these kinds of limits in the direct application of the model.
For mirroring circuits do, indeed, only deliver information
about others’ goals and intentions for classes of actions
whose purpose is already appreciated: the act of using a
tool to get food, for example. Even to intelligently
combine the meanings of already-understood actions (to
understand, for example, someone’s pointing to a tool
that is being used to get food) would be a cognitive task
whose successful undertaking plausibly requires more
than the kinds of circuitry discussed in the target article
alone.
This kind of worry is also prominent in the commentary
by Preston, who, while agreeing that many basic percep-
tion-action mechanisms are preserved in our higher-level
understandings, notes that such mechanisms require the
agent to already command an understanding of (or at
least, some form of representation of) the type of action
or state at issue. Closely related issues are raised by van
Rooij, Haselager, & Bekkering [van Rooij et al.],
who note that direct simulation (used to mirror the
means-end structure of observed actions) is often
inadequate to reveal the goal of (or the intentions
behind) an action. This is because our actual understand-
ing of the operative goals and intentions is often pro-
foundly affected by the context in which the action
occurs. As a result, there is no one-to-one relation
between actions (conceived as sets of motor signals) and
goals.Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen, in their incisive dis-
cussion of some possible shortcomings of the SCM, point
out that in many cases one needs to understand that the
intention of the other is that you should do something
different to (but complementary to) their own action.
For example, two people can carry a heavy log, but not
by copying each other’s actions, which will be log-end-
specific. Here, the automatic activity of the mirroring
system seems more of a liability than an asset (but see
our remarks later on the commentary by Hove, for one
possible solution, consistent with the spirit of the SCM).
Yet another way of raising the same kind of issue is use-
fully displayed by Paglieri & Castelfranchi, who suggest
that SCM is hamstrung by its failure to consider some
additional roles of goal-states, namely, their role in (not
just control but also) “evaluation and motivation”: that is,
in deciding upon appropriate goals for our own and
others’ actions, and in evaluating the actions in terms of
those newly arrived-at goals. These elements are clearly
central both to the understanding and the generation of
intentional action. But they do not seem to be naturally
captured, at least in any of the more advanced flavours
we have just been discussing, by the bedrock story about
mirroring and shared information spaces for perception
and action.
All this, we feel, is exactly as it should be. It was not
Hurley’s aim to offer a single kind of mechanism as a cog-
nitive panacea, capable (all on its own) of explaining all
aspects of human intelligent performance. Rather, the
story is better seen as an attempt to display one key ingre-
dient in such stories – one that has the virtue of first
appearing (in basic form) at quite low levels of cognitive
sophistication, and then making a contribution at many
later stages. But intelligent human performance is not to
be understood as flowing solely from the operation
of that key ingredient alone. Rather, the ingredient is
one enabling element in a larger story, whose full shape
has yet to be determined.
Several commentators made helpful suggestions con-
cerning such additional mechanisms. The basic story,
Whiten suggests, might well need to be combined with
an account that displays a developing capacity for “second-
ary representation” (Perner 1991), allowing us to maintain
multiple perspectives simultaneously on a single physical
event. Iacoboni reports the exciting discovery, in human
frontal cortex, of what Iacoboni and Dapretto (2006) dub
“super mirror neurons” that seem to modulate the activity
of standard mirror neurons in various ways. Such modula-
tory effects look to offer one possible mechanism by means
of which an increasingly intelligent use of the mirror
system itself may be enabled. Longo & Bertenthal,
while also noting the general limitation that mirroring
requires the presence of the target action in one’s own
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repertoire, report work (Longo et al., in press) that puts
this fact to use as a way of demonstrating the existence
of mirroring at many levels of grain or abstraction.
Longo & Bertenthal also report developmental studies
showing the “progression of inhibitory control over mirror-
ing responses.” Therefore, although there is clearly an
important issue to be resolved concerning the increasingly
intelligent use of shared circuits, there seems no reason to
doubt their role as a functional element in a wide variety of
sophisticated forms of reason and understanding. We
agree with Goldman, however, that it is not clear that
control theory alone will provide a sufficient framework
within which to accommodate and understand the full
gamut of mechanisms active in our understanding of self
and of others.
One specific area where many commentators felt that
the SCM fell short was in accounting for various forms
of joint action and joint attention. Thus, Hove notes that
interpersonal synchrony raises issues that do not arise in
most cases of imitation and mirroring. To synchronize
our actions with those of another (as in the log-carrying
case suggested by Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen), we
may need to predict what the other will do and to act
accordingly.
Semin & Cacioppo go further, arguing that despite
presenting itself as a model of social cognition, SCM as
it stands is an individualistic model that fails to account
for the co-regulation of action or the distributed nature
of real social cognition. Thus, imitative behaviour, for
example, is not just about the reproduction of behaviour
but additionally helps establish connections between indi-
viduals that support the co-regulation of action. The point
about establishing connections is expanded by Nielsen,
who notes that some forms of imitation and interpersonal
synchrony may be best understood as what Freeman
(2000) calls “technologies of social bonding.” The point
about co-regulation, if we understand it correctly, is that
the resources that guide and explain the behaviours of
the collective (which may be as small as two) are them-
selves distributed across the agents and (perhaps)
aspects of the situation. Examples of co-regulated beha-
viours include cases of mutual entrainment, such as rhyth-
mic clapping, and cases of complementary action of the
kind previously described (where a complex common
task requires different but matching actions by multiple
agents).
Despite laying out this missing territory in compelling
detail, Semin & Cacioppo remain silent on just how
such phenomena may best be accommodated. A promis-
ing suggestion is made by Hove, who notes that one key
may be the use of the kinds of predictive simulation
stressed by the SCM, but with some of the predictions tar-
geting the actions of others and the joint effects of the
actions of self and other. A concrete example of how
shared circuits may contribute to one specific form of
joint action is given in the thoughtful contribution by
Garrod & Pickering, who focus on the potential role of
such circuits in dialogue. Here, there is emerging evidence
that agents use their own production systems to generate
predictions about the other person’s speech output, in a
way that aids their own comprehension. This is a neat
example of one way in which the kinds of action/percep-
tion found in layer 3 of the SCM may contribute to what
are intuitively much “higher” cognitive capacities.
Several commentators note a prima facie challenge to
Hurley’s heavy use of control theory as a framework for
SCM. Thus, Goldman notes that although there is
strong evidence for the role of efferent copy and reafferent
input in the domain of perception and action, no such
body of evidence exists for many of the other domains
(such as that of pain, feelings, and emotions – for the
latter case, see also the contribution by Preston and our
own comments in section R2) where various shared cir-
cuits also seem to enable mirroring and simulation to
occur. This calls into question, Goldman suggests, the
guiding idea that a control-theoretic perspective is apt as
a general framework for all “shared circuit”-style phenom-
ena. In its place, he proposes a Hebbian learning paradigm
in which associative learning binds together various forms
of neural activation. Oberman & Ramachandran reject
the Hebbian alternative as a sufficient account of the
development of F5 mirror neurons themselves, on the
grounds that one still needs to explain why some F5
neurons end up having mirror properties while others do
not. Goldman might (indeed, probably would) accept the
existence of what Oberman & Ramachandran call “special-
ized mechanisms and hardwired constraints” for this
special population, while still rejecting (but again, see
our comments in section R2) any generalization of the
control-theoretic explanatory apparatus to other domains
in which mirroring and mindreading also seem to occur.
At least one of us (Clark) is inclined to the view that the
choice of a single control-theoretic perspective to
address all such phenomena would indeed be premature.
It seems unlikely that all the work required can be
achieved by any single kind of mechanism. Nonetheless,
the attempt to display a wide variety of mirror-system
phenomena from a control-theoretic perspective strikes
us as eminently worthwhile. Subsequent departures from
that perspective, and the exploration of additional kinds
of mechanism and explanatory framework, can then be
motivated and described on a case-by-case basis.
We would like to end by flagging, once again, what we
take to be the central contribution of the SCM, which is
the suggestion that social cognition is continuous with
more basic cases in which we perceive the actions of
others by means that involve (and not merely as collateral
effects or learnt associations) one’s own capacities for
similar actions. In this way, Hurley posits a “shared infor-
mation space” as a starting point for our explorations
of interpersonal space and as a lever for our coordinated
action. The problem facing the intelligent agent is then,
not so much how to learn about the minds of others, as
how to separate her own mind from the minds of others.
Insofar as this is correct, it turns much of the standard dis-
cussion inside out. “Mindreading” becomes the norm,
though at the cost (Star Trek fans will recognize) of a
Borg-like threat of mutual cognitive dissolution. By moni-
tored inhibition of output, we nonetheless end up extrud-
ing a genuine (but perhaps fragile?) self/other distinction
in the face of (and without ever disabling) those basic ten-
dencies of automatic copying and simulation. Such a story,
if it is true, matters in ways that go far beyond the immedi-
ate concerns of the cognitive scientific community. It
matters for policy, for education, for psychiatry, and for
our own self-understanding as a species. Hurley herself
was keenly aware of this larger picture, and we would rec-
ommend that interested readers consult her powerful
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paper, Hurley (2006a), revealingly entitled “Bypassing
Conscious Control: Media Violence, Unconscious Imita-
tion, and Freedom of Speech.”
Much, to be sure, remains unresolved. Hurley’s story, at
least in its broadest outlines, is compatible (as many com-
mentators rightly observed) with a wide variety of ways of
“filling in the mechanisms” and of linking (or even identi-
fying) the putative layers. But whatever the details, there
seems something deeply right about the guiding spirit.
That spirit is a vision of the human mind as fundamentally
social, as an evolved organ not of solipsistic individual cog-
nizing, but of social and communal co-cognizing. That kind
of talk is not unfamiliar (especially to those working in
developmental science), but it has not yet informed the
shape of the cognitive scientific mainstream. Hurley’s
great achievement is to place this kind of model center
stage, and to do so in a way that – as we have seen – is
both concrete enough to raise questions of detail, scope,
and adequacy, yet general enough to invite constructive
elaboration for many years to come.
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